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A b s t r a c t
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance theory established the foundations 
of capital structure theory. They showed that, in a capital market free of taxes, 
transaction costs, asymmetric information, and other frictions, the value of the 
film is independent of its capital structure choice. Most o f the capital structure 
theory development that followed tested the irrelevance theory with more 
realistic assumptions regarding market frictions and information asymmetries.
The vast amount of empirical research into the extent and effects o f bankruptcy 
costs and taxes on capital structure, as well as cross-industry and cross-country 
examination of observed capital structure, led to the mainstream view that firms 
act as if  there is a unique, optimal capital structure that results from the trade­
off between tax and agency cost benefits of increased debt use and the 
increased bankruptcy and agency costs that higher levels o f debt entail.
As an alternative to the trade-off model, Myers (1977) put forward the Pecking 
Order hypothesis of capital gearing. This states that because of information 
asymmetry and different stock market reactions to debt and equity issues, firms 
follow a “pecking order” in their financing decisions, i.e. they would first prefer 
to use internal funds rather than issuing securities. If forced to resort to 
external financing they would use debt before equity.
Section one of this study undertakes a comprehensive review of the theoretical 
literature 011 capital structure to date, emphasising those theories that are more 
pertinent to the empirical study carried out in section two.
Another school of thought which tries to explain the use of debt is transaction 
cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1996), which sees debt and equity as two
iv
governance mechanisms, the choice between which is strongly dependent on 
asset specificity.
Empirical tests are carried out in this study using regression analysis to try to 
establish whether the capital structure of firms in the UK hotel and retail 
industries is better explained by a pecking order model or by a target 
adjustment model.
The last chapter presents an empirical analysis of different variables that are 
likely to influence the observed capital structure patterns. This panel data 
analysis assesses the role of size, earnings volatility, profitability, asset 
structure, non-debt tax shields, leasing and management contract (this latter is 
specific to the hotel industry) variables on gearing ratios.
The conclusions of the empirical study are that the industiy data analysed are 
much better explained by the target adjustment model than the pecking order 
model. However, a number of independent variables appear to contribute to the 
“target adjustment effect” and the debt tax shield is just one of them.
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Chapter 1
In tr o d u c tio n  an d  O b jec tiv es
1.1. Introduction
Modem capital structure theory was bom with the publication o f Modigliani 
and Miller’s capital structure theoretical model in 1958. They showed that, in a 
capital market free o f taxes, transaction costs, and other frictions, the choice o f  
firm’s capital structure could not affect its market valuation -  because investors 
could make or unmake any level o f gearing they desired by borrowing or 
lending on personal account. Much o f the history o f capital structure theory 
during the past forty years has involved examining how robust the model is to 
more realistic assumptions regarding market frictions and the information sets 
available to managers and shareholders. The development o f agency theory in 
the 1980s, coupled with detailed research into the extent and effects o f  
bankruptcy costs during the 1980s, lead to a yet more detailed view o f the 
utility o f the basic M&M capital structure theory. Cross-industry and cross- 
cultural examination o f observed capital structure patterns in US and other 
industrialised countries lead to the mainstream view that corporations act as if  
there is a unique, optimal capital structure for individual firms that results from 
the trade-off between the tax benefits o f increasing gearing and increasing 
agency and bankruptcy costs that higher debt entails.
The mainstream model has not reigned unchallenged (Megginson, 1995, 
Chapter 7). Numerous researchers, particularly Myers, have pointed out real 
“blind spots” that the trade-off theory cannot explain. This is particularly true 
o f the observed stock market reaction to gearing-increasing and gearing- 
decreasing transactions, which consistently yield stock price increases and
l
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decreases respectively. As an alternative to the trade-off model, Myers (1977) 
put forward his Pecking Order hypothesis o f corporate gearing. It predicts that 
firms will prefer internal financing to issuing securities, and i f  forced to resort 
to external financing will use debt before equity. This model explains some 
observed patterns in corporate finance, including the tendency o f firms not to 
issue stock and their choice to hold large cash reserves and other forms o f  
“financial slack”.
Various signalling models o f capital structure have also been proposed which 
suggest that managers use leverage to signal firm prospects to poorly informed 
outside investors (Ross, 1977). These models generally predict that the firms 
with the best earnings and growth prospects should employ the most gearing, 
which is the opposite o f observed behaviour.
The property rights literature regards financial instruments as commitment 
devices and focuses on the control aspects o f these instruments (Hart 1996, 
Chapter 5). These instruments are viewed as defining both the allocation o f the 
control rights to the return streams and residual control rights.
Transaction cost economics explains the use o f debt and equity as governance 
instruments rather than simply as financial instruments. These can be matched 
to the asset attributes o f individual investment projects (transactions) in order to 
ensure the lowest cost o f transacting (Williamson, 1996, chapter 12). 
Transaction cost economics sees asset specificity (the degree o f non­
redeployability) as the determining factor in the choice between equity and 
debt. It predicts that low specificity projects should be debt financed while 
equity should be used for funding high specificity projects.
The above mentioned theories and the models derived from them have 
identified several variables that are likely to explain the observed capital
2
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structure patterns. Some o f them are profitability, earnings volatility, growth 
opportunities, asset structure, non-debt tax shields, etc.
1.2 Research Objectives
This study starts a comprehensive review o f the theoretical literature on capital 
structure, and than proceeds to a thorough empirical study to test models 
derived from these theories in a U.K. setting, with particular reference to 
capital structure in the U.K. retail and hotel industries. The thesis contributes 
to the explanation o f the firm’s financing decisions by combining different 
theories and econometric methods used by earlier empirical studies in this field.
Hotel and retail industries were chosen because it was felt that service 
industries tend to be left out o f most o f the capital structure studies, which 
concentrate mainly in what are known as mainstream industries. Hotel and 
retail firms exhibit different asset structures. Hotels tend to have large amounts 
o f relatively less specific assets while that it is not the case for the retail 
industry. On the other side retail companies make extended use o f the hade 
credits available to them which is believed to play a role in the amount of 
borrowing.
The primary objectives o f this study are as follows:
1. To test how well the pecking order model explains the capital structure 
behaviour in the sample companies.
2. To test how well the hade-off model explains the capital structure 
behaviour in the sample companies.
3. To examine the spectrum of variables that are likely to explain the observed 
capital structure pattern in the U.K. hotel and retail industries in the light o f  
the above mentioned models and other theories o f capital structures.
3
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This thesis contributes to the existing literature because it focuses on U.K  
companies. There have been very few studies regarding capital structure in the 
U.K industries, (Marsh, 1982 and Michaelas at al, 1999) and this is the first one 
undertaken for the service industries.
The research design tests the most frequently cited theories using econometric 
methods not used in previous studies. To the best o f my knowledge this is the 
first study that contrasts two capital structure models in a UK setting.
The data sample was selected by using those companies within these two 
industries which provided a full data set for the study period 1985 -  1997. This 
study is a contribution in the ever growing use o f panel data in capital structure 
research.
1.3. The Structure of the Study
In Chapter 2 the study begins with a discussion o f Modigliani and Miller’s 
irrelevance theory with particular reference to the trade-off model that is 
derived from this theory. Chapter 3 discusses the alternative agency theory to 
capital structure, which stresses the role o f the agency costs o f debt and equity 
in financing decisions. Chapter 4 begins with a discussion o f the asymmetric 
information problem related to debt and equity employment. The second part 
describes the pecking order approach to capital structure. Chapter 5 provides a 
general discussion o f the property rights approach. Chapter 6 begins with a 
discussion o f  transaction cost economics and continues with its application to 
capital structure issues. Chapter 7 summarises the different schools o f thought 
described in the previous chapters and establishes their use in the following 
empirical chapters. Chapter 8 describes the data used in this study and 
provides a general discussion o f the statistical definitions and tools employed in 
the empirical research. The pecking order model and the empirical results 
obtained by its application in the U.K. retail and hotel industries data are dealt 
with in Chapter 9 . Chapter 10 discusses the trade-off model and the empirical
4
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conclusions reached by its application to the data. The explanatory variables 
derived from the theories described in the previous chapters, and the results 
concluded by the multiple regression analysis, are set out in Chapter 11. 
Finally, Chapter 12 provides an overall discussion o f the empirical outcomes 
concluded in the previous chapters and makes suggestions for further research 
in the area.
5
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Chapter 2
M o d ig lia n i’s a n d  M ille r ’s Ir r e le v a n c e  T h e o r y
2.1. Introduction
One o f the most contentious areas in the theory o f business finance in the past 
forty years has been the theory o f capital structure. The genesis o f this 
controversy was the seminal contributions o f Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
about the irrelevance o f capital structure. The general academic view, after 
this, was that the optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage 
of debt against the expected present value o f financial distress costs (the so- 
called trade-off theoiy). Miller (1977) presented a new challenge by showing 
that the tax advantage o f debt at the firm level is offset by the tax disadvantage 
at the personal level and by arguing that any residual tax advantage o f debt 
would be arbitraged away. Most o f the research that followed has attempted to 
reconcile Miller’s model with the trade-off theory o f optimal capital structure. 
The main result o f this work is that firm’s optimal capital structure will involve 
a trade-off between the tax advantage o f debt and various gearing-related costs. 
The outcome o f these extensions o f Miller’s model is the recognition that the 
existence o f an optimal structure is an empirical issue as to whether or not tax 
advantages and gearing-related costs are economically significant enough to 
influence the cost o f corporate borrowing.
This chapter presents a review o f the Modigliani and Miller (MM) capital 
structure analysis. It starts with the general discussion o f the original 
Modigliani and Miller Irrelevance Theory in Section 2.2. Sections 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2  introduce market imperfections, respectively taxes and financial distress, 
into the MM approach. A summary o f main empirical work carried out on
7
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different issues o f optimal capital structure and trade-off theory is given in 
Section 2.3. The main arguments discussed in the chapter are concluded in 
Section2.4
J. Nuri Chapter 2: MM's Irrelevance Theory
2.2. Modigliani’s and Miller’s Irrelevance Theory
To understand the causes and consequences of capital market imperfections we 
first need to understand the nature o f a world in which these problems do not 
exist. The key result is the “value irrelevance” preposition which states that: 
capital structure is irrelevant to firm value.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that under certain conditions capital 
structure is irrelevant to a firm value. A firm’s value is the net present value o f  
the stream of cash flows generated by its investments. Once the investment 
decisions have been made, financing decisions cannot affect firm value 
(Stiglitz, 1969; Fama, 1978). The project’s cash flows and risk adjusted cost of 
capital are independent o f how the funds are raised for the project. Another 
way to look at this is to quote Professor Miller (1963): “The value o f 
irrelevance proposition holds that you cannot make yourself richer by taking 
money out o f one pocket and putting it into another”.
To prove their “value irrelevance” proposition MM make the following key 
assumptions:
1) Asset ownership: All physical assets are owned by corporations.
2) Firm  Growth: There is no growth, or cessation, so all cash flows streams are 
perpetuities.
3) Frictionless Exchange: No taxes, transaction costs, agency costs or 
bankruptcy costs. Claims on cash flows can be exchanged without any payment 
to third parties. Firms and individuals can costlessly issue, purchase or 
exchange securities. Managers maximise overall firm value.
9
J. Nuri Chapter 2: MM's Irrelevance Theory
4) Symmetric Information and Homogeneous Expectations'. Everyone has 
symmetric and costlessly available information. All agents are equally capable 
o f using information. All agents agree about the future expected returns o f all 
securities.
5) Risk Class'. All firms can be divided into “equivalent return” classes such 
that the return on the shares issued by any firm in any given class is 
proportional to (and hence perfectly correlated with) the return o f the shares 
issued by any other firm in the same class, (MM, 1958, p.2 66 ).1
6) Competitive Capital Markets'. All securities have perfect substitutes. No 
firm or individual has a monopoly on the supply o f any security. Agents take 
security prices as given. No arbitrage opportunities exist. If two securities 
have the same payoffs across all possible states o f nature then they must have 
the same price.
7) Complete Capital Markets'. All possible individual consumption plans can be 
produced with the payoffs from combinations o f existing securities, i.e. risky 
equity and risk-free debt. Both individuals and coiporation can borrow or lend 
at the risk free interest rate.
8) Independence o f Investment and Financing Decisions'. Firms make financing 
decisions taking their investment decisions as given.
The logic o f the MM argument relies heavily on the “no arbitrage argument”, 
i.e. the process o f buying a good in one market at a low price, and than reselling 
it in another market where identical good is selling at a higher price.
1 A question arises: Why did not MM use CAPM or another asset pricing model, to adjust for risk? The 
answer is that the CAPM had not been developed in 1958, and their article preceded the arbitrage 
pricing theory by almost two decades.
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Arbitrage promises infinite profits, and therefore is a powerfiil force in ensuring 
that the law o f one price (the same goods must sell within transactions costs o f  
each other in two different markets) holds, in well functioning markets 
(Megginson, 1995, p. 317). Once “real” (production and investment) decisions 
have been made the capital market knows the value o f those decisions. No 
change in how the resultant cash flows are to be divided will affect the overall 
value o f the cash flows themselves. Assume that an optimal capital structure, 
which maximises firm value, exists. Define that as the ratio o f debt to total 
firm value. Any change in gearing would have to lower firm value. If firm A  
chooses a non-optimal capital structure, it creates riskless arbitrage 
opportunities in the capital market. The firm’s underlying cash flows are given 
by its investment decisions. Everyone has identical information and agrees 
about the nature o f the firm’s prospects. Everyone in the securities market 
operates as a price taker. Any other firm, financial intermediary or individual 
could make a riskless arbitrage profit by buying up firm’s A original securities 
and issue new securities with claims to the same set o f contingent cash flows. 
Any capital structure choice the firm makes can be offset by some other agent 
in the perfect capital market. No purely financial decision can affect its 
equilibrium market value. Fama (1976) shows that the two sufficient 
conditions for this are that no firm has a monopoly on the supply o f  a particular 
security and that managers maximise overall firm value. Since other firms can 
issue securities that are perfect substitutes in a perfect and competitive capital 
market, the arbitrage condition still holds. Perfect substitutes are defined as any 
securities that offer the same pattern o f payoffs across all possible states o f  
nature. Under the “no arbitrage” condition, two securities offering the identical 
payoffs would have to be priced identically.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) take uncertainty into account by using the notion 
o f “risk class”. This is any set o f securities that have perfectly correlated 
returns. By definition this means they offer the same pattern o f consumption
11
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opportunities across all possible states o f nature. The securities in the same risk 
class are perfect substitutes. When two firms have identical stochastic 
technologies and are facing the same identical demand functions, their returns 
will be perfectly correlated. Firms in a competitive industry environment are 
essentially in the same risk class. If firms with identical technologies differ 
only in terms o f the scale o f production, their relative values, will be 
proportional by that scalar. In a perfectly competitive capital market this is 
equivalent to saying that the firms in a given risk class have access to each 
others’ technology. Also, members o f a risk class must have access to the same 
project on the same terms. In other words, in a perfectly competitive capital 
market there can be no idiosyncratic firm effects on returns due to factors like 
managerial ability, unique assets or complementaries with other assets or 
projects.
The MM analysis was presented in three propositions. The first is the crucial 
one.
Proposition 1: Irrelevance Proposition
The central proposition made by MM is that the weighted average cost o f  
capital (WACC) is independent o f the debt equity ratio and equal to the cost o f  
capital which the firm would have with no gearing its capital structure. In other 
words, the appropriate capitalisation rate for a firm is the rate applied by the 
market to an ungeared company in the relevant risk category. The arbitrage 
mechanism will operate to equalise the values o f any two companies whose 
values are temporarily out o f line with each other.
No distinction is made between short- and long-term debt and it is assumed that 
all borrowing is perpetual. The company is expected to deliver constant and 
perpetual annual earnings E. The overall rate of return that company must
12
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achieve to satisfy the stakeholders (shareholders and debt-holders) is the 
weighted average cost o f capital denoted k0. This can be expressed as:
i 1 v s 1 VB E „  Ek0 =  lc. x  —  +  kd x —  =  —  => V0 =  —0 e V  d y  y  0 ,
v 0 v0 v0 0
where: ke and lea - the respective rates o f return required by shareholders
and debt-holders
Vs and V B - the respective market value o f shares and the value o f
outstanding debt in a company 
Vo -the market value o f the whole company.
E - annual net operating income
The WACC also equals E/Vo since total operating income is composed o f  
payments to shareholders, keVs plus payments to lenders, iB (z is the coupon 
rate on debt and B the book value o f debt).
The proof o f the “irrelevance preposition”, which assumes that all firms and 
individuals can lend and borrow at the risk-free rate, relies on the 
substitutability o f the shareholders’ personal gearing for the firm’s gearing 
(home-made gearing, see Appendix 2.1).
Under the MM’s Proposition I the value o f the firm is:
V OG = Vou = E/ko (1)
Where: V q - market value o f levered firm
Vy - market value o f ungeared firm
E - Earnings before tax and interest
Proposition 2: The behaviour o f the equity cost o f  capital.
Underpinning Proposition 1 is a statement about the behaviour o f the relevant 
cost o f capital concepts, in particular the rate o f  return required by shareholders, 
which is expressed in MM’s second proposition. This states “the expected
13
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yield o f a share o f equity is equal to the appropriate capitalisation rate, ke, for a 
pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related to the financial risk 
equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between ke and kd”. This 
proposition can be written as follows:
VB
keg = keu + (kell - kd) x -------
Vs
where keg and keu denote the returns required by the shareholders o f a geared 
company and an equivalent ungeared company, respectively. The expression 
simply tells us that “the rate o f return required by shareholders increases 
linearly as the debt/equity ratio is increased”. The relationship is shown in 
Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. M M ’s proposition 1 and 2.
Proposition 3: The cut-off rate fo r  new investment
MM’s third proposition states that “the cut-off rate for new investment will in 
all cases be k0 and will be unaffected by the type o f security used to finance the 
investment”. Proposition 1 states that the WACC, ko, is constant and equal to 
the cost of equity in an equivalent ungeared company. Since ko is invariant to 
capital structure, it follows that despite how a project is financed, it must yield a 
return o f at least lc0, the minimum rate required to satisfy shareholders (Pike and
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Neal, 1999, chapter 11). (The arithmetical derivations o f Propositions 1, 2 and 
3 are given in Appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively).
As stated earlier, MM propositions are based on some restrictive assumptions. 
Relaxation o f these assumptions results in other theories to which reference is 
made latter.
2.2.1. Capital Market Imperfections and Capital Structure: 
Taxes
In 1963 Modigliani and Miller added corporate taxes to their model o f  
corporate valuation, under which the value o f the geared firm became sensitive 
to capital structure. In the presence o f corporate taxes the value o f the geared 
firm is: V q = Vy + TB, (the arithmetical derivation is shown in Appendix 2.4). 
The expression for the value o f the geared firm comprises the value o f an 
equivalent ungeared firm, Vu, plus a premium derived by discounting to 
perpetuity the stream o f tax savings which is applicable so long as the firm has 
sufficient taxable capacity, i.e. i f  E > iB. The introduction o f the term, TB, the 
discounted value o f the future tax savings, or the tax shield, is a major 
modification o f MM’s Proposition I. The firm’s value now increases 
continuously with gearing, (see Figure 2.2).
V,
0 V B/Vs
Figure 2.2: MM’s finn value with corporate tax
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Whereas the required rate o f return for shareholders is given by the formula:
The return required by the geared company’s shareholders is the sum o f  the cost 
o f equity in an identical ungeared firm plus a financial risk premium related to 
the corporate tax rate and the debt / equity ratio. The premium for financial risk 
required by shareholders is lower in this case owing to the tax deductibility o f  
debt interest, i.e. the debt interest burden is less exacting. This relationship is 
shown in Figure 2.3.
Debt, therefore, increases the firm’s value and reduces the required rate o f 
return on equity. This implies that the firm’s values are maximised by using 
100% debt financing.
Figure 2.3: MM’s cost of capital with corporate tax
However, Miller (1977) added personal taxes and returned to the original MM 
irrelevance proposition. In this instance, capital structure is irrelevant because 
in equilibrium marginal taxes insure that will be so. According to Miller the 
value o f the firm is:
k t s = A „ + ( k „ - k d) ( l - T ) ^
0 V b/V s
V„ = v„ +
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increases it. Hence the name “trade-off theory” according to which a firm’s 
optimal capital structure lies where the marginal benefits o f tax shields equal 
the marginal cost o f potential financial distress.
Let us denote the expected cost o f financial distress by FD; then the value o f a 
geared company is:
Vg = V u + (TB - FD)
This means that the financial manager should attempt to maximise the gap 
between the tax benefits and financial distress costs, i.e. (TB-FD), and that 
there exists an optimal capital structure where company value is maximised. 
Fig 2.4 shows this relationship.
The expected costs o f financial distress rise with gearing, once the market starts 
to perceive a substantially increased risk o f financial failure. The likelihood o f  
FD being non-zero depends on the probability distribution o f the film ’s earning 
prospects. For most companies the probability, p, of financial distress will 
increase with the book values o f debt, B, so that the FD function increases with 
gearing. If d denotes the percentage discount on the pre-liquidation value in the 
event o f a forced sale, the expected costs o f financial distress are: FD = (pdVg), 
and the value o f the geared firm is:
Vg = V u + (TB - pdVg)
This suggests that market imperfections can be exploited to raise company 
value so long as TB exceeds pdVg. In Figure 2.4 X* represents the optimal 
gearing ratio where the marginal benefits o f tax saving equal the marginal cost 
o f financial distress. Bankruptcy costs increase faster than the tax shield 
beyond this point, implying a reduction in firm value from further gearing.
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F in n
The above discussion presents two factors that affect the degree o f leverage. 
Unfortunately, no formula exists yet to exactly determine the optimal debt level 
for a particular firm. This is because the expected bankruptcy costs (mainly 
indirect bankruptcy costs) cannot be expressed in a precise way, (Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe, 1999, chapter 16).
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2.3. Empirical Work on Optimal Capital Structure
Baxter (1967) argued that excessive gearing is expected to increase the cost o f  
capital, commencing from the point where the increased direct plus indirect 
cost o f debt becomes greater than the debt’s tax advantages. A high degree o f  
gearing increases the probability o f bankruptcy and therefore increases the 
riskness o f the overall earnings stream. He investigated the bankruptcy cases o f  
three companies that had filed for receivership. The sales data from all three 
companies showed dramatic decline in sales immediately upon the filing o f the 
reorganisation petition. In short, though it is impossible to generalise, there is 
evidence that bankruptcy has associated costs -  those o f an administrative 
variety, and often costs in form o f reduction o f net operating earnings. 
Therefore, excessive leverage which can trigger bankruptcy may indeed raise 
the cost o f capital to a firm and reduce the total value o f the firm.
The implication o f this argument is that firms should not borrow beyond the 
point where the tax advantages o f gearing equals the cost o f debt and expected 
financial distress costs, giving rise to a value maximising capital structure.
Schwartz and Aronson (1967) used F-ratio or variance ratio test o f statistical 
significance to show that financial structure varies among industries. In 
addition, they showed that the financial structure o f firms across time is not 
random. Scott (1972) and Scott / Martin (1975) used F-ratio analysis (one way 
analysis o f variance tests the null hypothesis that the difference among the 
population means o f the various industrial classes sampled is zero) on common 
equity to total assets to show that the financial structure is homogeneous in an 
industry. An implication o f these studies is that firms behave as if  there exists 
an industry-related optimal or target capital structure.
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De Angelo and Masulis (1980) generalised Miller’s differential tax model by 
including other non-debt tax shields such as depreciation charges and 
investment tax credits. They stated that introduction o f such non-debt tax 
shields leads to the conclusion that each firm has an unique interior optimal 
capital structure that maximises its value. This capital structure is determined 
only by the interactions o f personal and corporate taxes as well as positive 
default (financial distress) costs.
Dammon and Senbet (1988) extended DeAngelo’s and Masulis’ work by 
scrutinising the firm’s investment decision. They disagreed with the existing 
literature on the relationship between debt and investment tax shields in the 
case o f optimal investments by the firm. Dammon and Senbet showed that an 
increase in investment-related non-debt tax shields owing to the changes in the 
tax code did not necessarily lead firms to reduce their debt level. They 
hypothesised that, in cross sectional analysis, the fact that firms with higher 
investment tax shields do not necessarily have lower debt tax shields, unless all 
the firms use the same technologies, may explain the deviation from DeAngelo 
and Masulis’ results.
Bowen, Daley and Huber (1982) studied eighteen hundred firms in nine 
industries, classified using the 4 digit standard industry codes. The authors 
studied the common equity to total assets ratio and the long-term debt plus 
short-term debt to total assets ratio as proxies for capital structure. Using F- 
ratio analysis, the authors found that the firms in each industry have similar 
capital structures; and using the Spearman rank coefficient analysis, they found 
that the film ’s relative ranking to mean industry financial structure across time 
is stable. Finally using the Fisher exact probability test, the authors also 
concluded that the gearing o f firms within an industry tends to converge to the 
industry’s average. The firms investigated in this study, therefore, aimed for a 
target capital structure.
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Marsh (1982) developed a descriptive model o f the choice between equity and 
long term debt financing based on both the theory (companies in need o f  new 
finance should issue equity if  they are above their target debt level and debt if  
they are below) and existing, empirical evidence. He tested his model using a 
logit analysis applied to a sample o f 748 issues o f equity and debt made by UK  
companies over the period 1959 - 1970.
First, he concluded that companies are heavily influenced by market conditions 
and the past history o f security prices in choosing between equity and debt 
financing. Indeed, these factors appear to be far more significant in his model 
than, for example, other variables such as a company’s existing capital 
structure. Second, this study provided evidence that companies do appear to 
make their choice o f financing instruments as though they had target levels in 
mind for both long term debt ratio, and the ratio o f short term debt to total debt. 
Finally, he concluded that the results are consistent with the notion that these 
target levels are themselves functions o f company size, bankruptcy risk, and 
asset composition.
Altman (1984) divided the cost o f financial distress into direct and indirect 
costs. He defined direct costs as lawyers’, courts’, accounts’ and other 
administrative costs which can be directly measured; and indirect costs as lost 
sales, reduced managerial energies and higher costs o f  funds, which can only be 
estimated. In his study, Altman evaluated the effect o f direct and indirect costs 
by studying a sample o f twelve retail and seven industrial firms which went 
bankrupt over the period 1970 - 1978. He found that bankruptcy costs were not 
trivial. In many cases they exceeded 20% o f the value o f the firm measured 
just prior to bankruptcy and even in some cases measured several years prior. 
This suggested that capital stincture should be set at a point where the marginal 
present value o f tax benefits equals the marginal present value o f financial 
distress costs.
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Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) developed a model that synthesises the modem  
trade-off theoiy o f optimal capital structure. In the empirical testing o f this 
model, the authors found that the volatility o f a firm’s earnings had a negative 
relationship with gearing. In addition, they found a strong direct relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and the firm’s debt level.
Emery and Gehr (1988) stated that the use o f  a variety o f instruments other than 
equity reduces the firm’s tax expense, i.e. the ratio o f tax suffered by the firm 
and its investors to the firm’s pre-tax cash flows; in the aggregate this increases 
the value o f the film ’s tax options. Therefore, it is possible for each firm to 
capture some o f the value created by using multiple securities. For each firm, 
therefore, there exist a combination o f bonds, warrants, preferred stock and 
common stock that makes up its optimal capital structure. This implies that it is 
possible for a firm to increase its value by incorporating instruments in its 
capital structure with returns that are not perfectly correlated with those o f  its 
existing securities.
Givoly, Hayn, Ofer and Sarig (1992) evaluated the response o f firms to the U.S. 
1986 Tax Reform Act. The results o f that study support the tax-based theories 
of capital structure. Also, they found that there exists a substitution effect 
between debt and non-debt tax shields and that both personal and corporate tax 
rates affect capital structure.
Ashton (1989) reworked the MM (1958. 1963) and Miller (1977) arguments to 
fit capital structure within the U.K. tax system at the time. He argues that if  
there is a U.K. tax advantage o f debt, it is likely to be much smaller than the 
traditional MM value and it is likely to be no more than 13% o f the market 
value o f the permanent debt. The tax advantage o f debt is considerably less 
under the U.K. imputation system than it is under the U.S. classical system. 
This reduced tax advantage to debt arises because under an imputation system,
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the withholding tax on the gross dividend can both be offset against the firm’s 
corporation tax ability and treated as a tax credit by the shareholder, thus 
reducing both corporate tax (Tc) and personal tax on equity (Tpe). The smaller 
tax advantages o f debt in the U.K. would predict, in general, lower levels o f  
debt in the U.K. than in the U.S.
Castanis (1983), discussed whether there is or there is not a negative 
relationship between observed gearing and historical failure rates across lines 
of business. He examined the relative stationary level o f failure rates over time 
for 21 lines o f  business for 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, and for 1972 through 1977. 
The author concluded that firms in lines o f business that “tend” to have high 
failure rates also tend to have less debt in their capital structures. The empirical 
results are not consistent with the capital structure irrelevance model o f Miller. 
The results are consistent with the thesis that ex ante default costs are large 
enough to induce the typical firm to hold an optimum mix o f debt and equity.
Kwansa (1995) in his study o f 10 restaurant firms that went bankrupt between 
1980 and 1992 investigates the size o f the indirect costs to firms that file for 
bankruptcy, to determine if  this cost is substantial. Additionally, he 
investigates the trade-off between tax savings and indirect bankruptcy costs for 
its usefulness in signalling potential firm insolvency. One o f the findings 
indicates that the indirect cost o f bankruptcy is substantial in absolute terms. 
With regards to its significance as a proportion o f firm value, the findings 
confirm the fact that the foregone profits represent a sizeable proportion o f the 
firm’s value. The other finding was that generally the size o f the indirect 
bankruptcy costs outweighs the size o f the tax savings from debt use, the closer 
the film is to filing for bankruptcy.
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2.4. Conclusions
Modigliani and Miller (1958) have provided a starting point for the discussion 
of capital structure decisions o f firms. On the basis o f an arbitrage argument 
they have shown that in perfect market settings, and under a set o f restrictive 
conditions (no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs, no taxes, no asymmetric 
information and no agency problems), the financing decisions cannot be viewed 
as a source o f value, i.e., value cannot be created by rearranging capital 
structure. From their theorem it follows that that the choice o f capital structure 
is irrelevant. In an MM world, investment and financing decisions are 
completely separated. Their theorem is showed to hold under generalised 
uncertainty.
According to M&M (1963), in the presence o f taxes and the tax deductibility o f  
interest payments, and under the assumption that the debt is default-free, firms 
are expected to be financed entirely by debt. However, since borrowing 
increases the likelihood o f  bankruptcy, and bankruptcy is costly, an optimal 
capital structure represents a level that balances the tax advantages of debt 
against the different costs associated with financial distress. There have been 
many studies (some o f which were described in the previous section) 
introducing different costs generated by the likelihood o f bankruptcy. These 
costs may be either directly or indirectly related to the bankruptcy process. 
Many o f these studies conclude that firms behave as though they have a target 
level (or optimal level) o f capital structure in mind, which can be achieved by 
the trade-off o f the tax advantages o f debt and bankruptcy costs or other costs 
related to debt use.
Relaxing different subsets o f the aforementioned assumptions results in 
different families o f the theoretical models. Theoretical models that proceeded 
from the MM irrelevance theorem can be divided into three major groups:
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models based on bankruptcy costs, models based on agency costs (costs 
associated with moral hazards and adverse selection), and models based on 
asymmetric information. A  detailed discussion o f the last two models and 
empirical research inspired by them, is provided in Chapter 3 and 4 
respectively.
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Chapter 3
A g e n c y  T h e o r y  an d  C a p ita l S tru c tu re
3.1. Introduction
Observed contractual arrangements in finance are complex. Agency Theory (AT) 
tries to give an explanation o f these contractual relationships by positing that 
capital structure is determined by agency costs, which arise from conflicting 
interests among parties to the corporate firm, such as management, capital 
contributors, employees, customers, suppliers, and the government. Unless these 
problems were resolved they would lead to sub-optimal allocation o f resources 
within the organisation. The term “agency” derives from the fact that corporate 
decisions are delegated to agents who perform on behalf of other parties. Agency 
theory considers the firm as a nexus o f contracts. The resolving o f agency 
problems through contractual arrangements leads to the evolution o f corporate 
finance.
Agency theory identifies two types o f conflicts: a) conflicts between managers 
and shareholders, and b) conflicts between debtholders and equityholders. The 
former arise because managers hold less than 100% of residual claims, therefore 
they have the incentive to transfer firm resources to their own personal benefit. 
The latter conflicts arise because the debt contract gives equityholders an 
incentive to invest in a manner detrimental to the debtholders’ interest because of 
the different risk-sharing characteristics o f equity and debt.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the origins o f agency 
theory. Section 3.3 gives a brief description o f the agency theory approach to 
capital structure. It continues with the agency costs o f external equity in Section
3.3.1. Section 3.3.2 deals with agency costs o f debt, respectively the risk shifting 
incentive in Section 3.3.2.1, the underinvestment incentive in Section 3.3.2.2,
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asset liquidation and payout proceeds in Section 3 3 .2 .3 , and debt finance 
dividend payment in Section 3.3.2.4. The chapter continues with Section 3.3.3 in 
which the debt-equity ratio is determined based on an agency theory approach. 
The roles o f monitoring and bonding costs as well as bankruptcy and 
reorganisation costs are discussed in Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 respectively. 
Section 3.4 gives a summary o f the empirical studies earned out based on the 
agency theoiy proposition. And finally Section 3.5 summarises the main 
highlights o f the chapter.
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3.2. Origins of Agency Theory
During the 1960s and 1970s, economists explored risk sharing among individuals 
or groups (e.g. Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968). This literature described the risk- 
sharing problem as one that arises when co-operating parties have different 
attitudes towards risk. Agency theory broadened the risk sharing literature to 
include the so-called agency problems that occur when co-operating parties have 
different goals and division of labour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Ross 1973). 
Specifically, agency theory is directed at the agency relationship, in which one 
party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that 
work. Agency theory attempts to describe this relationship using the metaphor o f  
a contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Agency theoiy is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or 
goals o f principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the 
principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved “appropriately”. The second is 
the problem o f risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different 
attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may 
prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences.
Because the unit o f analysis is the contract governing the relationship between the 
principal and the agent, the focus o f the theory is on determining the most 
efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions 
about people (e.g., self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organisations 
(e.g., goal conflict among members), and information (e.g., information is a 
commodity that can be purchased). Specifically, the question becomes: Is a 
behaviour oriented contract (e.g., salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient 
than an outcome oriented contract (e.g., commissions, stock options, transfer of  
property rights, market governance)? Table 3.1 gives an overview of agency 
theoiy.
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Key Idea Principal-Agent relationships should reflect efficient organisation
and risk-bearing costs.
Unit of Analysis Contract between principal and agent
Human Assumption Self Interest
Bounded Rationality
Risk Aversion
Information Assumption Information as a purchasable commodity
Contracting Problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection)
Risk Sharing
Problem Domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing
goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation,
leadership, impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical
integration, transfer pricing.
Table 3.1 Agency theory overview (sources Esenhardt, 1989)
The agency framework is applicable in a variety o f settings, ranging from macro­
level issues such as regulatory policy to micro-level phenomena such as blame, 
impression management, lying and other expressions o f self interest. Most 
frequently, agency theoiy has been applied to organisational phenomena such as 
compensation (e.g., Conlon and Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1985), acquisition and 
diversification strategies (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981), board relationships (e.g., 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kosnik, 1987), ownership and financing structures (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Argawal and Mandelker, 1987), vertical integration 
(Anderson, 1985), and imiovation (Bolton, 1988).
From its roots in information economics, agency theoiy has developed along two 
lines: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). The two streams share a 
common unit o f analysis: the contract between the principal and the agent. They 
also share common assumptions about people, organisations, and information. 
However, they differ in their mathematical rigour, dependent variables and style.
Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the 
principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the 
governance mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour. Positivist 
research is less mathematical than principal-agent research. Also, positivist
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research has focused almost exclusively on the special case o f the principal-agent 
relationship between owners and managers o f large, public corporations. Three 
articles have been particularly influential. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explored 
the ownership structure o f the corporation, including how equity ownership by 
managers aligns managers’ interests with those of owners. Fama (1980) 
discussed the role o f efficient capital and labour markets as information 
mechanisms that are used to control the self-serving behaviour o f top executives. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) described the role o f the board o f directors as an 
information system that the shareholders within large corporations could use to 
monitor the opportunism of top management.
From a theoretical perspective, the positivist stream has been most concerned 
with describing the governance mechanisms that address the agency problem. 
The positivist stream identifies two propositions regarding the governance 
mechanisms. One proposition is that outcome-based contracts are effective in 
curbing agent opportunism. The argument is that such contracts co-align the 
preferences o f agents with those o f the principal because the rewards for both 
depend on the same actions, and, therefore, the conflict o f  self-interest between 
principal and agent is reduced. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
described how increasing the firm ownership o f the managers decreases 
managerial opportunism. The second proposition is that information systems also 
curb agent opportunism. The argument here is that, since information systems 
inform the principal about what agent is actually doing, they are likely to curb 
agent opportunism because the agent will realise that she or he cannot deceive the 
principal. For example, Fama (1980) described the information effects of 
efficient capital and labour markets on managerial opportunism, and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) described the information role that boards o f directors play in 
controlling managerial behaviour.
At its best, positivist agency theory can be regarded as enriching economics by 
offering a more complex view o f organisation (Jensen, 1983). However, it has
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been criticised by organisational theorists as minimalist (Hirsch, Michaels and 
Friedman, 1987; Perrow, 1986) and by microeconomists as tautological and 
lacking rigour (Jensen, 1983). Nonetheless, positivist agency theory has ignited 
considerable research.
Principal-agent researchers are concerned with a general theory o f the principal- 
agent relationship, a theory that can be applied to employer-employee, lawyer- 
client, buyer-supplier, and other agency relationships (Hanis and Raviv, 1978). 
Characteristic o f formal theoiy, the principal-agent paradigm involves careftil 
specification o f assumptions, which are followed by logical deduction and 
mathematical proof.
In comparison to the positivist stream, principal-agent theory is abstract and 
mathematical and, therefore, less accessible to organisational scholars. Indeed, 
the most vocal critics o f the theory (Perrow, 1986; Hirch et al., 1987) have 
focused their attacks primarily on the more widely known positivist stream. Also, 
the principal-agent stream has a broader focus and greater interest in general, 
theoretical implications. In contrast, the positivist writers have focused almost 
exclusively on the special case o f the owner/CEO relationship in the large 
corporation. Finally, principal-agent research includes many more testable 
implications. The two streams are complementary: Positivist theory identifies 
various contract alternatives, and principal-agent theory indicates which contract 
is the most efficient under varying levels o f outcome uncertainty, risk aversion, 
information and other variables.
Before proceeding into the analysis o f the financial theory o f agency, the 
following is a summary o f the framework that characterises most o f the economic 
research in this area. First, the analysis is based on a single period model. This is 
a limiting assumption, because ignores the implications o f the outcomes o f one 
period on the structure o f contracts in future periods. The learning process o f 
market participants, which is embedded in multiperiod analysis, gives rise to
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“goodwill” and human capital, which affect the action o f agents and mitigate 
agency problems to some extent. Second, the analysis is based on one agent and 
one principal. Except for the introduction o f a minimum utility level that must be 
satisfied to attract agents, the analysis ignores the existence o f markets and the 
implications o f competition among principals and agents. Third, the analysis 
assumes that the manager’s preferences and alternatives o f action are perfectly 
known to principals. Fourth, the analysis assumes that the end-of-period wealth 
o f both parties is limited to the realised value of the firm under consideration. 
The possibilities o f diversifying via the capital market, and thereby reducing the 
amount o f risk that is shared, are generally ignored. Fifth, the analysis assumes 
that contracts are binding, which implies that any commitment in an enforceable 
contract is perfectly honoured.
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3.3. Agency Theory and Capital Structure
A significant fraction o f the effort o f researchers has been devoted to models in 
which capital structure is determined by agency costs, i.e. costs due to the conflict 
of interests between different groups in a firm. Research in this area was initiated 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) building on earlier work o f Fama and Miller 
(1972).
Agency theoiy defines the firm as “...simply one form of legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterised by 
the existence o f divisible residual claims on the assets and the cash flows o f the 
organisation which can generally be sold without permission o f  the other 
contracting individuals”. (Jensen and Meckling (1976, p311).
An agency relationship is defined as a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some seivice on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent. In other words, in any business relationship there are two parties, one of 
who is the agent (the manager, the decision-maker) and the other is the principal 
(investors, i.e., shareholders and debtholders). The agent in his decisions affects 
not only his own welfare but also that o f the principal. If both parties to this 
relationship are utility maximisers it is expected that the agent will not always act 
in the best interest o f the principal. The principal is ready to pay a reward to the 
agent in return for a certain appropriate action. Unfortunately, the principal 
cannot observe the agent’s action in full detail. The principal can limit 
divergences from actions on his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for 
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs, design to limit the diverging 
activities o f the agent. In a certain situations it will be beneficial for the agent to 
employ resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain 
actions which will be against the principal’s interest. It is understandable that 
neither law nor contracts will give the principal perfect protection. The reason is
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that the information is not perfect and costless, and that contracting is costly. 
Information is perfect if  all the individuals assign a positive probability to the 
same future state o f nature, and also all individuals know all possible strategies o f  
the agent and their outcomes in every state, e.g. all individuals give the same 
market value to any strategy o f the agent. Under perfect information and if  
costless o f contracting, contracts would be written such as to describe exactly the 
actions, which would maximize the market value o f all firms. Therefore, the 
contracts would also prescribe when to liquidate the firm and how to distribute 
the liquidation value.
Imperfect information usually implies that the managers are better informed than 
capital owners in both ex ante and ex post states o f the world. Ex ante they know 
better the possible states o f the world affecting the firm and the action that can be 
chosen, and therefore the state-dependent future cash flows o f the action. Ex  
post, they are better informed o f the actual state o f the world and the realized 
action’s outcome. These information imperfections, together with costly 
contracting, make it profitable to write incomplete contracts between managers 
and principals. But incomplete contracts offer the possibility for the manager to 
expropriate the principal by choosing non- Pareto efficient actions.1 Therefore, it 
is impossible to insure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the 
principal’s point o f view.
In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss agency costs as the 
key tool in evaluating alternative designs o f principal-agent relations. They 
define agency costs as the sum of 1) monitoring expenditures by the principal, 2) 
the bonding expenditures by the agent and, 3) the residual loss i.e. the monetary 
equivalent o f the reduction in the welfare o f the principal as the result o f the 
differences between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would 
maximize the welfare o f the principal.
1 If the actions are Pareto-efficient, then any resultant benefit to the agent will not 
entail any disbenefit to the principal, and vice-versa.
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Major insights into the problems o f capital structure can be gained if  they are 
understood in terms o f principal agent theory.
Many principals such as shareholders, bondholders, customers, etc., are 
dependent on an agent (or a group o f them), and conflicts o f interests arise. 
These conflicts o f interest stem from the structure o f the claims against the firm, 
which are respectively the fraction o f the shares held by the “owner -  manager”, 
the amount o f shares owned by non-owner managers, and the creditors’ claims.2 
This financing structure determines a kind o f sharing rule, and conditions the 
actions that could be considered optimal from the agent’s point o f view.
Considering the financing decision in this way omits the independence argument 
discussed by Modigliani and Miller (recall their main hypothesis that in a world 
of perfect markets capital structure does not matter). The outcomes o f the firm 
are no longer independent o f financing decisions, not only because o f tax 
advantages but also for reasons o f conflicts o f interests, which may result in 
different optimal investment decision.
The main issues that the positive agency theoiy tries to address are:
a) To study the influences of the sharing rule in itself through a detailed 
analysis o f agent’s actions if  a certain capital structure is assumed and if  
the fiim has already got the financing. This has to do with several wealth 
transfer mechanisms, which the agent might use to promote his own well­
being at the expense o f the principal’s welfare after he has received the 
money.
b) To devise a certain kind o f framework which will enable us to identify the 
ultimate bearers o f the losses resulting from the agency problems.
c) To devise different instruments which can be used to tackle these agency 
problems in different scenarios that might arise.
2 An “owner-manager” is a manager who has whole or partial ownership interests in 
the firm.
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3.3.1. Agency Costs of External Equity
In their work Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe this situation: Imagine an 
owner - manager who derives utility from three sources: a) money (wages); b) the 
market value o f the fraction o f firm’s shares owned by him; and c) non-money 
related perquisites such as a luxury office, social prestige, etc. Assume that no 
debt is used. If the manager is the full owner o f the firm he bears all the costs of 
these non-money related benefits. As the owner - manager’s fraction o f the 
equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to 
encourage him to appropriate a larger amount o f corporate resources in the form 
of perquisites. This also makes it desirable for the shareholders to expend more 
resources on monitoring his behaviour. Thus, the wealth costs to the owner of 
obtaining additional cash in the equity market rise, i.e., the price obtained for 
each fraction o f equity falls as his fractional ownership falls.
The owner-manager’s tastes for wealth and perquisites are represented in Figure 
3.1 by a system of indifference curves, U i, U2, etc. The indifference curves will 
be convex as long as the owner-manager’s marginal rate o f substitution between 
perquisites and wealth diminishes with the increasing levels of the benefits.
MARKET VALUE OF THE STREAM OF MANAGER’S PERQUISITES CONSUMPTION 
Figure. 3.1. Jensen’s and Meclding’s perquisites consumption model
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For the 100 per cent owner-manager, this presumes that there are no perfect 
substitutes for these benefits available on the outside, i.e. to some extent they are 
job specific. For the fractional owner-manager this presumes the benefits cannot 
be turned into general purchasing power at a constant price.
* jfc
When the owner has 100 per cent o f the equity, the value o f the firm will be V 
where indifference curve U2 is tangent to VF, and the level o f perquisites 
consumed is F*. If the owner sells the entire equity but remains as manager, and
if  the equity buyer can, at zero cost, force the old owner (now manager) to take
• *  • « 
the same level o f perquisites as he did as owner, then V is the price the new
owner will be willing to pay for the equity.
We would not expect the new owner to be able to enforce the same behaviour on 
the old owner at no cost. If the old owner sells a fraction o f  the firm to an 
outsider, he, as manager, will no longer bear the full cost o f any perquisites he 
consumes. Suppose the owner sells a share o f the firm (1 - a), and retains for 
himself a share, a. If the prospective buyer believes that the owner-manager will 
consume the same level o f perquisites as he did as full owner, the buyer will he 
willing to pay (l-a)V* for a fraction (1-a) o f the equity. Given the outsider’s 
claim of (1-a) on the equity, the cost to the owner-manager o f consuming £1 of 
perquisites in the firm is no longer £1. Instead, it will be a  x  £1. If the 
prospective buyer actually paid (l~a)V* for his share o f equity, and if  thereafter 
the manager could choose whatever level o f perquisites consumption he liked, his 
budget constraint would be V)Pi in Figure 3.1 with a slope equal to -a. Including 
the payment the owner receives from the buyer as part o f the owner’s post-sale 
wealth, his budget constraint, ViPi, must pass through B , since he can if  he 
wishes to have the same wealth and level o f perquisites consumption he 
consumed as full owner.
But if  the owner-manager is free to choose level o f perquisites, F , subject only to 
the loss in wealth he incurs as a part owner, his welfare will be maximised by
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increasing his consumption o f perquisites. He will move to point A  where VjPi is 
tangential to Ui representing a higher level o f utility. The value o f the firm falls 
from V* to V0, i.e., by the amount o f the cost to the firm of increased perquisites 
consumption, and the owner-manager’s consumption o f perquisites increases 
from F* to F°.
The agency conflict that derives from the manager’s tendency to appropriate 
perquisites out o f the firm’s resources for his own consumption is not the only or 
the most important conflict. It is likely that the most important conflict arises 
from the fact that as the manager’s ownership falls, his effort to devote 
significant effort to creative activities such as searching out new profitable 
projects falls, i.e. he may shirk. He may in fact avoid such projects simply 
because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part to leam about them. 
Avoidance o f these personal costs and the anxieties that go with them represent a 
source o f on-job utility to him, and this shirking can result in the value o f the firm 
being substantially lower than it otherwise could be.
In practice, it is possible by expending resources to alter the opportunity the 
manager has for receiving non-money related benefits. These methods include 
auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions and the establishment of 
incentive compensation systems, which serve to bring the manager’s interests 
closer to those o f outside shareholders.
43
J. Nuri Chapter 3: AT and Capital Structure
3.3.2. The Agency Costs of Debt
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their paper (p.334) raise the question “Why don’t 
we observe large corporations individually owned with a tiny fraction o f the 
capital supplied by the entrepreneur in return for 100% o f the equity and the rest 
simply borrowed?” The reason they give for this are: 1) the incentive effects 
associated with highly geared firms, 2) the monitoring costs these incentive 
effects lead to and 3) bankruptcy costs. All these costs are simply particular 
aspects o f the agency costs associated with the existence o f debt claims on the 
firm. Some o f the incentive effects associated with debt are:
3.3.2.1. Risk Shifting Incentive
The agency costs o f debt are associated with the moral hazard problems than can 
arise after a loan has been made. Shareholders have the incentive to take actions, 
especially investment decisions that would make themselves better off and leave 
creditors worse o ff (to highlight the conflict o f interest between lenders and 
borrowers we abstract from the problem o f manager - shareholder conflict and 
the separation o f ownership and control, and we also assume there are no taxes). 
It is assumed that the firm’s investment decision-makers are acting to maximise 
shareholders’ value rather than overall firm value. This is the equivalent o f the 
shareholders making the investment decisions.
If the owner - manager has the right to decide which investment programme to 
undertake, and if  after he decides this he has the opportunity to sell part or all of 
his claims on the expected returns in the form o f either debt or equity, he will 
be indifferent between the investment opportunities. However, i f  the owner has 
the opportunity to first issue debt, then to decide which investment to take and 
then to sell part or all o f his remaining equity claim in the market, he will not be 
indifferent between different investment opportunities. The reason is that by 
promising to take low variance projects, selling bonds and hen taking a higher 
variance project he can transfer wealth from the “naive” bondholders to himself 
as equity holder. Once they receive a loan the shareholders have the incentive
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to accept investment opportunities that lenders would consider to be too risky.
To demonstrate that shareholders may benefit by investing in high risk projects, 
the equity can be considered as Black - Scholes European call option to buy back 
the entire firm from the debtholders at maturity, at an exercise price equal to the 
principal amount o f debt. As the level o f risk increases the expected payoffs to 
shareholders increase, and the expected payoffs to debtholders decrease because 
of the default risk. In itself this would not affect the overall firm value. In the 
absence o f other costs (agency costs, bankruptcy costs, transaction costs, etc.) this 
could mean just a redistribution o f wealth between the two types o f claimants.
Shareholders’ upside gains are unlimited once the debt has been repaid. 
However, with limited liability, their downside losses are bounded. Debtholders 
recognise the shareholders’ incentive to shift risk. Let us say that two projects A 
and B have the same risk adjusted expected returns (see Appendix 3). They must 
be worth the same in the market. While the shareholders would prefer the riskier 
project A, debtholders recognise this incentive and are willing to pay less for it. 
Project A will be accepted, but there is no loss in efficiency. The value o f the 
project and therefore the overall value o f the firm stay the same, (see Appendix 3, 
Figure 3.4). However, assume project A is worth less than project B and is also 
riskier than B. Given the choice between A and B shareholders may still have an 
incentive to choose A (see Appendix 3, Figure 3.5). Even though project A is 
riskier and lower valued, the value o f equity may be large enough to give 
shareholders a larger expected payoff. Given the shareholders’ incentives and the 
increased risk, the debtholders will be willing to pay less for project A, 
Shareholders will choose A, the riskier lower valued project. The higher valued 
less risky project B, is not chosen given the risk shifting incentive o f decision­
makers (see Appendix 3). The difference in value between two projects is a 
deadweight loss due to the risk shifting incentive (Bamea, Haugen and Senbet, 
1985). This implies a negative relationship between the risk of a project and the 
ability to fund the project with debt.
3.3.2.2. The Underinvestment Incentive
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If the firm were totally equity funded, shareholders would accept all positive 
NPV projects. However, when partially funded with debt the shareholders may 
have an incentive to reject some positive NPV investments (Myers 1977). A firm 
has two types o f assets:
Assets already in place: These are sunk costs, irreversible investments that 
generate cash flows that are independent of any subsequent, discretionary 
investments the firm might make.
Growth opportunities: Their value is based on the firm’s subsequent, 
discretionary investment decisions. In another word they are assets not yet in 
place.
Since the investment decision is discretionary and depends on conditions that 
arise in the future, growth opportunities can be thought o f as providing the option 
to exercise profitable investment opportunities in the future. Then, i f  it appears to 
be unprofitable, the firm has no obligation to carry it out. A growth opportunity 
is like a call option on the set o f assets to be put in place in the future. The 
discretionary investment decision is where to exercise the option to implement 
the investment. Its exercise price is the cost o f implementing the investment. At 
expiration the firm will exercise the option if  the value o f the underlying assets 
exceeds the exercise price - the cost o f the investment, (see Appendix 3).
For example research and development (R & D) expenditures purchase a call 
option on the right to produce and market a new product sometime in the future. 
The amount o f R & D spending is the call premium. The new product is the 
underlying asset. Its value it is assumed to be uncertain. The size o f the 
opportunity window - the length o f time that the firm feels it can delay making a 
decision - is the time to expiration. The firm has the option to begin the 
production when the expected future cash flows exceed the cost o f setting up 
production and marketing facilities. If the option is exercised it becomes dead. 
The strategy is implemented and new assets in place are purchased. Alternately,
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at expiration, if  the expected cash flows do not exceed the cost o f investment, the 
option is allowed to expire unexercised. The assumption is that to own the option 
to cany out the strategy and produce a given product the firm has to have 
invested in previous R & D and marketing and reputation assets and to have 
developed the set o f skills that would allow to production and distribution to 
begin.
Under the net present value (NPV) rale a firm would accept a project if  the 
present value o f the generated cash flows exceeded the present value o f the cost 
of investment. Some positive NPV projects could generate enough proceeds to 
cover the basic cost o f purchasing the required inputs and capital goods but still 
not generate enough cash flow to also pay the outstanding debt. The shareholders 
would not accept the project unless its expected proceeds would both cover the 
cost o f investment and pay-off the debtholders, (Rule is: PV > I +B not PV > I, 
where PV -  present value, I -  investment and B -  value o f debt, see Figure 3.6, 
Appendix 3). Debt effectively increases the exercise price o f the option to 
implement the growth opportunity. If the shareholders default, the assets accrue 
to the bondholders. In other words, all o f the benefits o f the positive NPV project 
would go to the debtholders. The shareholders would receive nothing. The 
shareholders have no incentive to exercise the option to implement some positive 
NPV projects.
Myers (1977) argues that when a firm’s assets are largely made up o f growth 
opportunities it would be difficult to fund the firm with debt because o f the 
shareholders’ incentive to underinvest. A wide variety o f both tangible and 
especially intangible assets are essentially growth opportunities.
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3.3.2.3. Asset L iqu ida tion  and Pay out Proceeds.
If there is no pay-out constraint (e.g. through law or debt covenants), shareholders 
may decide to liquidate the firm and take the proceeds as a dividend. They would 
still have to pay-off the creditors. However, provided I > B this could be 
preferable to making a further investment in order to keep the firm going. Of 
course, the shareholders will undertake this action only if  the salvage value I )  o f  
the assets sold is greater than the market value of their shares (Vs) and the 
creditors’ claims B are worthless: Vs -  B = I (see A3-17).
3.3.2.4. D ebt F inanced D iv idend Payments (M ilk in g  the 
Property)
Shareholders may raise funds from new creditors by giving them the same or 
higher priority than the existing ones and use the funds to pay themselves 
dividends. The total market value o f the firm will remain the same if  the 
investment policy does not change and the signals o f tax effects are not taken into 
consideration. The wealth is transferred from the old creditors to the 
shareholders.
An extreme o f this strategy is to pay out extra dividends or other distributions in 
times o f financial distress, leaving less in the firm for the debtholders. This is 
called “milking the property” a phrase borrowed from the real estate industry. 
The underinvestment strategy and that o f “milking the property” (Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe, 1996), are veiy similar. In the former, the firm chooses not 
to raise new equity; the latter goes a step further, because equity is withdrawn 
through the dividend.
In the above description, each o f the agency problems is presented in isolation; 
however, there are cases where these problems can be combined which 
complicates the situation even more. An example is the combination of problems
48
J. Navi Chapter 3: AT and Capital Structure
2 and 4, where the project is financed first by the issuance o f equity and an 
underinvestment problem may come up. Then a debt-financed dividend payment 
is made in the amount o f the investment outflows, which would be funded with 
new debt. By this the shareholders will be able to capture more o f  the projects 
NPV. Based on this argument some researchers have argued that the under­
investment problem can be tackled by using all debt finance, but other studies 
have shown that this may lead in overinvestment or in the worse case in even 
more underinvestment.
Another range o f problems arises in the case o f funding future investment by the 
partial liquidation o f the current firm’s assets. In this case there is a combination 
o f (1), (3) and (4).
3.3.3. Determination of the Debt / Equity Ratio
Jensen and Meckling (JM) in their paper give an analysis o f the determination of 
the debt/equity ratio under the framework o f the agency costs analysis. They 
name:
Si - inside equity, So - outside equity and, B - debt
The total market value o f the equity is S = Si + So, and the total market value (V) 
o f the firm is V = S +B.
They consider first the optimal ratio o f the outside equity to debt So / B. For this 
they keep constant the size o f the firm as well as the amount o f outside financing 
(B +So). V  for a given size will depend on the agency costs incurred. They use 
as an index of size V*, the value o f the firm at a given scale when agency costs 
are zero. Considering that a certain amount o f financing (B + So) will be realized 
outside, the problem is to determine the optimal fraction E* = So* / (B + So) to 
be financed by outside equity.
From the owner - manager viewpoint, the optimal proportion o f outside funds to 
be obtained from equity for a given level o f internal equity is the value o f E,
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which results in minimum total agency costs.
They define As0(E) as the total agency cost o f outside equity and Ab(E) as the 
total agency cost o f debt. At(E) =  As0(E) + Ab(E) is the total agency cost. 
Referring to the function As0(E) when E =  So/(B + So) is zero, the manager’s 
incentive to exploit (acquiring perks, shirking, etc) the outside equity is zero, as 
the changes in the value o f the total equity are the same as the changes in his own 
equity. As E  increases to 100% his incentive to exploit the outside equity 
increases, therefore the agency costs As0(E) increase.
The agency costs associated with the existence o f debt, Ab(E) are composed 
mainly o f the value reductions in the firm and monitoring costs caused by the 
manager’s incentive to reallocate wealth from debtholders to himself by 
increasing the value o f his equity claim. They are at a maximum where all 
outside funds are obtained by debt, i.e. where So = E = 0. As the amount of debt 
declines to zero these costs also go to zero as E  goes to 1 and his incentive to 
reallocate wealth from debtholders to himself falls. The reasons for this fall are:
a) the total amount o f debt falls, therefore it is more difficult to reallocate any 
given amount away from debtholders; and b) his share o f each reallocation is 
reduced as So increases and his share o f the total equity Si / (Si + So) falls.
Agency costs
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Figure 3.2 Total of agency costs as a function of the ratio of outside equity, to total outside 
financing
The curve At(E) represents the sum of agency costs from various combinations 
of outside equity and debt financing. The minimum total agency cost for given 
size firm and outside financing will happen at some point as At(E*) with a 
mixture o f both debt and equity.
3.3.3.1. E ffe cts o f the scale o f  outside fin a n c in g
Again to study the effect o f the scale of outside financing (So + B), JM keep the 
firm value V* constant. They define an index o f the amount o f outside financing 
to be:
K
r
and consider two possible levels o f outside financing Ko and Ki for a given scale 
of the firm such as Ko < K i.
As the amount o f outside equity increases, the owner’s fractional claim on the 
firm falls. Therefore, he will be induced to take additional non-money related 
benefits from the firm as his share in the equity falls. This on the other side 
increases the optimal level o f monitoring. Both these factors will cause the point 
of agency costs As0(E,K) to shift upwards as the fraction of outside financing, K , 
increases. This is represented in Figure 3.3 by the two curves representing the 
agency costs o f equity, one for the low level o f outside financing, As0(E, Ko) the 
other for the high level o f outside financing As0(E,Ki,).
The locus o f the latter lies always above the locus o f the former, except at the 
origin where they are both zero.
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The agency costs o f debt will similarly rise as the amount o f outside financing 
increases. This means that the locus o f Ab(E, Ki) for high outside financing, Ki, 
will lie above the locus o f Ab(E, Ko), for low outside financing, Ko, since the total 
amount o f resources which can be reallocated from the bondholders increases as 
the total amount o f debt increases.
Total Agency
Fraction of Outside Financing Obtained from Equity
Figure 3.3. Agency cost functions and optimal outside equity as a fraction of total outside 
financing, for two different level of outside financing.
The net effect o f the increased use o f the outside financing given cost functions 
assumed in Figure 3.3 is: a) to increase the total agency costs from At(E*, Ko) to 
At(E*, Ki); and b) to increase the optimal fraction o f outside funds obtained from 
the sale o f outside equity. The locus point, At(E*, K) where agency costs are 
minimised determines E*(IC), the optimal proportion o f equity and debt to be 
used in obtaining outside funds as the outside funds K  range from 0 to 100 
percent.
3.3.4. The Role of Monitoring and Bonding Costs
In principle it would be possible for the bondholders, by the inclusion o f different 
covenants in the contract provisions, to limit the managerial behaviour which
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results in reductions in the value o f the bonds. To completely protect the 
bondholders from the incentive effects, these provisions would have to be veiy  
detailed and cover most operating aspects o f the firm. The costs involved in 
writing down such provisions, the costs o f enforcing them and the reduction in 
the profitability o f the firm would be important. All costs associated with such 
covenants are part o f what is considered as monitoring costs.
The bondholders will engage in the writing o f such covenants and in monitoring 
the actions o f the manager to the point where the marginal costs to them are equal 
the marginal benefits they receive.
The manager has the incentive to take into account the costs imposed on the firm 
by covenants in the debt agreement, which directly affect the future cash flows of 
the firm since they reduce the market value of his claims. Because both external 
and internal monitoring costs are imposed on the manager, it is in his own interest 
that the monitoring is performed at the lowest cost possible.
3.3.5. Bankruptcy and Organization Costs
If there were no costs associated with bankruptcy, the total market value o f the 
firm would not be affected by increasing the probability o f its occurrence. It is 
possible to write contracts representing claims on a firm which depict the rights 
of the owners for all possible states o f the world. Even i f  there were no 
antagonistic incentive effects in increasing debt use relative to equity, the use of 
debt would be constrained by the cost o f defining and enforcing the bondholders’ 
claims. Experience has shown that bankruptcy and reorganization are not 
costless. Thus these costs will influence directly the potential debtholders, as 
their future claims will depend on the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, the 
bankruptcy and reorganization costs claim a non-negligible percentage o f the 
firm’s assets, ((the debt reconstruction costs o f QMH amounted in £40m out of 
£850m of its assets, which is about 4% (The Economist, March 1997); Kwansa &
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Cho (1995) found that the indirect costs o f bankruptcy is “substantial in absolute 
terms”)).
In summary the agency costs associated with debt consist of:
1) the opportunity wealth loss caused by the impact o f the debt on investment 
decisions o f the firm,
2) the monitoring and bonding costs and,
3) the bankruptcy and reorganization costs.
The above analysis deals with one period investment financing, ignoring the 
issues linked with multi-period financing decisions and reputation aspects. It is 
understandable that the expectations o f the future sales o f outside equity and debt 
will change the costs and benefits that the manager faces in making decisions 
which benefit himself at the expense o f current share and bond holders. If he 
develops a reputation for such dealings, he can expect this to unfavorably 
influence the terms at which he can obtain future capital from outside resources. 
John & Nachman (1985) draw together some critical issues in examining the 
reputation phenomena. The paper syntheses the reputation aspects o f debt 
contracts and debt repayment, namely that in the presence o f  the correlated 
opportunities the firm’s first period action can reveal information about the 
second period opportunities. The paper also examines the underinvestment 
problem in an agency setting by introducing repeated play in a two-period model 
with correlated investment opportunities. The paper concludes that reputation 
incentives reduce the frequency o f underinvestment in the first period so that this 
occurs in a lesser mode in the next period. The basic model is that o f an agency 
relationship between inside and outside claimants in an underinvestment 
situation. They show that the repeating o f this relationship a finite number of 
times does not improve the agency costs o f the relationship. In other words, if  the 
multi-period relationship simply involves replication o f otherwise independent 
situations with no inter-temporal linkage, full agency costs o f the one period
54
J. Nari Chapter 3: AT and Capital Structure
scenario will continue.
Another issue that the above analysis does not treat is die voting rights problem.
It is assumed that all outside equity is non-voting. If this equity has voting rights 
then the manager will be concerned about its effect on his welfare o f reducing his 
fractional ownership to the point where he loses control o f the corporation. There 
are several issues linked with voting rights, such as contractual rights involved 
for both sides, the role o f boards o f directors, the coordination costs borne by 
debtholders in implementing policy changes. Voting rights are discussed 
extensively by Grossman & Hart (1988, One Share One Vote and the Market for 
Corporate Control); Hanis & Raviv (1988, Corporate Control Contests and 
Capital Structure), Zingales (1995, What Determines the Value o f Corporate 
Vote?); Franks & Nyborg (1996, Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss o f  
Private Benefits; The Case o f UK Insolvency Code).
Harris & Raviv view financial leverage as an anti-takeover instrument because it 
affects the ownership distribution. Since common stock carries voting rights and 
debt does not, the debt-equity decision may affect the outcome o f corporate votes 
and thus may partly determine who controls coiporate resources.
In Hanis and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990), managers disagree over an 
operating decision. In particular, in the Harris and Raviv managers are assumed 
to want always to continue the firm’s current operation even if  investors prefer 
the firm liquidation. In Stulz, managers are assumed to want always to invest all 
available funds even if  paying out cash is better for investors, therefore creating 
an overinvestment conflict. In both cases, it is assumed that the conflict cannot 
be resolved through contracts based on cash flow and investment expenditures. 
Debt mitigates the problem in Harris and Raviv model by giving investors 
(debtholders) the option to force liquidation if  cash flows are inadequate, whereas 
in Stulz, as in Jensen (1986), debt payments reduce free cash flow. The cost o f  
debt in Stulz’s model is that debt payment may more than exhaust free cash flow,
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reducing the hinds available for profitable investment (underinvestment).
The optimal capital structure in Hams and Raviv trades off improved liquidation 
decisions versus higher investigation costs. A larger debt level improves the 
liquidation decisions because it makes default more likely. In the absence o f 
default, incumbent management is assumed not to liquidate the firm even if  the 
assets are worth more in their next best alternative use. Following the default, 
however, investors control the liquidation decision, and they expend resources to 
obtain additional information pertinent to this decision. Since investors choose 
an optimal liquidation decision based on their information, default improves this 
decision. More frequent default, however, is more costly as resources are 
expended investigating the firm when it is in default.
Diamond (1989), and Hirshleifer and Thalcor (1989) show how the managers or 
films have an incentive to pursue relatively safe projects out o f reputational 
considerations. Diamond’s model is concerned with a firm’s reputation for 
choosing projects that assure debt repayment. There are two possible investment 
projects: a safe, positive NPV project and a risky negative NPV project. The 
risky project can have one o f two payoffs: success or failure. Both projects 
require the same initial investment, which must be funded by debt. A firm can be 
of three, initially observationally equivalent types. One type has access only to 
the safe project, one type has access only to the risky project and one has access 
to both. Since investors cannot distinguish the firms ex ante, the initial lending 
rate reflects their benefits about the projects chosen by firms on average. Returns 
from the safe project suffice to pay debtholders, but returns from the risky project 
allow payment only if  the project is successful.
Because o f the asset substitution problem, if  a firm has a choice o f projects, 
myopic maximisation o f equity value would lead the firm to choose the risky 
project. However, if  the firm can convince the lenders it has only the safe 
project, it will enjoy a lower lending rate. Since the investors can observe only
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the firm’s default history, it is possible for a firm to build a reputation for having 
only the safe project by not defaulting. The longer the firm’s history o f repaying 
its debt, the better is its reputation, the lower is its borrowing cost. Therefore, 
older, more, established firms find it optimal to choose the safe project, i.e. not to 
engage in asset substitution to avoid loosing a valuable reputation. Young firms 
with little reputation choose the risky project. If they survive without default, 
they will eventually switch to the safe project. As a result, firms with long track 
records would have fewer default rates and lower costs o f debt than those with 
brief histories. Although the amount o f debt is fixed in Diamond’s model, it is 
plausible that an extension o f the model would yield the result that younger firms 
have less debt than older ones, other things equal.
Managers may also have an incentive to pursue relatively safe projects out of 
concern for their reputation. Hirsheifer and Thalcor (1989) consider a manager 
who has the choice o f two projects, each having two outcomes, success or failure. 
Failure means the same for both projects, but from the shareholder’s point o f 
view, the high - risk the high - return project yields both higher expected returns 
and higher returns if  it succeeds. However, suppose that from the manager’s 
reputation point o f view, success in the two projects is equivalent, i.e. the 
managerial labour market can only distinguish success against failure. Thus the 
manager maximises probability o f success while shareholders prefer expected 
return. If the safer project has a higher probability o f success, the manager will 
choose it even if  the other project is better for shareholders. This “play safe” 
behaviour o f managers reduces the agency cost o f debt. Thus, if  managers are 
susceptible to such a reputation effect, the firm may be expected to have more 
debt than otherwise.
Jensen (1986) argued that since a firm’s free cash can either be paid out as 
dividends to shareholders or retained by the firm, a conflict may arise between the 
concerned parties. Shareholders prefer to receive free cash as dividends while 
managers, whose compensation is tied to the firm’s expansion, prefer to invest
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free cash in expanding the firm, sometimes beyond its optimal size. One way to 
reduce the free cash and overinvestment, is to increase the film ’s fixed 
obligations by increasing the use o f debt financing.
Harris and Raviv (1990) presented a model based on the effect o f the debt on the 
investors’ information about the firm in their ability to oversee managers. 
Managers prefer to perpetuate the firm’s existence even when it is in the best 
interest o f the shareholders to liquidate. Furthermore, managers will not provide 
information that would lead investors to take control o f the firm. Such conflict 
can be resolved by increasing the use o f debt financing, since debtholders aimed 
with the indentures o f the loan agreement, will take over the firm in case o f  
default. Therefore, increased use o f debt financing provides investors with the 
option to liquidate or take control o f the firm when it is in their best interest.
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) argued that the characteristics o f the projects’ 
cash flows are determined endogenously in an industry. So, capital structures that 
allow the film ’s shareholders to expropriate the bondholders’ wealth are not 
value-reducing in industry equilibrium in a reasonable setting. They also show 
that in the absence o f taxes capital structure is irrelevant to individual firms. But 
with taxes capital structure becomes relevant.
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3.4. Empirical Research
Chung (1993) examines the empirical relationship between firm’s assets 
characteristics and financial leverage, based on the hypothesis derived from the 
agency theory literature. His study includes 1449 firms (out of which 319 are in 
regulated industries) and covers a five year period (1980 -  1984).
In essence, his study showed that firms with large asset beta (ungeared beta) use 
less long- and short-term debt, which is consistent with the traditional notion that 
riskier firms would use less debt. The study also found an inverse association 
between firm’s non-systematic risk and long-term debt, i.e. a positive association 
between asset diversity and long term debt, which supports the joint hypothesis of 
managerial risk aversion and agency costs o f debt arising from shareholder- 
debtholder conflict.
The firms with greater growth opportunities tend to use less debt, which is 
consistent with Myers’ under-investment hypothesis. Firms with a higher 
proportion o f fixed assets tend to use more long-term debt, indicating that firms 
are matching maturities o f their assets and liabilities. Finally, he concludes that 
regulation has a strong positive effect on the long-term debt capacity, which 
perhaps indicates lower agency costs o f debt in regulated industries.
Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) examine empirically the terms o f call 
provisions in a sample o f 268 bonds. They show that in the absence o f a call 
premium, equity holders have an incentive to recapitalise too early. This 
incentive arises from equityholders’ ability to transfer wealth from holders o f a 
fixed coupon bond. This results in too frequent costly recapitalisation. Rational 
bondholders anticipate this behaviour and demand a higher coupon rate. They 
observe substantial variation in relative call premia across bonds, and find that 
bond risk significantly influences the chosen premium: the call premium 
increases with bond risk.
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Kim and Sorensen (1986) attempt to empirically test for the presence of agency 
costs and their relation to the debt policy o f the corporation. Using ANOVA and 
regression techniques on a sample o f 168 firms (divided into three groups: low, 
medium and high inside ownership) for the years 1978, 179, 1980, they found 
that fnms with higher inside ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with 
lower inside ownership. This finding may be due to agency costs. Firms with 
high inside ownership (a) may issue debt so as to remain a  firms because o f costs 
of outside equity. Alternatively, more debt may be issued by high a  firms 
because the agency costs o f outside debt decline with ownership concentration. 
In addition, other regression results tend to confirm the theoretically optimal 
relationship put forward by Myers, that high growth firms use less debt rather 
than non-high growth firms, high operating risk firms use more debt and firm size 
appears to be uncorrelated the level o f debt.
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examined seven control mechanisms which are 
used to control the agency problems between managers and shareholders. They 
are: insider shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, shareholdings by 
blockholders, the use o f outsiders on the board o f directors, debt financing, the 
external labour market for managers, and the market for corporate control.
They constructed a data set containing approximately 400 large firms. They 
found statistically significant relationships between firm performance, measured 
by Tobin’s q, and insider ownership, outside representation on the board o f  
directors, debt financing, and corporate control activity. Greater insider 
ownership was positively correlated with performance, while more outsiders on 
the board, more debt financing, and greater corporate control activity were 
negatively correlated with performance. Except for board composition, their 
results were consistent with optimal use o f each component
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) examined whether executive holdings o f firm’s 
securities reduced agency problems between shareholders and management.
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Specifically, they studied the relationship between stock and stock option 
holdings o f executives and whether acquisition and financing decisions were 
made consistent with the interests o f shareholders. In general, managers prefer 
lower risk acquisitions and lower debt financing. Their sample included 209 
firms that participated in acquisitions and divestitures between 1974 and 1982. 
Consistent with agency ideas, executive security holdings were related to 
acquisition and financing decisions that were more consistent with shareholders’ 
interests. That is, executive stockholdings appeared to co-align managerial 
preferences with those o f the shareholders.
Friend and Hasbrouclc (1988) re-examine in their paper the econometric 
relationship between the capital structure and theoretically relevant explanatory 
variables (asset structure, profitability, volatility, size) by adding in their analysis 
variables that measure one aspect o f the special investment interests that insiders 
have in the continued viability o f the corporation with which they are associated. 
By using such variables as the value o f the maximum dollar investment in the 
stock of the company owned by a corporate insider and related measures o f size 
of insiders’ holdings, they investigate whether there is any systematic relationship 
between such insider holdings and the debt ratio, keeping constant other relevant 
variables. They found generally significant negative correlation between size o f  
these holdings and the debt ratio, although these results were not completely 
uniform. This result was different from those found by other studies, i. e. a 
positive relationship between insiders ownership and financial gearing. They 
state that the larger the size o f an insider’s stock holdings the larger his special 
interest in the company and as a consequence the larger his desire to minimise 
capital structure and therefore the likelihood o f financial distress. They found 
that using both shareholder and management optimisation variables, they still 
could explain only well under half o f the variance o f the debt ratio, with a 
relatively small proportion being explained by the specific management 
optimisation variables used. Their data covered the period 1974 — 1983.
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3.5. Conclusions
The economic theory o f agency focuses on contractual arrangements that provide 
an incentive to agents to invest the appropriate amount o f efforts required by the 
objectives o f the principal.
The financial theoiy o f agency can be considered as an application o f the 
economic theory o f agency to contractual relationships in  finance w ith  the 
distinctive feature o f an explicit consideration o f financial markets (Bamea, 
Haugen &  Senbet, 1985).
Agency problems that are considered in  the financial literature originate from  
three sources. First, partial ownership o f the firm  by owner-managers may 
provide an incentive to consume perquisites beyond that which a sole owner 
would consume optim ally. Second, the existence o f debt financing under lim ited 
lia b ility  creates an incentive to shareholders to engage in  high-risk activities that 
transfer wealth from  debtholders to shareholders. Lim ited lia b ility  on previously 
issued debt may cause shareholders to forgo new profitable investments. Also, it 
may reduce the value o f the firm  when shareholder-debtholder disputes are 
resolved through the process o f costly bankruptcy. Third, there is the problem o f 
inform ational asymmetry. The problem arises when management, which is 
presumed to be acting in  the interest o f existing securityholders, attempts to raise 
additional capital from  outsiders. Management possesses inside inform ation on 
the future values o f the firm , but it  cannot convey the inform ation to the market 
unambiguously because o f a moral hazard problem. I f  management sells the 
securities to outsiders at undervalued prices, existing securityholders suffer a loss 
that can be viewed as an agency cost.
The agency problems o f equity are associated w ith  inform ational asymmetry and 
excessive perquisite consumption. The agency problems o f debt are associated 
w ith these phenomena, as w ell as w ith  risk incentive, investment incentive, and 
bankruptcy problems. The fixed nature o f the debt claim, in  conjunction w ith
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lim ited liab ility , is the prime source o f the risk incentive, investment incentive, 
and bankruptcy problems.
Agency theory has given rise to a whole body o f research regarding the conflicts 
o f interest between shareholders and debtholders, the role o f management 
buyouts in reducing or / and resolving these conflicts, debt reconstructing, 
takeovers and acquisition models, growth opportunities.
Agency models have generated some interesting implications. These models 
predict that gearing is positively associated w ith:
a) firm  value (H irshleifer and Thakor (1989), Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz 
(1990)),
b) default probability (Harris and Raviv (1990))
c) extent o f regulation (Jensen and M eckling (1976), Stulz (1990))
d) free cash flow  (Jensen 1986), Stulz (1990))
e) liquidation value (W illiam son (1988), Hanis and Raviv (1990))
f) managerial reputation (H irshleifer and Thakor (1989)
and that gearing is negatively coiTelated with:
a) growth opportunities (Jensen and M eckling (1976), Stulz (1990))
b) interest coverage (Hanis and Raviv (1990)
c) the cost o f investigating firm  prospects (Hanis and Raviv (1990)
d) probability o f reorganisation fo llow ing default (Harris and Raviv (1990)
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Chapter 4
A sym m e tric  In fo rm a tio n : S igna lling  and A dverse Selection, 
The Pecldng O rd e r T h e o ry  and C a p ita l S tru c tu re  
4.1 In tro d u c tio n
The chapter discusses different theories o f capital structure, which have been 
developed based 011 the asymmetric inform ation argument, i.e. that managers 
have inform ation that investors do not have. The main theories derived from  this 
argument are the signalling model, the pecking order theory.
Signalling model is based on the idea that managers w ith  favourable inside 
inform ation about their firm s have a clear incentive to somehow convey this 
inform ation to outside investors, in  order to increase the market value o f shares. 
The rational o f signalling models regarding debt is that debt can be used as a 
device to convey the inside inform ation to the outsiders.
Pecking order approach differently focuses on the m otivation o f corporate 
managers, rather than on market valuation principles. The argument o f the 
pecking order theory is based on the assumption that because o f the inform ation 
asymmetry the market would place a low  value on common stock. Therefore, a 
way to avoid this underpricing is to use equity as last resort by using in itia lly  the 
retained earnings as a firs t source o f financing followed by debt,
1
Section 4.2 provides discusses the asymmetric inform ation issue and its use in  the 
signalling models. Section 4.3 provides a general discussion o f the pecking order 
theory. Section 4.4 summarises some other theories, which use the asymmetric 
inform ation argument fo r explaining the debt use. Section 4.5 discusses the
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empirical research carried out using the arguments discussed in  the above 
mentioned chapters. Finally, Section 4.6 provides a summary o f the main 
arguments analysed in  the chapter.
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4.2. A sym m e tric  In fo rm a tio n : S ig n a lling  and A dverse  
Selection
A ll contributions to the asymmetric inform ation approach share the common 
assumption that insiders o f the firm  have private inform ation. They then discuss 
the implications o f this assumption for the firm ’s financial policy. The discussion 
developed from  the earlier papers, which took managers’ incentives and even the 
firm ’s real side (e.g., investment policies) as given, to more complex models and 
richer contractual structure.
An early contribution is the Ross (1977) paper on the “ incentive signalling 
approach” , where he developed a signalling model o f corporate capital structure 
based on asymmetric inform ation problems between w ell-inform ed managers and 
poorly informed outside shareholders. This model and several ones that 
followed, (see John &  ICalay (1982), John &  Nachman (1985), John &  W illiam s 
(1985), John &  John (1993), John, Saunders &  Senbet (1996), Narayanan
(1988)), are based on the idea that corporate executives w ith  favourable inside 
inform ation about their firm s have a clear incentive to somehow convey this 
positive inform ation to outside investors, in  order to increase the market price o f 
shares. However, managers cannot sim ply announce that they have good news 
because every other manager has the incentive to do the same, and the market 
w ill be appropriately cautious towards any self-serving statement which can only 
be proved to be true as the time passes. One solution fo r this problem is for 
managers having “ good news” , i.e. o f high-value firm s to signal it  to the investors 
by talcing some action that is prohib itive ly costly for the managers that have “ bad 
news”  i.e., o f low-value firm s to m im ic. As defined in  the economic literature, a 
signal is an action that imposes deadweight costs (higher probability o f 
bankruptcy fo r low-value firm s) on the signaler, in  order to convey inform ation 
about value to relatively poorly informed outsiders. The signal is credible i f  it is 
prohibitively costly fo r a weaker firm  to attempt to m im ic. Ross shows that it  is
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possible to design an incentive based compensation contract for managers o f high 
value firm s that w ill induce them to use a heavily leveraged capital structure for 
their companies. Less valuable companies are unw illing to assume so much debt 
because they are much more like ly  to fa ll into bankruptcy. Based on these 
assumptions, a separating equilibrium  occurs where high value firm s use more 
debt financing and less valuable companies rely more on equity. Investors are 
able to differentiate between high and low  value firms by looking at their capital 
structure and are w illin g  to assign higher valuations to highly levered firms. 
Since weaker firm s are unw illing to m im ic the stronger ones by borrow ing extra 
debt, the equilibrium  is enforced.
The main insights can be developed in  a simpler version o f Ross’s model. 
Consider two film s, A and B, w ith safe returns a and h at t = 1 where b < a. 
Denote the firm s’ values at time t by V tA and V tB, respectively, t = 0,1. Assume 
managers are subject to an incentive compensation scheme, M, and that they 
actually act to maximise M . It is given by:
™  \ f  V, i f  V, > F 
M  ( l + r)y„V 0 + y, j V i_L  i f v ,  <F
where V 0 and V j are the respective values o f the firm  at time 0 and at time 1, and 
L  denotes the penalty fo r the manager i f  the firm  is bankrupt at tim e 1, yo and yj 
are fixed nonnegative weights, whereas r  is the interest rate. Now denote by F  the 
face value o f debt and consider a critical level fo r F  such that b < F < a. Then 
there exists a separating equilibrium  in which investors use the level o f debt as a 
signal to conclude that the firm  is o f type A whenever F > F * and o f type B 
whenever F < F*. Firms have face values o f debt FA and FB such that FA > F* and 
FB < F*. I f  a film  signals itse lf to be o f type A and i f  it  also sets FA < a, so that it 
does not risk bankruptcy unnecessarily, then: V 0 = V 0(FA) = a / (1+r). S im ilarly a 
firm  that gives type B signal by setting F3 < b w ill have an in itia l value o f V 0(FB) 
= b / (1+r). The compensation o f the manager o f the type A firm , then, w ill be 
given by M A = (y0 + y i)ci and the compensation o f the manager o f type B firm  
w ill be M b = (y0 + yfb , and no manager has an incentive to deviate to the other
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fim Ts financial strategy. In  order fo r this to happen, note that the manager o f 
firm  A  would receive y0b + y i a i f  he deviated, which is clearly less than his 
equilibrium  salary. Conversely, i f  the manager o f firm  B deviated, he would 
obtain y0a + yi(b  -L). If: 
yo
L > ---------- ( a - b )
yi
deviation to signal a higher type is not worthwhile. Hence, the manager o f the 
higher return firm  chooses a higher face value o f debt. The manager o f the lower 
value firm  cannot im itate this because it would invoke a bankruptcy penalty L 
which is not compensated by the gain in the stock market’s valuation at t = 0. 
Ross acknowledges that financial signalling is only one possibility to 
communicate the firm ’s true value to the market. Another one would be a 
managerial contract which includes a lia b ility  o f the manager L  i f  profits fa ll short 
o f the threshold level F . Ross argues that such a lia b ility  may be more d ifficu lt 
(and expensive) to enforce than bonding via capital structure.
Although the signalling models are in tu itive ly attractive, the observed patterns o f 
capital structure suggest that they describe the actual behaviour poorly. As it has 
been shown in several studies, leverage ratios are negatively correlated w ith  
p ro fitab ility  in  almost every industry - and not positively correlated as the 
signalling model suggests. The signalling model predicts that industries rich in 
growth options should use more debt than mature, tangible asset rich industries 
because growth companies have more severe inform ation asymmetry problems 
and therefore, greater need to signal. In  fact the opposite pattern is observed, 
tangible asset rich companies use far more debt than do growth companies 
arguably, because o f the asset specificity problem, (discussed in  Chapter 6).
On the other hand, the signalling model does explain the market reaction to 
security issues quite w ell. Typically, debt issues signal good news and are 
greeted w ith  a positive share price response, and share issues signal bad news and
are met w ith  a significant share price decrease (i.e., the market expects “ dilution”  
o f equity cash flows).
Leland and Pyle (1977) address a sim ilar set o f issues, but they consider the 
entrepreneurial firm  and motivate capital structure choice by referring to the 
entrepreneur’s risk aversion. They consider an entrepreneur who has to raise K  in 
order to finance a project w ith  end period return, p + s. He can either issue 
riskless debt w ith  face value D or issue equity in  the firm . He retains a fraction a  
o f the equity. Assume the rate o f interest on riskless debt is zero. Then the 
entrepreneur must raise:
(1 - a ) (V (a ) - D) + D = K
where V (a ) denotes the valuation o f the firm  by the market as a function o f the 
fraction a  retained by the entrepreneur. Hence, the higher the fraction o f equity 
the entrepreneur retains the higher the amount o f debt he has to raise. The 
entrepreneur is risk averse and maximises the expected u tility  o f end o f period 
wealth Eu(W ), which is given from:
W  = a  (p  + s - D ) + (1 - a )( V (a ) - D)
It can be shown that there exists a signalling equilibrium  in  which the amount o f 
equity retained by the entrepreneur is increasing in  the firm ’s returns p which are 
known to the entrepreneur but not to the market. Then the amount o f equity a  
retained by the entrepreneur is regarded by the market as a signal o f quality, and 
the valuation by the market increases in  a  c.f. “ hostage posting”  in  transaction 
cost economics. No entrepreneur has an incentive to deviate from  this 
equilibrium . He could choose a higher a  in  order to signal a higher value and 
obtain a higher valuation on the equity he sells. However, this would expose him 
to more o f the specific risk o f his project. Since entrepreneurs w ith  better projects 
obtain a higher return on their fraction o f retained equity, a higher a  is less costly 
to them than entrepreneur w ith  in ferior projects. Hence, the signalling
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equilibrium  separates good and bad projects by the amount o f retained equity. 
Leland and Pyle show that an entrepreneur’s willingness to invest in  his own 
project can serve as a signal o f project quality. They posit that: a) a project w ill 
be undertaken if, and only if, its true market value, given the expected return from  
the project, exceeds its cost. This implies that inform ation transfer through 
signalling possesses a crucial efficiency property: the set o f projects which are 
undertaken coincides w ith  that set which would be undertaken i f  inform ation 
could be communicated costlessly; b) an increase either in  the specific risk o f the 
project or in  the risk aversion o f the entrepreneur w ill reduce the entrepreneur’s 
equilibrium equity position, fo r any value o f expected return at which the project 
is undertaken; c) an increase in  the specific risk o f the project results in  lower 
expected utility fo r the entrepreneur, fo r any level o f the expected return at which 
the project is undertaken. Thus projects which are “ more distinct”  (higher 
specific risk) from  the market are relatively easier to signal, in  the sense that they 
result in lower signalling costs in equilibrium ; and d) fo r any level o f expected 
return, greater project variance implies lower optimal debt, i.e., independent o f 
possible bankruptcy costs, firms w ith  riskier returns w ill have lower optimal debt 
levels.
In  an inform al discussion, Leland and Pyle relate their results to financial 
intermediation. In  the market equilibrium , they say, entrepreneurs obtain fa ir 
terms o f finance by communicating their project quality to the market by a high 
level o f retained equity a. However, this way o f communicating their private 
inform ation is costly, since their u tility  is reduced by their exposure to the 
idiosyncratic risk o f their project. Intermediaries (e.g., brokers in  the venture 
capital markets) can be thought o f as organisations which specialise in 
inform ation acquisition and monitor entrepreneurs’ projects. They obtain 
knowledge about the projects at a cost and offer entrepreneurs better terms o f 
finance than they would have received w ithout the inform ation. Their discussion 
shows that signalling equilibria are unsatisfactory, since they accept that the 
transmission o f inform ation is costly: separation happens because agents trade o ff
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the signalling costs against the benefits o f communicating the inform ation 
differently (other than selecting the optimum level o f a). This always raises the 
question why this inform ation cannot be communicated and verified more 
cheaply in a more direct way. The last question was taken up by literature on 
non-desipative signalling, which developed models o f financial signalling that do 
not rely on sacrifices in  the form  o f excessive risk exposure as in  Leland and Pyle 
or penalties as in  Ross.
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4.3. The Pecking O rd e r T h e o ry
Myers and M a jlu f (1984) went beyond the focus o f signalling models, which took 
the firm ’s investment policy as given, and analysed the interaction between 
financing and investment decisions in  an environment w ith  asymmetric 
information. They consider a firm  which in itia lly  at (t =  0) has assets in  place and 
a growth option. The growth option is an investment opportunity which can be 
carried out at t = 1 and can he neither accelerated nor postponed. Returns are 
realised at t=  2. Returns are uncertain and are denoted by A  fo r the assets in place 
and by B fo r the new investment (returns are net o f investments). Realisations o f 
these random variables are denoted respectively by A  and B. Their expected 
means are given as pA and pB respectively. A t t =  0 there is symmetric 
inform ation between managers and outside investors who all know the 
distribution o f returns. A t t =1 managers, but not investors, learn the realisations 
A, B o f the returns (i.e. the managers know the realisation B, o f B, ex ante at t =
1), and update their values accordingly. Then managers decide whether to 
exercise the option to invest further. I f  they invest they have to raise an amount K  
in  the financial markets, by issuing either debt or equity.
The important assumption driving the results is that managers maximise the value 
o f the shares o f existing shareholders, denoted by V. They evaluate these shares 
given their private inform ation, hence V w ill generally d iffe r from  the market’s 
valuation o f these shares, denoted by P . Consider firs t the case o f an equity issue. 
The value o f the new equity issued at t = 1 is E and the total market value o f the 
firm  after issuing and investing the same amount raised is P + E. I f  the option to 
invest is not exercised V  = A. I f  investment takes place, the total value o f the 
fnm  is A  + B. O ld shareholders receive a fraction P / (P + E) o f this value, hence 
V  = {[P / (P+E)] (A  -KB)}. Since managers maximise the value o f the stake 
owned by existing shareholders, they w ill invest i f  and only if:
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P E
A  < (A  + B) <+> B > A
P + E P
Hence, managers invest i f  and only i f  the net present value o f the project, B, 
exceeds a threshold which is strictly positive whenever A is strictly positive. 
Specifically, i f  B is positive but smaller than (E/P)A, the growth option w ill not 
be exercised. Hence, positive net present value projects are not realised. The 
intu ition is that after the issue o f new shares, old shareholders receive a share P / 
(P + E) in the net present value o f the new project B in  exchange fo r giving new 
shareholders a share E / (E + P) in  the returns on the assets in  place. The 
assumption that managers maximise the value o f the shares o f old shareholders 
implies that managers invest i f  and only i f  the share that the existing shareholders 
receive in  the new projects is worth more than the share they give up 011 assets in 
place. This is exactly reflected in the condition given above.
The important result im plied by Myers and M a jlu f s analysis is known as the 
“ pecking order theory”  o f financing. Their model is based on four assumptions 
about corporate finance behaviour: 1) Managers try  at a ll costs to maintain a 
constant dollar-per-share dividend payment, and w ill neither decrease nor 
increase dividends in  response to the fluctuations in  current profits; 2) firms 
prefer internal financing (retained earnings and depreciation) to external financing 
o f any sort, debt or equity; 3) i f  a firm  must obtain external financing, it  w ill 
chose the least risky security first; 4) as a firm  is required to obtain external 
financing, it  w ill w ork down the “ pecking order”  o f securities, beginning w ith 
very safe debt, than progressing through more risky ju n io r debt, convertible 
securities, preferred stock and fina lly  common stock as the last resort.
This model focuses on the motivations o f corporate managers, rather than on 
capital market valuation principles. Myers and M a jlu f make two key 
assumptions about corporate managers. First, they assume that the firm ’s 
managers know more about the company’s current earnings and investment
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opportunities than do outside investors and somehow they want to convey this 
inform ation to the outsiders. Second, they assume that managers act in  the best 
interests o f the existing shareholders. The asymmetric inform ation assumption 
implies that managers who develop or discover a marvellous new positive NPV 
investment opportunity are unable to convey that inform ation to outside 
shareholders because the managers’ statements w ill not be believed. A fte r all, 
every management team has an incentive to announce excellent new projects in 
order to push up the firm ’s stock price, so that they can sell shares at an 
overestimated price. And, since investors are unable to verify  these claims until 
long after the fact, they w ill assign a low  average value to the stock o f a ll firm s 
and w ill buy new equity issues only at a large discount from  their equilibrium  
values w ithout the inform ational asymmetry. Corporate managers understand 
that, and sometimes w ill refuse positive NPV projects i f  this would mean issuing 
new equity, since this would give away to much o f the project’s value to the new 
shareholders at the expense o f the old. So we have a situation where investors 
cannot trust managers, so they place a low  value on common stock, and managers 
are forced to forego good investment opportunities because they cannot credibly 
convey their private inform ation to the existing shareholders. Myers and M ajlu fs’ 
answer to this problem is fo r corporations to retain sufficient financial slack to 
fund positive NPV projects internally. Financial slack is defined as firm ’s cash 
and marketable securities holdings, as w ell as unused risk free debt capacity. 
Firms w ith  sufficient financial slack w ill never have to issue risky debt or equity 
securities in  order to finance their investment projects, and they are thus able to 
solve or avoid asymmetric inform ation problems between managers and 
shareholders.
Pecking Order Theory explains several observed patterns o f behaviour. Knowing 
that new equity issues are “ punished”  by the stock markets, managers w ill issue 
shares only i f  they are either forced to do so by an earnings shortfall or are 
voluntarily acting against the interest o f the existing shareholders in  order to 
enrich themselves. Note also that when common stock is issued, this is normally
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by means o f a “ rights issue”  allow ing existing shareholders to buy at a discount 
(or else sell their “ rights”  in  the market. In  either case, this explains to some 
extent why leverage decreasing actions are associated w ith share price declines 
(see M ikkelson and Partch 1986). On the other hand, the leverage increasing 
announcements indicate that the managers are confident enough about the firm ’s 
future earnings power that they can increase corporate debt levels w ithout 
im pairing the firm ’s ab ility  to service its investment internally. Therefore, the 
stock market reacts positively to leverage increasing announcements (sim ilar to 
the A T  argument from  asymmetry inform ation).
Unfortunately, the Pecking Order Theoiy cannot explain all the capital structure 
regularities obseived in practice. It  suffers in  comparison w ith  the trade-off 
theoiy in its inab ility  to explain how taxes, bankruptcy costs, security issuance 
costs, and an individual firm ’s investment opportunity set influence the 
company’s actual debt ratio. The theory ignores significant agency problems that 
can easily arise when the firm ’s managers accumulate so much financial slack 
that they become immune to the market discipline (Megginson 1995, chapter 7). 
This can happen when a firm  does not need to raise external funds, and therefore 
cannot be penalised by the market through a low  security price, and has 
accumulated so much financial slack that its managers are immune to forced 
removal via a hostile acquisition.
Myers and M a jlu f s analysis has subsequently been criticised and extended. Two 
discussion should be mentioned here. Dybvig and Zender (1991) discuss the role 
o f the specific assumption about managerial incentives by exp lic itly introducing a 
managerial contract negotiated between the old shareholders, at t  =  0, and 
managers. They observe that the managers’ incentives in  the Myers /  M a jlu f 
model amount to m axim ising the share price at the end o f the second period. 
However, when shareholders choose the capital structure and negotiate the 
incentive contract w ith  managers at t = 0, they maximise the value o f the firm  at 
this point in time, which under the assumption o f all equity financing amounts to
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m axim ising the share price at t = 0. From the point o f view  o f in itia l 
shareholders, it  is optimal to give managers incentives which induce them to 
implement all and only positive net present value projects. I f  managers are risk 
neutral, this can be achieved by giving them a linear compensation contract which 
is contingent on total cumulative earnings at t = 2, and does not depend on the 
stock price, in  particular not on the price at t = 1. Such a contract cannot be ruled 
out, since it is contingent on exactly the same variables as financing contracts, 
whose payoffs depend on second period earnings (one theme o f their article is 
that optimal contracting is independent o f financing because using market prices 
one cannot improve on contracts that already exploit the public inform ation on 
which the market prices are based). Myers and M a jlu f obtain a different result 
only because they make managers arbitrarily interested in  the stock price at an 
intermediate date, t = 1. However, when managerial contracts are optim ally 
chosen the firs t best investment rule is implemented. On the basis o f this 
argument Dybvig and Zender show that the capital structure and dividend payout 
policy are irrelevant in  a model w ith  endogenous investment and asymmetric 
inform ation i f  managerial contracts can be chosen independently o f financing 
contracts. However, the assumption that managers are risk-neutral is quite a 
strong one.
Another criticism  o f Myers and M a jlu f s results was formulated by Brennan and 
Kraus (1987) who considered a w ider range o f financing possibilities. Their 
results contrast also w ith  the earlier literature on signalling, because they show 
that signalling w ith  the capital structure can be costless. Brennan and Kraus 
consider a market in which firm s who have private inform ation about their future 
income streams issue securities. Managers are interested in  m inim ising financing 
costs, based on their private information. This implies that they prefer to issue 
those securities which are valued higher by the market. The authors show that a 
separating equilibrium  in  this market has the property that a ll the claims are 
priced according to the “ lemmons principle” , namely, the market prices each 
security under the supposition that is issued by that firm  fo r w hich it  is worth least
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and that the supposition is correct. They give an example in  which a film  can be 
either in  a good or a bad state and show that each firm  reveals its type costlessly. 
In  the good state, the existing debt o f the firm  is assumed to be riskless. Then the 
firm  retires debt and issues equity. In  the bad state debt would be risky and 
accordingly have a lower value. In  this state the firm  would retire all the debt and 
issue equity. This is an equilibrium  because the firm  has never an incentive to 
deviate from  this strategy and all securities are fa irly  priced since the stock market 
learns the state from  the financing method chosen. In  the good state, the firm  
does not finance only w ith  equity, because the market would conclude that the 
bad state has occurred and the shares issued would be underpriced. Conversely, 
in the bad state, the firm  does not retire a ll debt, because the market would 
conclude that the state is good and overvalue debt, causing a loss fo r the firm . 
Hence, in  this equilibrium  all firm s obtain fa ir terms o f finance and no firm  has an 
incentive to m im ic another type. As a consequence, a ll and only positive net 
present value projects are implemented, contradicting Myers and M a jlu f s results.
The literature which puts asymmetric inform ation at the core o f capital structure 
theoiy analysed financing methods as a way to communicate the private 
inform ation o f company insiders to the markets for financial instruments. The 
earlier papers concluded that asymmetric inform ation leads to efficiency losses, 
because credible communication o f private inform ation requires deviations from  
the optimal allocation o f risk or optimal investment policy. The criticisms 
discussed above have shown that the costly signalling and adverse selection 
results are somewhat fragile, since moderate changes in  the contractual 
framework (introduction o f optimal managerial contracts or more complex 
financing arrangements) can reduce or eliminate these costs, and the claim that 
these alternatives cause higher transaction costs is not convincing. Moreover, the 
asymmetric inform ation approach to financial contracts focuses exclusively on 
income streams and does not even raise the question o f control rights associated 
w ith  securities. Hart (1991) remarks that a simple and common institution such 
as senior debt cannot be understood from  an asymmetric inform ation point o f
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view, an argument which could most probably be extended to voting rights o f 
equity shares.
Nonetheless, the Pecking Order Theory o f capital structure seems to explain 
certain aspects o f observed corporate behaviour better than some other models, 
and this particularly true o f corporate financing choices, i. e. what type o f 
securities firm s choose to issue, and market response to the type o f security 
issues.
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4. 4. Some O th e r T heo re tica l T rea tm ents  o f C a p ita l S tru c tu re
Grossman and H art’s (1982) bonding theory o f capital structure relies on the 
notion that equity finance gives the manager more scope fo r consuming 
perquisites than debt finance. However, in  their model the benefit o f debt finance 
is not related to the fraction o f inside equity held by the manager and the notion o f 
asset substitution is absent. They assume that the owner - manager can consume 
the funds intended for investment i f  creditors cannot exercise control over the 
firm , which they do only i f  bankruptcy occurs. I f  managers do not seek high 
profits, the probability that the corporation w ill go bankrupt increases. I f  the 
benefits managers receive from  the firm  are lost in the event o f bankruptcy, 
mangers may prefer to maximise profits or come close to it rather than to risk 
sacrificing their perquisites. Thus, the managers trade o ff the u tility  o f consuming 
some o f the wealth and the probability o f being bankrupt. Therefore, issuing debt 
rather than equity gives managers an incentive to invest more funds so as to avoid 
bankruptcy. In  this sense, the capital structure acts as a bonding device. 
Grossman and Hart combine an agency problem sim ilar to Jensen and M eckling 
(1976) (consumption o f perquisites) w ith  a signalling equilibrium , in  which the 
debt level signals the unobservable production decision taken by managers.
Jensen (1986) expanded on the issue o f management’s deviations from  optimal 
investment policies and perquisite consumption raised in  Jensen and M eckling 
(1976). He pointed out that managers tend to use cash available in  the firm  for 
investing in  new projects, and prefer investment in  negative net present value 
projects over passing on excess funds (“ free cash flo w ” ) to shareholders. Hence, 
in mature industries where firm s generate large cash flows, but have only few 
growth opportunities, managers tend to overinvest and diversify into industries in 
which they have little  knowledge. B y issuing debt in  exchange fo r stock, 
managers are bonding their promise to pay future cash flows in  a way that cannot 
be accomplished by simple dividend increases. Jensen calls this the “ control 
hypothesis”  fo r debt creation. Debt creation, w ithout retention o f the proceeds o f
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the issue, enables managers to effectively bond their promise to pay out future 
cash flows. Thus, debt can be an effective substitute for dividends. He continues 
w ith  some evidence in  the use o f free cash flow  theoiy in  explaining financial 
restructuring, leveraged buyouts and “ going private”  transactions (equity buy­
backs).
Hanis and Raviv (1990) developed a theory o f debt based on the idea that assets 
have alternative uses outside the firm , but managers are reluctant to give up 
control. Suppose the firm  has stochastic income x at t = 1 and its assets have value 
L  and V  outside and inside the firm , respectively. Outsiders do not leam x or V  
and managers resist liquidation in  order to realise a higher outside value i f  L  > V ; 
hence, they do not disclose the relevant inform ation. Debt w ith  face value D 
serves to increase firm  value because it forces control into the hands o f outsiders 
whenever x  < D. Then the firm  defaults and outsiders investigate the firm . They 
incur investigation costs and leam V  and x. They then decide whether to continue 
or liquidate the firm . Since liquidation is more like ly  to be the optimal policy in  
lower states, standard debt is an optimal contract and the optimal debt level trades 
o ff the costs o f investigating the firm  against the gains from  an improved 
liquidation decision.
Myers (1977) identified another cost o f debt finance fo r firm s which have growth 
opportunities. Suppose a firm  is levered and has promised F to creditors. I t  has 
an investment opportunity which has a present value V  and requires an in itia l 
outlay I. It  w ill be impossible to finance this project i f V - F > I > V  because 
shareholders cannot recover their in itia l outlay I  i f  they finance the project as a 
part o f the return goes to debtholders. Hart (1991) has criticised Myers because 
he does not explain why firm s use senior debt to begin w ith: the tax savings to 
which he refers can also be obtained w ith  subordinate debt. Hart and Moore
(1989) have extended this analysis and combined it  w ith  Jensen’s (1986) notion 
o f overinvestment from  free cash flow . By extending the theory in  a dynamic 
setting, they derive an optimal m aturity and seniority structure o f debt from  the
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need to control simultaneously the overinvestment problem (Jensen) and 
underinvestment (Myers).
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The common point o f the agency approach to capital structure and the property 
rights theory is in that they both emphasise conflicts o f interests and the way in 
which the contractual set up o f the firm  aids conflict resolution. The fo llow ing 
table gives an overview over the kind o f conflicts considered which lead to costs 
and benefits from  debt, and identifies the trade o ff which determines the optimal 
capital structure.
BENFITS OF DEBT COSTS OF DEBT
Jensen and Meckling (1976) Increase the managers equity share 
and limit diluting private benefits 
(perquisites)
Risk shifting (asset 
substitution)
Jensen (1986) Limit diluting private benefit 
(overinvestment)
Unspecified
Grossman and Hart Gives entrepreneurs the incentive 
to use borrowed funds for 
investment
Loss of control rents 
(consumption of borrowed 
funds)
Myers (1977) Tax benefits Underinvestment in 
growth opportunities
Hart and Moore (1989) Limit Overinvestment Underinvestment
Hanis and Raviv (1990) Generates information about 
profitability
Investigation costs
Stulz (1991) Reduce free cash (overinvestment) Underinvestment
Table 4.1. A summary of costs and benefits of debt identified by different studies
Managers, equity holders, and bondholders have potentially conflicting views 
about the optimal production plan o f the firm  between which the optimal 
combination o f securities in  the capital structure strikes a balance.
Conflicts o f interest are analysed from  an incentive point o f view, where 
incentives are determined by income streams which are shared between managers 
and outside investors. The analysis o f these conflicts o f interest resembles, then, 
a principal-agent model in  which capital structure assumes the role o f a pro fit- 
contingent compensation scheme fo r the agent, again raising the question o f why 
a direct incentive contract fo r the manager is not chosen. The form al literature
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fo llow ing Jensen and M eckling reviewed here has neglected the allocation o f 
control rights as one dimension o f securities and corporate capital structure. 
From this point o f view, the agency literature shares the shortcomings o f the 
asymmetric inform ation literature discussed above. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
have, however, discussed the issues o f corporate governance, control rights and 
the structure o f decision making. These papers give a more extensive discussion 
o f property rights and the structures o f decision making in a corporation.
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Donaldson (1961) conducted a survey o f how the managers choose their sources 
o f funds. His findings were:
1) Film s prefer to use internally generated funds to finance projects. Such 
generated funds represent the accumulation o f retained earnings, depreciation 
and depletion expenses.
2) Dividend payout ratios are determined based on expected future earnings and 
cash flows. That is, the payout ratio is set such that the expected retaining 
earnings cover the expected investments, under normal conditions.
3) Dividends are sticky. Managers hold dollar dividend payout constant in  the 
short-run. In  addition, they avoid reducing dividends whenever possible.
4) Whenever a firm  has retained earnings in excess o f what is needed fo r planned 
investments, it  w ill invest these funds in marketable securities, rather than 
increasing the dividend.1
5) In  cases where firm s need external sources o f funds to finance an investment, 
debt is preferred to equity. Firms use equity financing only as a last resort.
Baskin (1989) suggested that the pecking order hypothesis appears to describe 
corporate practice. He used regression-based econometrics to distinguish 
between the pecking order behaviour and the static optimal capital structure 
(trade-off) theoiy. A  sample o f 378 firm s from  the 1960 Fortune 500 that were 
s till available in  COMPUSTAT in  1984 was used. The results confirmed the 
basic pattern o f correlation that is consistent w ith  the pecking order theoiy, and it 
was shown that the small positive serial correlation in  debt financing disappears 
once the effect o f p ro fitab ility, growth and dividend policy are controlled for. 
The alternative theory o f static optimal capital structure seems to have little  power 
in explaining corporate behaviour.
1 More recently share repurchases have become quite common as a use of excess funds, especially in 
jurisdictions which allow “treasury stock” to be sold.
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Norton (1991) used a survey instrument designed to examine the motivations, 
behaviour and beliefs that guide capital structure decisions o f small firm s. Only 
110 out o f 405 such survey instruments received from  small, high-growth 
corporations, were usable. The survey questions were derived from  various 
strands o f the theoretical financial literature on capital structure. The results 
showed that, contrary to mainstream financial theoiy, factors dealing w ith 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs and inform ation asymmetry have little  effect, i f  
any, on the capital structure policy o f such firm s. In  fact, he concluded that these 
factors “ ...are a concern only to firm s liv ing  on the edge, e.g. large firms 
experiencing financial problems or firm s w ith  an inadequate track record” . The 
responses showed that financial officers in  the sample followed a “pecking order”  
when choosing their sources o f funds. In  financing assets, internally generated 
cash was used as much as possible and in  the cases where external financing is 
needed, debt is used to raise funds and equity instruments are issued as a last 
resort.
Griner and Gordon (1995) used subsets o f Fortune 500 companies in  each o f the 
years 1985 to 1988 to test the pecking order and managerial hypotheses, i.e. 
managers who have a small ownership stake in  the firm  use internal cash flows to 
undertake a level o f capital expenditures higher than that which would maximise 
the wealth o f current shareholders. The bivariate analysis o f capital expenditures 
and internal cash flows confirmed the prediction o f both theories that internal 
cash flow  is an important determinant o f capital expenditure levels. The analysis 
also showed an inverse curvilinear association between capital expenditures and 
insider ownership. The m ultivariate analysis confirmed that internal cash flow  is 
an important determinant o f capital expenditure levels. However, the most 
important finding was that there no association between capital expenditures and 
insider ownership, in  any o f the years, after controlling fo r other determinants o f 
capital expenditures. The conclusion was that the reliance on internal cash flow  is 
not caused by conflicts between managers and existing shareholders, but rather is 
a consequence o f inform ation asymmetries between managers and potential new
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shareholders. Hence, using internal cash flows is, ceteris paribus, wealth 
maximising fo r existing shareholders when compared to issuing debt. (However, 
that would not explain the use o f cash flo w  rather than debt).
Adedeji (1998), in  his study o f 224 U.K. firm s over the period 1993 - 1996, 
concludes that there is a negative relationship between the dividend payout ratio 
and investment. He also concludes that there is a positive association between the 
dividend payout ratio and gearing. However, there is no significant correlation 
between gearing and investments. Although investments have a positive 
influence on gearing, the opposite does not hold. The results are sim ilar to the 
previous evidence on pecking order theory, asymmetric inform ation and dividend 
policy.
A  very important empirical research particularly relevant to the empirical study o f 
this research is that o f Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) where they tested the 
static trade-off model against the alternative o f the pecking order model o f 
corporate financing in their study o f 157 firm s over the 1971 - 1989 period.
They based their pecking order model on the idea that when a firm ’s cash flows 
are inadequate for its real investment and dividend commitments, the firm  issues 
debt. Equity is never issued, except possibly when firm s can only issue ju nk debt 
and costs o f financial distress are high. According to their model the firms 
borrowing behaviour would depend on the amount o f deficit or surplus o f 
available cash flows. They calculated this deficit/surplus as the difference 
between operating cash flows and dividend, capital expenditures, net increase in 
working capital and the current portion o f long-term debt. F ina lly they regressed 
the firs t differences in debt (the amount o f debt issued or retired) against the 
deficit/surplus in  cash flows.
Their static trade-off model was based on the idea that managers seek optimal 
capital structure. Random events would bump them away from  it, and they
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would than have to work gradually back. I f  the optimum debt ratio is stable, we 
would see mean reverting behaviour. They target adjustment model stated that 
changes in  the debt ratios are explained by the deviations o f the current ratio from  
the target. The proxy target debt ratio they used was the historical mean o f the 
debt ratio fo r each firm .
They concluded that the pecking order is an excellent firs t order descriptor o f 
corporate finance behaviour. The target adjustment model, when tested 
separately seems to perform  well. When the two models are tested jo in tly , the 
coefficients and the significance o f the pecking order change hardly at all, 
whereas the performance o f the target adjustment model degrades. The strong 
performance o f the pecking order does not occur just because firm s fund 
unanticipated cash needs w ith  debt in  the short mn. Their results suggest that 
firm s plan to finance the deficit w ith  debt.
They tested the statistical power o f their test through a Monte Carlo simulation on 
hypothetical data. They found that the target adjustment model appear to explain 
financing decisions when underlying behaviour is purely pecking order. Based 
on this result they concluded although there is mean reversion in  the sample 
companies’ debt ratios, but that does not mean that companies were issuing and 
retiring debt to move toward an optimal target debt ratio. Mean reversion in  debt 
ratios can generate spuriously good fits, and significant coefficients fo r target- 
adjustment models, even when the mean reversion has nothing w ith  optimal debt 
ratios, but sim ply reflects pecking order financing coupled w ith  cycles or mean- 
reversion in  financial deficits or surpluses.
The effect o f the financing decision on securities’ prices was also evaluated by 
Krasker (1986). He confirmed the results founded by Myers / M a jlu f by allow ing 
the firm  to vary the size o f the investment. He found that the larger the stock 
issue the worse the price effect on existing common stock.
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M ikkelson and Partch (1986) analysed the stock price effects o f various types o f 
financing events undertaken by a set o f 360 companies in the period 1972 through 
1982. On average they found a negative, statistically significant stock price 
response to the announcement o f common stock and convertible debt offerings. 
The average price reaction to the announcement o f preferred stock, straight debt, 
private placements o f debt and term loans is small and non-significant at the 0.10 
level. The average price response to the announcement o f credit agreements is 
positive.
Cheung &  K rinsky (1994) investigated the alleged underpricing in in itia l public 
offerings (IPOs) caused by the inform ation asymmetry between the investment 
banker and the issuer. They reported that their results in  general failed to support 
the IPO underpricing hypothesis. When the underpricing was asserted it appeared 
to be a short run phenomenon (that m ight mean that “ stags”  in  IPOs get their 
profits quickly).
Shah (1994) investigated the effect o f pure capital structure in firm s and found 
that leverage increases and decreases convey qualitative different inform ation. 
Leverage increases appear to lower the investors’ assessment o f the risk o f the 
firm ’s stock but not their expectations o f cash flow . Leverage decreases appear to 
lower the investors’ assessment o f cash flows hut not their assessment o f risk. He 
also concluded that increases in  leverage do not explain the inform ation content 
or the inform ation asymmetry o f the issue.
Beatty, R iffe  and Welch (1997) assess the future net capital expenditures for a 
broad cross-section o f COMPUSTAT firm s from  1973 - 1989. They explore 
three general categories o f factors expected to influence investment: external 
equity financing, internally generated accounting inform ation and tax incentives. 
They find  that external financing and inform ation play a role in  that both positive 
stock returns and equity issues indicate future increases in  investments.
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Accounting inform ation about internal sources and uses o f funds is also important 
in  the investment decision.
Davies and Brucato (1987) examined the role that property rights play in 
explaining differences in  economic behaviour in  the Australian Banking Industry 
fo r the period 1962 - 1978. This industry is characterised by firm s w ith  distinctly 
different forms o f ownership: those w ith  non-transferable public ownership by 
taxpayers and those w ith  transferable private ownership. The results o f their 
analysis o f these ownership differences support the general im plications o f 
property rights analysis. They found first, that the management o f publicly 
owned banks prefers less risk, which leads to a lower expected return on assets, 
when managing the bank’s assets. This conclusion is supported by the lower 
percentage o f commercial loans and higher percentage o f Australian public 
securities the publicly-owned bank holds relative to the private banks. Second, 
private banks show greater p ro fitab ility  than the publicly-owned bank. The 
results o f the equations showing greater profits per assets and profits per deposit 
fo r the private banks as w ell as the finding showing higher net earnings per 
employee support this conclusion.
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4.6 C onclusions
The main predictions o f the asymmetric inform ation and signalling theories 
concern stock price reactions to issues and exchange o f securities, the amount o f 
leverage and whether firm s observe a pecking order fo r security issues.
Stock Price Effect o f Security Issues:
Debt: Myers and M a jlu f (1984) and Kraslcer (1986) predict the absence o f price 
effect upon issuance o f (riskless) debt. Narayanan (1988) predicts a 
positive price effect o f a risky debt issue.
Equity'. Mayers and M a jlu f (1984) Kraslcer (1986) and Lucas and MacDonald
(1990) predict a negative price effect o f an equity issue.
Stock Price Effects: replacement o f debt w ith  equity and vice-versa.
Debt: Increasing Offers: Constantinides and Grundy (1989) predict a positive 
stock price reaction that is larger, the larger the exchange.
Equity: Brennan and Kraus (1987) predict a positive stock price reaction.
Is there a Pecking Order?
Yes: Donaldson (1961), Myers and M a jlu f (1984), Narayanan (1988), Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), etc.
No Brennan and Kraus (1987), Noe (1988) dispute the pecking order results in  
models sim ilar to that o f Myers and M ajluf. Other signalling models, such 
as Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977), and Heinkel (1982) do not obtain 
a pecking order result.
Leverage
Myers and M a jlu f (1984) implies that leverage increases w ith  the extent o f the 
inform ation asymmetry. Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977) Heinkel (1982), 
John (1987) all derive a positive correlation between leverage and value in  a cross 
section o f otherwise sim ilar firm s. Ross (1977) also predicts a positive
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correlation between leverage and firm  value, while Leland and Pyle (1977) 
predict a positive correlation between value and the proportion o f equity held by 
insiders.
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Chapter 5
The P ro p e rty  R ig h ts  T h e o ry  and C a p ita l 
S tru c tu re .
5.1. In tro d u c tio n
The view  held by proponents o f the property rights approach is that a firm  can he 
defined by its non-human assets and the allocation o f property right to these 
assets. Property rights can be defined as the rights to return streams and the rights 
to make strategic decisions in contingencies not exp lic itly contracted upon 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). Property rights include the right to determine how 
assets are used (control rights), the rights to the cash flows generated by these 
assets (return rights) as w ell as the right to sell these rights (A lchian and Demsetz, 
1972).
State - contingent control rights are important in  financial contracting; one party 
may be in  control when the firm  is doing w ell, w hile another takes over in 
financial distress. According to the recent property rights research, property 
rights to corporate assets are specified in  the firm ’s financial contracts. The 
firm ’s capital structure here refers to both the composition o f different types o f 
financial contracts (e. g., debt and equity) and the distribution o f these contracts 
among investors (e.g. between an entrepreneur and an external investor). The 
property rights literature regards financial instruments as commitment devices 
and focuses on the control aspects o f these instruments. These instruments are 
viewed as defining both the allocation o f rights to the return streams and residual 
control rights.
A  b rie f description o f the property rights approach and its application to capital
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structure is given in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. Section 5.4 provides a
general evaluation o f property rights approach. The main topics discussed in  this 
chapter are summarised in  Section 5.5.
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5.2. The P ro p e rty  R igh ts  T h e o ry  o f the F irm .
The key question addressed by the property rights approach to the theory o f the 
firm  is: what defines the boundaries o f the firm? That is, why are some 
transactions carried out through the market and contracts relating to particular 
transactions, and why are the others carried out w ith in  the organisation? This 
question can be traced back at least to Coase’s (1937) seminal article. He 
observed that the market transactions involve costs o f haggling and bargaining 
over the terms o f the contract. These transaction costs can be reduced by making 
both parties to a contract part o f the same organisation in  which a central 
authority gives instructions about the transactions to be carried out. These 
savings would be particularly significant fo r economic relationships which are 
repeated. On the other hand, concentrating many transactions in  one firm  and 
subsuming them under the authority o f one central body leads to inefficiencies 
due to errors and the rigidities o f large organisation. The optimal size o f the firm  
is then decided from  this trade-off. This analysis has been criticised (Hart, 1989) 
because it does not answer the question o f when and why the cost o f supervising 
the execution o f instruction by central authorities, and the friction  internal to the 
firm , results in  lower costs than the bargaining over contracts in  the market. The 
same question has been posed by W illiam son in his TCE treatment (see Chapter 
6).
Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1996) took this 
analysis a step further to build a theory, which explains the existence as w ell as 
the boundaries o f the firm  from  the overriding principle. Their firm  fo r this 
theoiy is defined as a collection o f specific non-human assets. Since the aim is to 
develop a theory o f ownership and control over assets, the defin ition does not 
include human assets over which, absent slavery, no control or ownership can be 
transferred. Ownership is defined as the residual right o f control over these 
assets, where “ residual”  refers to all the rights which have not been specifically 
transferred in any other contract. This concept is related to the assumption that
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contracts are incomplete, in  the sense that they do not specify a ll decisions and 
hades o f the contracting parties fo r all future contingencies. Specifying such a 
contract would be very costly, and generally would only specify trades and 
decisions fo r some events and w ill allocate the right to make decisions fo r all 
other events in  a summary way to one party, who is than said to exercise residual 
rights control. The theory does not distinguish between ownership and control. 
As a consequence, agents w ill reassess the situation at a latter date and negotiate 
the terms o f trade fo r those contingencies, fo r which no prior contract was 
specified (or even re-negotiate an in itia l contract i f  it  exists): incomplete contracts 
lead to ex post bargaining between the contracting parties.
In order to develop these concepts, consider a highly stylised economy w ith  two 
assets, denoted A  and B, and two agents, denoted 1 and 2. A t date t = 0 a 
contracting opportunity between these two agents arises. Both agents have to 
undertake relationship-specific investments, which are assumed to be entirely in 
human capital. These are denoted by hi, i = 1, 2 and are not contractible in  the 
fo llow ing sense: both agents can observe each other’s investment. However, no 
th ird agent, say a court, can observe them. Therefore, no contract contingent on 
hi, can be enforced, in  particular, no compensation payment between the two 
agents can depend on it. The investment costs are given hy a function Q(hj). A t 
date t = 1, all uncertainty is resolved and agents take further decisions and 
execute trades. The decisions required by each agent at t = 1 are summarised in 
some vector dt. These decisions are also not contractible at time t = 0, since they 
are too complicated to be specified fo r all states. However, at t  =  1, uncertainty is 
resolved and contracts are not contingent. Hence assume that a ll elements o f dt 
are contractible at t —  1. Then contracts are signed and executed, the surplus is 
realised and shared. This sharing o f surplus is part o f the re-negotiation o f the 
in itia l contract which takes place at t —  1. Events are summarised in the 
fo llow ing tim e-line:
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t =  0 t = l t =  2 time
Initial Contract 
Ownership of 
Assets A and B 
assigned to 
Agents 1 and 2
Specific 
Investments 
in Human 
Capital hi
Contract Decisions ch 
Renegotiation and 
Bargaining 
over Surplus
Figure 5.1. A summary of contracting events at t = 0, 1,2
Outcome and 
Trades Surplus 
Realised 
Surplus shared
In  order to interpret the results o f this model, it is important to understand the 
interaction between the bargaining outcome at t = 1 and incentives fo r 
investment.
Bargaining over the surplus generated by a trade takes place between all parties 
which are essential, in the sense that they can stop these trades from  talcing place 
i f  they withdraw their asset. This explains the focus on specific assets. Non­
specific assets are readily available on the market. They are fungible and give 
their owners no bargaining power, whereas specific assets are not easily 
substituted and give their owners bargaining powers. ((Grossman and Hart’s, 
(1986, p710) give the example o f an insurance agent)). However, the share o f 
surplus an agent can obtain in bargaining w ill d irectly influence his incentives to 
undertake relationship specific investments.
This leads to the conclusion that, as a rule, agents whose investments are 
important for a trade should be also given the specific assets, since this gives 
them a stronger ex post bargaining position and hence better incentives to invest. 
On the other hand, agents whose investment is less important fo r a trade should 
not be given ownership over assets which give them bargaining power. They 
would extract parts o f the surplus and dilute the incentives to other agents whose 
investments are more important.
The last insight is crucial fo r understanding why the theory provides a criterion 
fo r the lim its o f the firm . I f  activities which require investments by two agents,
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say, are grouped under one owner, then the incentives o f the other agent are 
reduced and he w ill invest less than i f  he had at least one o f the assets. The main 
results o f this analysis are: 1) complementary assets should be owned together; 2) 
independent activities should be grouped in  different film s; and 3) i f  only one 
agent makes important, non-verifiable investments, he should also own the assets. 
Hence, the boundaries o f the firm  are given by the hade-off between the gains 
from  co-ordination (agents who make specific investments cannot be held up by 
others who are less important), and the costs o f large organisations and 
bureaucracies (the lower incentives to invest fo r a non-owner agent).
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5.3. The P ro p e rty  R igh ts  A p p ro a ch  to  F in a n c ia l C o n tra c tin g
The previous analysis has motivated the incompleteness o f contracts by referring 
to unforeseen contingencies and states, which are d iffic u lt to describe ex ante. 
However, the model is non-stochastic and there is no further reference to 
different states o f the world. This leaves to spot contracts at t = 1 the fillin g  o f 
gaps in the original contract and the sharing o f the surplus arising from  any trade 
taking place. This was sufficient fo r giving answers about the question on the 
lim its o f the firm  and on the optimal degree o f integration (e.g., vertical 
integration). A  further and important aspect o f ownership and contracting is the 
incorporation o f new inform ation, which is o f particular importance fo r the 
analysis o f financial contracts. This aspect o f the property rights theory is better 
understood in a framework w ith an explicit stochastic structure in  which at least 
some o f the variables (e.g., money income, payments to creditors) are verifiable.
Aghion and Bolton (1992) discuss a model o f this land in  which they show how 
securities can implement such a contingent control structure. They consider an 
environment in which an entrepreneur (manager), who has no wealth o f his own, 
has to raise an amount IC in  order to finance a project, which also requires an 
action a. This action cannot be specified in  a long-term contract. A t a latter date, 
t = 1, firs t period profits yj are realised and the project can be either in a good or 
in a bad state 6. The state # is  not verifiable and hence no contract can be written 
on it, but firs t period income yj is correlated w ith  the state. Then the action is 
taken by the party who is in charge and fina lly  second period income y2 is 
realised. The sequence o f events is displayed in  Figure 5.2
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 time
Investment and Realisation of Action a Realisation
Initial Contract State Q and is taken of Profits y?
Profits yi
Figure 5.2 . Sequence of events at time t = 0, 1, 2 of financial contracting under the property 
rights approach
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The entrepreneur suffers a u tility  loss I which depends on action a. Actions d iffe r 
in terms o f private u tility  loss, and since only the entrepreneur cares about private 
u tility  loss, there could be a conflict as to the choice o f action. For example, the 
entrepreneur may prefer action plan {a2, a2}, i.e., to always take a low  private 
u tility  loss action a2. The external investor, on the other hand, may prefer {a i, a i} 
In  this case the two parties have directly conflicting interests. Both the investor 
and the entrepreneur are risk neutral. Assume the second period profits satisfy 
the follow ing:
where: E(y2 | a2; 0g) and E(y2 1 a2; 0b) are the expected values o f security benefits 
associated w ith  action a; in good and bad states (0g and 0b), respectively. The 
term l(a;) represents the private u tility  loss associated w ith  action aj. Condition (i) 
says that total benefits (the sum o f monetary returns and u tility  loss) are higher 
fo r action a2 than for ai fo r good states o f nature, while the reverse is true in  had 
states o f nature (condition (iii)). According to conditions (ii) and (iv ) action ai 
always produces higher monetary returns, whereas action a2 always results in 
lower private u tility  loss, i.e., l(a2) < l(a i).
The overall surplus is maximised i f  action aj is taken in  the bad state and a2 is 
taken in  the good state. However, outside investors always prefer action aj since 
they are only interested in  monetary returns and not in  the u tility  loss o f the 
entrepreneur. Observe that the conditions im ply that l(a i) > l(a2), hence the 
entrepreneur would always choose a2 and there is a complete conflict o f interests.
Suppose now die project is financed w ith  voting equity. Than outside investors 
have all the control rights at t = 1 and action aj is chosen in  a ll states, thereby
E(y2 | a2; 0g) - l(a2) > E(y2 | a}; ©g) - l(a i) 
E (yz|a2; 0g)< E (y 2 |a 1;0 g)
E(y2 1 a2; 0b) - l(a2) < E(y2 1 a t; 0b) - l(ai) 
E(y2 1 a2; 0b) < E(y2 1 ai; 0b)
( iii)
(iv)
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imposing too high an u tility  loss on the entrepreneur. On the other hand, i f  the 
entrepreneur issues non-voting equity, he w ill always be in  control and chose 
action a2, since he is only interested in  the u tility  loss, not in  the monetary returns. 
Now, suppose fo r sim plicity that y i and 0 are perfectly correlated such that y i (0b)
< y i(0 g), or that they are heated as such fo r contracting purposes, i.e. y i high is 
heated as a proxy fo r 0g, etc. Then the optimal solution can be implemented by a 
debt contract which matures at t = 1 and has a face value o f R i where yi(0b) < Ri
< y i(0 g). Then the entrepreneur w ill be in control in  the good state where he can 
pay back his debts and choose a2. In  the bad state he defaults and creditors take 
control and select action a/. Hence, even though action is not contractible, it  is 
implemented via a control structure, which allocates decision making rights to 
that party which has the appropriate incentives.
The important new aspect o f the explicit stochastic structure o f the model is that 
the optimal control structure is stochastic: in one state (here the bad state), control 
by an outsider (creditor) is optimal. In  the other (good) state, control by an 
insider is optimal. This dominates any deterministic control structure, (c.f. 
W illiam son’s “ dequity”  but w ithout the “ selective intervention problem” ). The 
key insight is that the security structure, (here standard debt plus equity owned by 
the entrepreneur), can implement such a stochastic control structure over the 
assets, and new inform ation becoming available at date t = 1 is used optim ally in 
the sense that the ownership o f the firm , and hence the decision making structure, 
adjust optim ally in  the ligh t o f this inform ation.
The property rights theory o f the firm , and the related approach to financial 
contracting, analyse the questions o f ownership and contract design. They start 
from  the observation that contracts are incomplete: agents find  it cheaper to 
allocate control rights in  a summary way than to specify and m onitor actions for 
all future contingencies. This implies that some actions remain unspecified, and 
the in itia l contract lays down only the procedure by which decisions are made in 
the future, and how parties to the contract resolve conflicting views about the
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course o f action. This situation poses two key problems. Firstly, investments and 
actions, which are relationship-specific, have to be protected and rewarded in  the 
future, hence some in itia l contractual arrangement must be made. Secondly, 
actions have to be taken in  the ligh t o f information, which arrives in  the future. A  
complete contract would assign the optimal action to each state. However, i f  
either the state or the action is too complex to be described ex ante, they cannot 
be part o f the in itia l contract and the lin k  between actions and states must be 
implemented in  another way. The literature has analysed two ways in  which 
incomplete contracts can provide fo r an optimal adaptation o f decisions to a 
changed environment:
Stochastic control structures allocate control to agents according to some 
verifiable state; actions can then be taken by different agents in  different 
states, thereby invoking optimal state contingent decisions. This is useful 
i f  the state can be described in  the contract, but the action cannot.
Re-negotiation o f the in itia l contract under terms which are part o f the 
original contract; then even inform ation which is not verifiable by a th ird 
party can be used, because the outcome o f ex post bargaining depends on 
it. Re-negotiation design is useful i f  the action can be described in  the 
in itia l contract, but the state cannot.
Hence, stochastic control structure (e.g., securities) and re-negotiation design are 
complementary means o f linking actions and states.
The property rights theoiy looks at securities in this light: they are state 
contingent, in  that they refer to stochastic variables (profits, payments to 
investors), and they allocate control rights which invoke future re-negotiations o f 
the in itia l contractual structure.
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5. 4. The P ro p e rty  R igh ts A p p ro a ch  to  C a p ita l S tru c tu re  -  
A n  E va lu a tio n
The property rights research is s till in  its infancy and an evaluation o f the 
usefulness o f its theoretical apparatus may be considered premature. Furthermore 
the property rights approach has yet to formulate precise hypotheses fo r empirical 
testing. This explains the considerable lack o f empirical research based on 
property rights approach.
According to the property rights approach, an “ ideal”  theory o f capital structure 
should:
• be submitted under a more general theory o f the firm  applicable to 
both closely held and w idely held firm s
• explain the role o f financial instruments in m itigating conflicts
• explain why financial instruments are designed in  a particular 
way and why they appear in  certain combinations in  the firm
• consider both return and control characteristics o f financial 
instruments, at least both standard debt and equity
•  explain why financial instruments and combinations o f financial 
instruments are used in  certain situations
•  explain why certain investors hold certain instruments
• explain why financial instruments appear in particular patterns across 
industries and across countries
• explain why particular financial patterns seem to cluster together and 
how these clusters relate to the larger context
•  allow fo r future renegotiations o f contracts
• have normative im plications fo r financial policies o f individual 
corporations and fo r public policy
Property rights has gone some way towards meeting these criteria, however it  s till 
suffers from  important deficiencies.
110
J. Nuri Chapter 5: Property Rights Theoiy
The theory o f incomplete contracting s till lacks a standardised framework for 
analysis. From a theoretical point o f view, this theory does not provide an 
explicit model o f contracting costs; it relies on, but does not model, bounded 
rationality. In  addition, the recent property rights theory o f the firm  typically 
equates ownership w ith  control and ownership o f the firm  w ith  ownership o f non­
human assets. W hile equating ownership w ith  control may be reasonable fo r the 
entrepreneurial firm , it  misses important issues in the w idely held firm . The 
definition o f control as the right to make strategic decisions in  contingencies not 
exp lic itly  covered by contractual arrangements is rather sim plistic. The property 
rights approach has had little  to say about how control is exercised w ith in  the 
organisation. L ike the agency literature, property rights is concerned w ith  agency 
costs arising from  conflicts o f interests between investors. However, the property 
rights literature is distinct in that it provides a rationale fo r the use o f the financial 
instruments beyond that o f incentives. The incentive effect cannot be the only 
justification for concluding that capital structure matters; appropriate incentives 
could be achieved more inexpensively through a financial compensation scheme. 
Instead, the property rights literature regards financial instruments as 
commitment devices and focuses on the control aspects o f these instruments. 
These instruments are viewed as defining both the allocation o f rights to the 
return streams and residual control rights. Capital structure is determined by 
agency costs stemming partly from  conflicts between investors and partly from  
the separation o f ownership and control (Tirole, 1988). Through the allocation o f 
control across investors and across states o f nature, conflicts associated w ith  
moral hazard may be mitigated. In  essence, agency costs are reduced by shifting 
the principal-agent relationship around in  certain states.
Property rights literature views capital structure as a mechanism fo r the transfer 
o f control from  the management; each instrument is associated w ith  a particular 
mechanism (Grossman &  Hart, 1988). Equity makes possible a control transfer 
to a party outside the in itia l contract through a takeover. Debt ensures that 
control is transferred to external investors in low  performance states
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(bankruptcy). Capital structure influences when and how control is transfered 
and the terms on which transfer occurs.
The property rights approach is s till rather incomplete as a theory o f capital 
structure, i.e., as a theoiy explaining w hy certain financial instalments are used 
and why they appear in particular combinations.
Most o f the research based on the property rights approach generates capital 
staictures where external finance comes from  only one financial instalment, 
either all debt or all-equity. In  Aghion and Bolton (1988), standard debt 
dominates equity unless the first-best is implementable under an a ll equity 
structure where the entrepreneur retains control. Grossman and Hart (1989) 
exclude debt from  the analysis all together, concentrating on the allocation o f 
votes among equityholders. In Hart &  Moore (1989) there is no role for equity. 
The same is noticeable in  Hart (1996), where the whole analysis o f capital 
structure is made from  a debt use point o f view. It portrays equity in  a rather 
rudimentary manner and gives the impression that equity financing is a residual 
o f debt financing decisions. Aghion and Bolton (1992) are an exception by 
including voting and non-voting equity in  their analysis (see the discussion in 
section 5.3). Furthennore, the property rights literature provides no clear 
understanding o f the use o f convertible securities.
Whereas traditional capital structure literature, as w ell as much o f the agency 
literature on incentives, has been prim arily concerned w ith  the allocation o f the 
return streams, the property rights approach tries to analyse both the rights to 
returns and control rights. However, most o f the recent contributions in  the 
property rights literature, w ith the exception o f Hart &  Moore (1989) and Hart 
(1996), have almost exclusively concentrated on the control aspect o f financial 
instalments.
M ost o f the property rights literature, w ith  exception o f Hart (1996, Chapter 6)
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model the financing problem o f the closely held entrepreneurial firm  w ith  only 
one external investor. Even though several problems o f external financing can be 
studied in such setting, the w idely held firm  introduces a great number o f 
additional complications. In  particular, models have to be developed which allow 
fo r the form al analysis o f collective choice problems. In  addition, the focus on 
the entrepreneurial firm  leads into thinking that capital structure consists only o f 
bilateral contracts w ithout taking into account the interconnection between the 
parties to the film ’s different contracts.
D iffused ownership and interconnections between contracts are particularly 
important fo r the understanding o f debt finance and the control aspect o f this 
instrument. Needless to say, i f  one includes taxes and trade creditors, one- 
creditor fnms are rare in reality, to the extent that they exist at all. M ulti-creditor 
situations give rise to new ex-post bargaining problems. The debtor may plot 
w ith  one o f the creditors in  the expense o f the other creditors. In  general, the 
existence o f more than one creditor tends to enhance the bargaining power o f the 
debtor (Bolton &  Scharfstein, 1990). H ellw ig (1990) suggests that the 
m u ltip lic ity  o f investors may also be a commitment device; the inefficiencies 
associated w ith  m ultilateral bargaining may weaken the incentives to renegotiate 
ex-post. A  complete control theory o f capital structure must also encompass the 
m ulti-creditor case as w ell as the case where both debt and equity are w idely 
held.
Most o f the models in  this literature, again w ith  Hart and Moore (1989) and Hart 
(1996) as exceptions, generate no renegotiation in equilibrium . This result is 
unsatisfactory since one o f the most distinct features o f debt contracts is that they 
are frequently negotiated. Another characteristic o f these contracts yet to be 
modelled convincingly by the property rights literature is seniority (see Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1996; and Hart and Moore, 1990 and Diamond (1991)). To 
understand why financial instruments appear in  the particular combinations, both 
the issue o f the security design and that o f the seniority structure in  the presence
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o f m ultiple investors must be addressed.
The financing models o f the property rights approach (w ith  exception o f Hart 
1996, p. 106) have been prim arily concerned w ith  the end game situations, i. e., 
situations where the relationship between the contracting parties ends after the 
last period o f the game. To analyse this type o f game may be appropriate when 
horizons are fin ite  (most debt contracts are fin ite ); unravelling from  the end leads 
to the end game being played today. However, end game behaviour is not a good 
characterisation o f many financing situations. In  particular, the power o f the 
threat not to refinance is like ly  to be underestimated in  this context; when a 
relationship is about to terminate, this threat carries little  danger.
Whereas the recent property rights approach may claim  some success in  
explaining the design o f individual securities, its record is less impressive in 
predicting obseived capital structures. Unfortunately, comparative statistics are 
s till few. Indeed, the hypotheses generated by this approach have so far not been 
sufficiently precise to allow fo r discrim inating empirical testing. Furthermore, 
like  much o f the contracting literature, research in the property rights literature 
has proceeded by rationalisation o f observed stylised facts (Hart, 1996, p l41 ), 
rather than independent empirical testing. In  the absence o f such tests, the 
empirical significance o f the approach has yet to be proved.
The property rights approach takes an agency perspective, but only a lim ited one 
as it  is concerned only w ith  conflicts o f interests between managers and investors 
(Hart, 1996, p. 147), leaving aside the conflicts o f interests that debt use can 
induce between firm s investors, i. e. shareholders and debtholders.
A t a general level, the property rights literature suggests that capital structure is 
related to the nature o f the firm ’s assets, e. g., their degree o f liquid ity. 
Furthermore, more profitable firm s and those w ith  a larger fraction o f cash flows 
that are contractible should have lower debt levels; the need to free cash flow  is
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less important. Some attempts have been done to use the property rights 
approach in  demonstrating how the choice o f contracts is influenced by the nature 
o f the underlying assets; when assets are easily diluted in  bad states o f nature, 
debt financing is more attractive than i f  such dilution were not possible (see 
Berglof, 1994). The theory may be successful in explaining change in  the capital 
structure over the life  cycle o f the firm , e.g., changes in the debt equity ratios as 
firm s go from  closely held to w idely held and vice versa. However, the property 
rights approach is unlike ly to predict exactly the debt equity ration in a particular 
firm  (in  fact none o f the theories discussed in  the previous chapters can do that). 
The concept o f control rights is not precise enough fo r this purpose; more 
structure must be added fo r models to generate testable hypotheses. The property 
rights approach may be viewed prim arily as an interpretative too l and as a 
theoretical framework w ith in  which alternative explanations can be analysed and 
tested.
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5.5. Conclusions
The property rights approach to capital structure bases the capital structure issue 
firm ly  into the theory o f the firm .
The “ nexus o f contracts”  approach introduced agency problems into the 
discussion, thereby focusing on conflicts o f interest and introducing a scope fo r 
analysing control rights and ownership. However, the formal literature did not 
exploit the potential o f this perspective and proceeded along fam iliar lines o f 
conflict resolution through incentive schemes. The potential o f the “ nexus o f 
contracts”  perspective was taken up in capital structure theory by the property 
rights approach, because its focus on ownership and control rights provides the 
basis fo r analysing contracts between several parties linked to one organisation 
called “ the firm ” . The property rights approach to capital structure emphasises 
control rights attached to securities. The sh ift in  focus away from  income streams 
has shed some ligh t on the analysis o f financial structure and security design. 
The analysis o f financial contracting starts w ith  an in itia l organisation design, 
which specifies the way in which control rights are allocated and how they can be 
transferred in  the future. In  relation to changes o f the ownership structure, two 
procedures have received particular attention: creditor control i f  firm s default on 
payments, and take-overs in which ownership is transferred by the acquisition o f 
voting rights.
According to the property rights approach taxes, asymmetric inform ation, and 
incomplete markets are all undoubtedly important influences on the choice o f the 
firm ’s capital structure. However, these factors alone cannot explain w hy debt 
has the feature that it is senior and that a failure to pay leads to a penalty in  the 
form  o f bankruptcy, i.e., why debt is associated w ith  a ‘hard’ budget constraint. 
Property rights claims to explain these facts.
The conclusion is that, although the agency approach may not be the whole story, 
its role in  the property rights theory suggests that it is like ly  to be an essential part 
o f any fiilly  developed theory o f capital structure.
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Chapter 6
T ra n sa c tio n  C ost E conom ics and C a p ita l 
S tru c tu re
6.1. In tro d u c t io n
The basis fo r a firm  to sustain its competitive advantages is its a b ility  to 
produce strategy, assets, technology skills and reputation that would be 
impossible or very d iffic u lt fo r its competitors to im itate. I f  a successful firm  
can be easily im itated, its com petitive advantages and superior performance 
w ill soon disappear. H igh ly firm -specific assets often increase 
competitiveness; however, asset specificity increases transaction costs. 
(W illiam son, 1988).
Transaction cost economics explains the use o f debt and equity as governance 
instruments rather than sim ply financial instruments. These can be matched to 
the asset attributes o f individual investment projects (transactions) in  order to 
ensure the lowest cost o f transacting.
In  this chapter we discuss the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) model and its 
im plications fo r Capital Structure. The chapter starts w ith  a general discussion 
o f transaction cost theory in  Section 6.2. In  Section 6.2.1 we explain asset 
specificity and its ram ifications fo r transaction cost economics. This is 
follow ed by a simple contractual schema in Section 6.2.2. Section 6.3.1 
discusses how capital structure choices can be made under a TCE contractual 
framework. The effects o f strategy and asset specificity on capital structure are 
discussed in  Section 6.3.2. Section 6.3.3 discusses asymmetric inform ation and 
brand name reputation. Section 6.4 gives a summary o f commonalties and
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differences between Transaction Cost Theory and Agency Theory. Section 6.5 
gives a summary o f some o f the em pirical studies based on the transaction cost 
theoiy, and Section 6.6 sets out some conclusions.
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6.2. T ra n sa c tio n  Costs Econom ics (T C E )
The transaction costs problem was firs t introduced by Ronald Coase in  1937 in 
his seminal article “ The Nature o f the F irm ” . He posed the question: when do 
fum s produce to their own needs and when do they procure from  the market? 
A lthough Coase’s vertical integration problem was the subject o f public po licy 
scrutiny in  the years to fo llow , there was little  conceptual development fo r 
about 35 years. W illiam son (1964, 1971, 1975, 1985 and 1996) and K le in, 
Crawford, and A lchian (1978) were the firs t to successfully w ork out a TCE 
approach to economic organisation.
TCE adopts a contractual approach to the study o f economic organisation. It  
supports and develops the view that economising over the sum o f production 
and transaction costs is the core problem. Transaction cost economics is 
concerned w ith  the governance o f contractual relations in  transactions between 
two parties.
In  his TCE theory, W illiam son pairs the assumption o f bounded rationality, (i.e. 
human beings are lim ited in  knowledge, foresight, sk ill and tim e), w ith  a self- 
interest seeking assumption (opportunism). As Coase (1984) pointed out, the 
concept o f the man as rational u tility  maximiser should be abandoned. 
W illiam son (1985) argues that the “ contracting man”  d iffers from  the 
“ m axim ising man”  in  two aspects, bounded ra tionality and opportunism 
(opportunism = self-interest thus guile, W illiam son 1975). Both these concepts 
help to distinguish between feasible and infeasible modes o f contracting. Thus:
1) Incomplete contracting: The condition o f bounded rationality prevents the 
agents from  engaging in  ex ante comprehensive contracting. A ll contracts 
w ith in  the feasible set are incomplete, and therefore, the ex post consequences 
o f contracts are o f particular importance. The notion o f complete ex ante 
comprehensive contracts is a fiction.
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2) Contract as promise. It  is convenient to assume that the agents w ill reliably 
fu lfil their obligations. The efforts to investigate the re lia b ility  o f economic 
agents and furthermore, given the presence o f opportunism, ex post measures to 
deter it, take on a d ifferent economic importance. (W illiam son, 1996, p.56)
TCE analysis deals w ith  frictions that arise when contractual hazards appear as 
the result o f bilateral dependency, leakage, strategising etc. It  involves an 
examination o f the comparative costs o f planning, adapting, and m onitoring 
task completion under different governance structures, by making “ the 
transaction”  its central un it o f analysis. Governance structures can be matched 
to transactions in a manner that leads to the lowest cost o f transacting 
(W illiam son, 1979, p. 245).
W illiam son identifies three main dimensions, which TCE in  its present form  
uses to describe transactions. They are: 1) the frequency w ith  which they 
occur; 2) the degree and type o f uncertainty; 3) the condition o f asset 
specificity; and probably 4) the ease o f measurement should be added. O f these 
four, asset specificity has the greatest economic significance fo r examining the 
governance o f contractual relations. (W illiam son, 1991, p. 80)
6.2.1. Asset S p e c ific ity
Asset specificity refers to the degree to w hich an asset can be re-deployed to 
alternative uses w ithout sacrifice o f its value. Asset specificity can take many 
forms. It not only involves complex ex ante incentive responses but, above all, 
i t  gives rise to complex ex post governance structure actions, and it makes 
possible the use o f TCE analysis in  the study o f economic organisation in a ll its 
forms.
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W ithout pretending to be comprehensive, TCE recognises six types o f asset 
specificity:
1) site specificity - where sites are located close together so to economise 011 
inventory and transport expenses;
2) physical asset specificity- such as specialised machinery that is used to 
produce a component;
3) human asset specificity- in  the form  o f skills, knowledge, experience that are 
accumulated from  a leam ing-by-doing process;
4) dedicated assets - which are customer specific investments;
5) brand name capital - specific investments that are connected w ith  customer 
loyalty and reputation
6) temporal specificity - caused by temporal restrictions
These types o f specificity d iffe r in  their organisational consequences.
6.2.2 The C o n tra c tu a l Schema
TCE recognises the fact that the terms upon which an in itia l bargain w ill be 
struck depend 011 whether bids can be derived from  more than one supplier, but 
stresses that the study o f contracting should include ex post features. TCE 
argues that the condition o f large numbers bidding at the start, does not 
necessarily im ply that a large numbers bidding condition w ill be obtained 
thereafter. Assume that decision makers are opportunistic and bounded 
rationally and they operate under conditions o f uncertainty. U ncertainty may be 
o f a state-contingent kind, i.e. rising from  random acts o f nature and 
unpredictable changes in  consumer behaviour; it  may he due to a lack o f 
communication, i.e. one decision maker having no way o f find ing out decisions 
made by others; or it may be a behavioural uncertainty, i.e. strategic 
nondisclosure, disguise or distortion o f inform ation. The com bination o f 
bounded rationality w ith  uncertainty means that traders face conditions o f 
incomplete contracting. It would be too d iffic u lt or sim ply impossible to
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specify ex ante actions o f all future parties under all possible future scenarios. 
Whether the ex post competition at the renewal interval is fully efficacious or 
not depends 011 whether the good or service in question is supported by durable 
investments in specific human or physical assets. Unforeseen contingencies 
and opportunistic behaviour will have no effect on asset values if  these assets 
are easily re-deployed in other uses. But if  there are no such specialised 
investments, there are no winners. Although they may continue to supply for a 
long time, they are merely matching competitive bids from other rivals. 
However, rivals cannot be presumed to operate on the basic o f parity once 
specific investments have taken place. The parity does not exist any more, as 
the winners enjoy advantages over non-winners. The contractual asymmetry 
between the winning and the non-winning bidder exists because economic 
values will be sacrificed if  the ongoing supply relation were to be terminated. 
Therefore, it is obviously in the interest o f the parties to work things out rather 
than terminate the ongoing contract. Hence, a shift from a large number 
contracting to bilateral dependency happens (Williamson, 1996, p.60).
Assume that a product or service is supplied by either o f two technologies, one 
being the general purpose technology and the other the special purpose 
technology. The latter requires more investments in specific assets. Denote k as 
a measure o f asset specificity. Transactions that invest in general purpose 
assets have k = 0, whereas for transactions investing in special purpose asset 
lc > 0. As the assets are specialised to the particular needs o f the parties, 
terminating prematurely this transaction will mean losing productive values. 
Therefore, the parties have the incentive to device safeguards (S) to avoid the 
above. An S = 0 means 110 safeguards are provided, and an S > 0 indicates that 
safeguards are in place. Figure 6.1 shows three states o f nature that could result 
from the combination o f different states o f k and S. The technology (k), 
contractual / governance safeguards (S) and price (p) are interactive and are 
determined simultaneously.
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contract is supported by specific assets for which no 
safeguard is devised, break-even price p2, where 
P2>Pl
general purpose assets with p, as break-even price
S > 0 C p3 contract is supported by transaction specific assets 
and a safeguard is provided, break-even price p3, 
where p3 > p2
Figure 6.1 A simple contracting schema (source: Williamson, 1996, p.63)
Williamson distinguishes two dimensions o f TCE: one deals with measurement 
problems, while the other deals with the governance of contractual relations. 
His discussion is concerned with the latter.
Williamson posits that markets and hierarchies are alternative mechanisms for 
governing contractual relationships. The firm’s problem is to choose a 
governance structure that will minimise both production costs and transaction 
costs. The latter are not dependent on the competitive market price o f the 
goods and services exchanged, but they arise in the form o f setting up, running 
and monitoring costs as well as re-negotiation due to the shifts in the alignment. 
In other words, the question is: which governance structures are best suited to 
organise which transactions in order to have maximum economising? Given 
the level o f asset specificity, market and internal organisation (hierarchy) 
instruments differ in their benefits and resources. The benefits represent the 
property rights over the return stream generated from the assets. The resources 
available are in the form o f control rights over managerial actions. When the 
level o f asset specificity is low, market procurement has the advantage over 
internal organisation as the market has high incentive characteristics, they limit 
bureaucratic distortions better, and each party to a non specific transaction can
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go its own way at little cost to the other. As the asset specificity deepens, 
hierarchy becomes the favourite instrument. The reason for this is that the high 
powered incentives o f markets are difficult to adapt in comparison to the 
authoritative nature o f hierarchy. Governance instruments differ in two aspects 
1) the type and degree o f adaptability and 2) the use o f incentive and control 
mechanisms.
Williamson (1996, Chapter 3) lays out a simple model o f how the costs o f  
market and hierarchy mechanisms change as the asset specificity changes.
He considers the main decision faced by any organisation “to make or buy”. 
The important element to be taken into consideration in this scenario is the 
control o f the production costs and governance costs (bureaucratic and 
adaptation costs). As the bilateral dependency between the parties increases, 
although the intense incentives of the market induce a better control o f  
production costs, they reduce the ease o f adaptation and therefore increase its 
cost. For a fixed level o f output let H(k) and M(k) denote respectively the 
bureaucratic cost o f the internal governance (hierarchy) and the corresponding 
market cost, where k corresponds to a certain level o f asset specificity. 
Assuming that the same level o f asset specificity is chosen by each instrument
i.e. at every lc, the following comparative cost relations can be drawn:
H(0) > M(0) and M ’ > H \ The former reflects the fact that bureaucratic costs 
vary inversely with incentive intensity and the latter inequality shows the 
comparative disability o f markets to adapt. Let us denote AG = H(k) - M(k) As 
shown in Figure 6.2 these expressions create a two part region. For k < k ’ the 
market is the preferred supply mode. At ka, AG(ka) > 0 as H(ka) > M(ka). For 
lc > lc’ the hierarchy form is preferred because the high powered incentives o f  
the market impair the comparative ease with which adaptive, sequential 
adjustments o f disturbances are earned out. At lcb, AG(lcb) < 0 as H(lcb) < M(kb).
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Specificity
Figure 6.2. Governance costs: market and hierarchy instruments
Let consider a hybrid mechanism between a market and a hierarchy. The 
hybrid would combine the incentive power and the lower administrative cost o f  
the market with the administrative control and low bargaining costs o f the 
hierarchy. The hybrid would allow elective intrusion, i.e. when things are 
going well use the market, otherwise use hierarchy to realign the contract. Let 
us denote by Y(lc) the governance cost function for the hybrid mechanism 
where Y(0) — M(0) and Yk = Hk > 0. In comparison to the market and 
hierarchies, hybrids have weaker administrative power and less direct 
intervention than hierarchies, however, they also have weaker incentives and 
negotiated adaptation than markets. Hence, M(0) < Y(0) < H(0) and Mk >Yk > 
Hk (this depends on the value of k, only true if  k < lc*.
As it can be seen from Figure 6.3 the exchange points become lc* and lc**. For 
any value o f lc between 0 and lc* the market should be used, for lc between lc* 
and lc** the hybrid is preferred and for lc > lc** the hierarchy should be used.
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lc* k ’ k** Asset Specificity
Figure 6.3. Governance costs: market, hierarchy and hybrid instruments
The basic idea o f Williamson’s model is that the benefits o f  a more 
administrative (discrete, hierarchical) organisational structure increase as the 
asset specificity deepens. For investments made in highly specific assets, in 
order to increase the firm’s competitive advantages, the use o f a more intrusive 
regime to govern those assets will increase their relative benefits.
The simple contracting schema and the above mentioned model can be applied 
across a wide range o f contracting issues. The following section shows how  
the TCE model is applied capital structure issues.
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6.3 Transaction Cost Economics Approach to Corporate 
Finance
6.3.1. Williamson’s Capital Structure Model
Williamson (1996) applies transaction cost economics to asset financing. In the 
agency theory capital structure models (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977 and Titman, 1984) the debt-holders fully anticipate the ex post 
contracting misalignments that could occur and build those problems into the 
amount they would be willing to pay for debt ex ante. These models mainly 
assume complete contracting. Many moral hazard problems can be mitigated 
with different contractual devices ex ante - call provisions, managerial 
ownership, debt covenants, dividend constrains etc. When the parties cannot 
fully anticipate all possible future contingencies, the moral hazard problems 
become even worse. The firm must find a governance structure that is suited to 
deal with unanticipated mal-adaptations and incentive misalignments after they 
occur. The question is given the degree o f asset specificity, which governance 
mechanism is best suited to adapt to unanticipated circumstances? What is the 
appropriate tool to govern the ownership, use and disposition o f the assets?
Williamson’s model operates at the transaction level rather than firm level. He 
focuses on debt and equity as governance devices rather as simply different 
types o f contingent claims on cash flows. Do the characteristics o f  the assets 
themselves, i.e. their asset specificity, make them more or less suitable for debt 
or equity financing?
In his TCE rationale for corporate finance, Williamson initially assumes that 
there are only two forms o f finance, debt and equity. Investments can be 
financed by either but not both o f them. Assume also that projects are
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arranged, from least to most, in terms o f their asset specificity, e.g. general 
purpose building, general puipose equipment, special puipose building or 
special purpose machinery.
Debt, as a relatively simple rule based governance mechanism, is suited to 
assets whose value would not be affected by autonomous action by any o f the 
parties. Equity, a more adaptive discretionary mechanism, is more suited to 
situations o f long term mutual dependency. When the specificity is high both 
the costs o f autonomous action and the benefits o f co-ordinated effort are high.
Debt is a fmite-lived, pre-emptive claims governed by a set o f simple verifiable 
rales whereby 1) fixed interest payments must be made at regular intervals, 2) 
the business must continuously meet certain liquidity tests, 3) principal must be 
repaid at the loan expiration date, and 4) in the event o f a default the debt­
holders will exercise their pre-emptive claims against the asset in question. “If 
everything goes well, interest and principal will be paid on schedule. But debt 
is unforgiving if  things go poorly” (Williamson, 1996, p 184). The failure to 
meet the obligations leads to liquidation. As the degree o f asset specificity 
deepens, the value o f the pre-emptive claim declines monotonically. If the firm 
is liquidated, there could be losses from forced selling in imperfect factor 
markets. For highly firm-specific assets, no secondary markets may even exist. 
By definition, the greater its specificity the less is the asset value in the next 
best use. It would be difficult to use debt to finance assets that are costly to re­
deploy to other firms. The loss in value increases the lender’s risk exposure. 
Therefore, the terms o f the contract would be adjusted adversely.
This can be extended beyond problems associated with liquidation. Bankruptcy 
reorganisation can be interpreted as a costly re-negotiation o f the terms o f debt 
contract. The greater the expected bargaining costs and / or control loss during 
the reorganisation, the more costly it is to govern the use o f an asset with debt.
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It is easier to govern the use and disposition o f an easily re-deployable asset 
with a simple, inflexible, rale-based device like debt. Why pay the added cost 
to keep flexibility when the net benefits are so small? If unanticipated 
circumstances did arise, the value o f the asset would be unaffected by the 
identity o f the owner. Since it would be costless to re-deploy an asset from one 
owner to another, why use anything more complex than a simple pre-emptive 
claim to govern the transfer o f control? When asset specificity is low the 
parties are not locked in a long-term relationship o f bilateral dependency and 
there are few benefits from co-ordination among the parties. The parties can 
act autonomously without affecting the value o f the asset. In this sense the debt 
is a market like mechanism.
Confronted with the prospect that asset specific investments will be financed on 
adverse terms, the firm might respond by forgoing some o f the asset 
specificities in favour o f a greater asset re-deployability. This would sacrifice 
some o f the cpmpetitive advantages that these specificities offer. This might be 
avoided by creating a new governance structure instrument to which providers 
o f finance would attach confidence, therefore the specific assets could be 
saved.
If debt were the only funding device available, asset specificity would provide a 
strong incentive to invent an alternative governance mechanism that would be 
less rale-based and more flexible. When asset specificity is high governance 
structures should allow for more direct co-ordination, control, monitoring, and 
discretionary intervention. Suppose that this instrument is called equity, and 
has the following characteristics: a) equity holders have the right to claim both 
residual earnings and asset liquidation value, b) it lasts for the duration o f the 
firm, c) it could create a board o f directors. This entity is elected by the pro­
rata votes o f those who hold tradable shares to represent their interests. The 
board is directly involved in monitoring the performance measures 011 a timely
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basis, in reviewing the decisions, in hiring and/or replacing the management, in 
management compensation, in the appraisal o f important investment and 
operating proposals before they are implemented and in disposal o f assets. 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).
“The board o f directors thus “evolves” as a way by which to reduce the cost o f 
capital for projects that involve limited re-deployability. N ot only do the 
added controls to which equity has access have better assurance properties, but 
equity is m ore forgiving than debt. Efforts are the therefore m ade to work 
things out and preserve values o f  a going concern w hen m al-adaptation 
occurs.” (W illiamson, 1996, p. 185)
Whereas the governance structure o f debt is seen as a very market-lilce type that 
allows for autonomous adaptation, equity is much more intrusive and similar to 
administration. It is a “hierarchy-like” mechanism more suited to situations that 
need more internal control, co-ordination and intervention.
Let us express the cost o f debt and equity as a function o f  asset specificity (k) 
respectively Dk and Ek. Both these costs are increasing functions o f asset 
specificity. A switch-over from D(0) < E(0) to D ’ > E’ > 0 will happen. Being 
a rule-governed relation the set up costs o f debt are relatively low. Equity 
finance has higher set up costs, as it is a much more complex governance 
instrument which allows intrusive involvement in the oversight o f  a project; 
that is why D(0) < E(0). Although both costs o f debt and equity increase as the 
specificity of the underlying assets rises, the cost of debt financing increases 
more rapidly. As the likelihood o f liquidation increases the expected loss in 
value from non-redeployability increases. A rule governed regime will 
sometimes force liquidation or otherwise force the firm to compromise value 
enhancing decisions that a more adaptable regime, such as equity finance, could 
implement, therefore D ’ > E ’ > 0.
Beyond some level o f asset specificity, lc’, it is cheaper to fund the project by 
using equity, (See Figure 6.4). For k > 0
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Dk = dD(k) / 5(k) > 0 and D(0) > 0 
Ek = 3E(lc) / a(k) > 0 and E(0) > 0 
D k > Ek and D(0) < E(0) if  k > lc’
Cost
E(0)
D(0)
k’ Asset
Specificity
Figure 6.4. Financing costs of debt and equity
The conclusion is that highly deployable assets will be financed hy debt, 
whereas equity is preferred as the assets become highly non-redeployable. Let 
lc’ be the value o f lc for which Ek = Dk. The optimal choice is to use debt for 
k < lc’ and equity finance for lc > lc’.
In comparison to other theories o f capital structure which seek a special 
rationale for debt use, the TCE approach states that debt is the natural financial 
instrument and equity appears as the financial instrument o f the last resort.
Williamson than suggests: why not create a new financial instrument - 
governance structure called “dequity”, denoted DEk? Let this instrument 
include all the constraining features o f debt. When, however, these constraints 
impede the value maximising activities, the board o f directors can temporarily 
remove the constraints, therefore to permit the firm to pursue a value
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maximising action. The constraints are thus the norm from which selective 
relief is permitted. In other words: use a set o f  simple rules until an 
unanticipated circumstance arises for which violating those rales would 
increase value. If this were feasible, DE would be an increasing function o f k 
such that DE(0) = D(0) and DE‘ = E \  The former reflects the fact that dequity 
is not burdened by the bureaucratic cost o f equity, and the latter that selective 
relief from the rules is permitted making dequity superior over both debt and 
equity.
Whether dequity would work as described depends on the plausibility o f  
selective intervention. This is in the hands o f mangers and here as elsewhere 
the “promise to behave responsibly” lacks credibility, as those who enjoy 
discretion can be expected to use it in their favour. Therefore it is nor clear if  
the intervention is benefiting dequity-holders or the managers, (See Figure 6.5).
Cost
where A - Cost of Equity 
C - Cost o f Dequity 
B - Cost of Debt
Specificity
Figure 6.5. Financing costs of debt, equity and dequity
If the selective intervention is a fiction, i.e. predictably breaks down, this would 
add costs such that D(k) > 5(k) > E(k) and D(0) < 5(0) < E(0). The net benefits 
o f more direct intervention and more co-ordinated governance mechanism  
increase as the asset specificity deepens. For projects for which asset
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specificity is from 0 to lc*, debt is the best means o f finance i.e. the lowest cost 
governance mechanism. Between lc* and lc**, dequity is the preferred 
mechanism, whereas for the high asset specific investments i.e. beyond lc** 
equity is the cheapest governance tool.
Another question is: how does the value o f lc’ change as uncertainty changes? 
An increase in uncertainty would increase both debt and equity cost functions, 
D k more than Ek, therefore the level o f asset specificity for which equity would 
be preferred over debt will decrease. (See Figure 6.6).
specificity
Figure 6.6 Financing costs: debt and equity with increased uncertainty
The main reasons for the shift are that the increased uncertainty imposes mal~ 
adaptation more often and consequentially, and rule-governed systems are 
under greater pressures under such circumstances, as compared to a 
discretionary system. From the lender’s point o f view, the level o f  risk 
exposure o f any investment is reduced i f  the loan can be secured with collateral. 
If an asset has a low level o f specificity it can easily be used as collateral which 
in turn reduces the effective cost o f borrowing.
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There are several intangible assets that are often argued to be sources o f  
competitive advantages: e.g., product reputation, brand recognition and 
customer loyalty, firm specific human capital and knowledge, research and 
development. They enhance the film ’s uniqueness and make it difficult for 
competitors to imitate a successM  strategy. Asset specificity increases firm 
value but also makes it difficult to re-deploy the asset to other uses in case o f  
financial distress.
6.3.2 Strategy, Asset Specificity and Capital Structure
The Modigliani and Miller proposition, that capital structure is irrelevant to 
firm value, has important implications for strategy research. First’ managers 
seeking to maximise firm value need only be concerned with “real” decisions. 
Since financing decisions cannot affect firm value they can and should be made 
completely separate from the decision whether to invest. Managers should 
focus on production operations and investment opportunities. All security 
holders, no matter what their type o f claim, would unanimously agree that the 
firm should accept all non-negative NPV projects. Second, the firm faces no 
funding constraint. Any firm can raise money in capital markets to fund any 
non-negative NPV projects. Whether funded with internally generated funds, 
or externally with newly issued debt or equity, the value o f the project would be 
the same. Third, in the absence o f synergy or joint production, all projects will 
be seen as basically independent o f each other. Decision makers need only be 
concerned with the risk-adjusted required rate o f return on each project 
separately. Total firm value would simply be the sum o f individual projects’ 
values. There would be no incentive to merge any two firms. Their post 
merger value would be the sum o f their pre-merger values. Decision makers 
can ignore the impact o f financial decisions only when those decisions would 
not affect the firm value.
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In a Modigliani and Miller environment, strategy would essentially be 
irrelevant. With symmetric information, perfect, competitive and complete 
capital markets, and no bankruptcy, agency or transaction costs, 110 firm could 
gain or maintain a competitive advantage. However, competitive strategy helps 
to create the conditions under which capital structure matters for firm value. 
Sustainable competitive advantage is attainable only in a environment in which 
it is too difficult and / or too costly for competitors to imitate a successful 
strategy. If competitors have equal access to the technology, factor markets and 
capital markets, they will purchase the assets necessary to imitate a successful 
strategy and drive rents to zero.
The capital structure models assume the existence o f real options, but do not 
investigate closely their origin. From a strategy point o f view, the importance 
o f real options is that they embody the assets that provide the basis for firm- 
level competitive advantage. The principal question is how real options are 
generated. The growth options that enhance a firm’s competitive advantage are 
highly specific. This creates problems regarding the concept that firms in the 
same industry fall into the same risk class. It is expected that when two firms 
have identical stochastic technologies and are facing identical demand 
functions, their returns will be perfectly correlated. Finns operating in a 
perfectly competitive industry are essentially in the same risk class.
The distinction between assets in place and real options is conceptually useful 
but probably unrealistic. Myers (1977) points out that the values o f a firm’s 
existing assets are often affected by its subsequent investments. In other words, 
some real options may not be separable from their underlying assets. For 
example, when the firm undergoes leaming-by-doing its unit cost decreases 
with cumulative production. This implies that firms can gain a competitive cost 
advantage by increasing market share. In a real option framework, experience 
effects are options associated with the existing assets. If the market share
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leader is already operating at frill capacity, learning effects give it the right but 
not the obligation to operate at lower cost than their competitors. Experience 
effects lower the exercise price on the option to increase capacity and output. 
When the effects are firm specific the options will be firm specific. It would be 
difficult for other firms to reproduce the particular set o f “experiences” unless 
they could reproduce the historical path taken by the market leader. Even if  
followers expand rapidly they may be facing competitive conditions different 
from the first mover. While the first mover may have had an open field, 
followers face an aggressive, leading competitor that is trying to build an even 
greater market share.
Two firms operating in the same industry may have identical physical assets 
and technology and still have very different portfolios o f real options. They 
may have different complementary physical or intangible assets. For, example 
differences in managerial knowledge and experience may make it less costly for 
one firm to enter a related product than other (Penrose, 1956).
Some real options are “compound options” - options to purchase options in the 
future. An example is the so called “time to build” model (Majd and Pindyck, 
1987). Assume that a plant must be built in stages and is not productive until 
completed. At the completion o f one “stage”, the firm has bought the option to 
continue to the next stage, delay or possibly abandon the project. This notion 
of “time to build” captures the idea that decision making is a sequential, 
adaptive process. Decision makers try to fit their resources to the environment 
given the level o f uncertainty and information they have at a point o f time. 
Even firms with access to the same technology may be at different stages o f  
“building” their strategy. They may have very different sets o f  options. Even 
though they have access to the same path, a firm that has already committed 
resources may face higher opportunity cost o f delay than a firm just considering 
beginning the process.
138
J. Nuri Chapter 6: TCE and Capital Structure
Some real options were bought with earlier investments in R&D and 
advertising. R&D expenditures are often used as examples o f  real options. The 
R&D outlays purchased the right to market some new product in the future. Ex  
ante there may not be an underlying asset on which the firm is purchasing an 
option. Expenses that were made for one puipose may have generated options 
that were totally unanticipated at the time the investment was made. It is 
impossible to use standard option pricing models to evaluate such R&D 
investments. There is no idea what the underlying assets will be, let alone what 
stochastic process their value will follow. The innovation changes both the 
production opportunity set and the consumption opportunity set in non- 
anticipatable ways. This makes it difficult, i f  not impossible, to evaluate some 
growth options.
By their very nature they are likely to be very firm specific. They are not likely 
to be traded very easily in factor markets. The factor markets for real options 
are likely to be imperfect if  they exist at all. It may be very difficult for 
outsiders to know the true value o f a real option because they may not know the 
real values o f complementary assets. Even insiders may not know the option’s 
true value. The most valuable complementary assets may be owned by other 
fiims. There are several key points. First, real options can exist because o f the 
imperfections, gaps in factor and product markets. When these growth 
opportunities are firm specific, this enhances a firm’s competitive advantages. 
Second, firm-specific assets (growth options) retain their value only as long as 
the firm continues operating. If the firm liquidates, those options have less 
value in their next best use in another firm. This can impose costs on 
stakeholders. Some profitable opportunities may not be implemented if  
shareholders expect that the proceeds will be needed to pay the existing debt.
In agency models, the debt-holders recognise the shareholders’ incentives ex 
ante and reduce the amount they are willing to pay for the debt, the
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shareholders ultimately bearing the agency costs. The extent o f these losses can 
be reduced if  the debt-holders have a credible method o f monitoring the firm’s 
behaviour. For example, debt covenants are monitoring mechanisms designed 
to mitigate these agency costs (Smith and Warner, 1979). However, to monitor 
effectively debt-holders need to know the firm’s set o f investment opportunities 
and to be able to observe and evaluate the firm’s investment decisions. The 
more firm-specific and intangible the firm’s growth opportunities, the more 
difficult it is for lenders to identify and evaluate the firm’s growth 
opportunities. This makes it difficult for them to assess the extent o f the risk- 
shifting and underinvestment problems. The more intangible and firm-specific 
a firm’s growth opportunities are, the greater the extent o f potential agency 
problems and the less effective are “solutions” which require an outsider to be 
able to observe either behaviour or outcomes. Therefore we would expect a 
negative relationship between leverage and the extent to which a firm’s assets 
consist o f firm specific, intangible growth opportunities (Long and Malitz, 
1985).
6.3.3 Asymmetric Information and Brand Name Reputation
Since highly film specific assets lose value in liquidation, anything that 
increases the likelihood o f liquidation would decrease the value o f such assets. 
Klein and Leffler (1981) (see Appendix 6) look at the asymmetric information 
between producers and customers about product quality. The firm purposely 
invests in highly firm-specific assets so as to provide quality assurance to their 
customers. If they produce poor quality goods they will lose their customers. 
The firm’s specific assets would lose value.
Their model assumes that low quality products are cheaper to produce. This 
gives the firm an incentive to earn profits by misrepresenting poor quality 
products as being o f high quality and charging a high quality price. Customers
140
J. Nuri Chapter 6: TCE and Capital Structure
base their product quality expectations on the firm’s previous period 
production. They all find out at period t what the quality was in period t-1. 
Once a customer discovers that the firm has produced poor quality goods, he 
will no longer purchase from that firm. Manufacturers face a trade-off. They 
can reap a one-time profit at the expense o f losing an infinite stream of future 
earnings. The firm has to decide whether the short-term gains outweigh the 
present value o f the future income. The basic set up is analogous to an 
infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, in which there is a sequence of 
two moves in eveiy play o f the game. In equilibrium, purchasers believe that 
the firm will continue to produce the same quality products. Producers 
manufacture goods at the product quality level the customers expect. However, 
for the producer to make the high quality goods he must receive a premium 
price above the marginal cost o f producing the high quality goods. The size o f  
price premium needed to induce a producer to make high quality products 
increases with the discount rate. The key is that the firm’s reputation generates 
added value.
This premium will attract new firms into this market segment until there are no 
more profits from entry. To offset the positive NPV o f future profits, the firms 
must incur losses (sunk costs) when they enter. One way to do this is by 
investing in firm-specific assets such as brand name and reputation. These 
assets would lose value if  the firm produced low quality products. The firm 
safeguards its reputation by purposely investing in assets that would lose value 
i f  it “defected” and tried to take advantage o f its customers (c.f. hostage posting 
to support credible commitment, Williamson, 1996, Ch 5).
What assures high quality supply is the capital loss due to the loss of future business 
if low quality is produced. Since the imputed value of the firm’s brand name capital 
is determined by the firm’s expected quasi-rents on future sales, this capital loss from 
supplying quality lower than promised is represented by the depreciation of the 
firm’s specific assets. The expenditures on brand name capital assets are therefore 
similar to collateral that the firm losses if it supplies output of less than expected 
quality and in equilibrium the premium stream provides only a normal rate of return 
on this collateral asset. (Klein and Leffler, 1981)
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This model depends strongly on the potential loss o f the infinite stream of 
future income. The model would be explained in reverse i f  there were finite 
number o f future periods. In the last period the firm has no incentive to provide 
high quality therefore there is no value to maintaining reputation in the next to 
the last period.
A financially troubled firm has a strong incentive to lower product quality. If 
the fnm is liquidated, all future stream cash flows cease to exist and reputation 
has no value. As the likelihood o f bankruptcy rises, the value o f  reputation 
decreases. As leverage increases, there is less incentive to make firm specific 
(sunk cost) investments which are needed to deliver the basis for good quality.
Titman and Maksimovic (1991) stress that this also reduces the incentive to 
make discretionary expenditures for maintenance o f already existing assets, for 
example in industries where safety is the main quality dimension. High levels 
of leverage and the increased probability o f financial distress can change the 
attitudes o f both consumers and regulators. Consumers would have the 
incentive to switch to other suppliers, and regulators would have a stronger 
incentive to monitor safety. They argue that there is a negative relationship 
between gearing and the firm’s incentive and /  or ability to produce high quality 
products or at least the possibility o f financial distress. Firms that anticipate 
bankruptcy have an incentive to lower their quality, and firms already in 
financial distress would want to cut costs and reduce quality in order to avoid 
bankruptcy in the short term. This could be seen as a form o f “cashing in” or 
“milking” o f reputational assets in order to alleviate financial distress in the 
short term.
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6.4. A Comparison Between Agency Theory and 
Transaction Cost Economics
Agency theory and transaction cost economics approaches are likely to provide 
two routes for the integration o f strategic management and finance. While 
some believe that these disciplines are based 011 very different paradigms, 
others think that the differences are overstated. The agency theory view o f debt 
has had a strong influence on strategic management research. O11 the other 
hand, others have suggested that transaction cost theoiy is a powerful viewpoint 
from which to examine capital structure (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993).
Transaction cost theoiy and agency theory share similarities across different 
dimensions. The notion o f managerial discretion in the context of  
opportunism, self-interest and bounded rationality are common dominant 
assumptions. This behavioural attitude, analysed in the presence o f uncertainty, 
leads to consideration o f conflicts that arise from a divergence o f goals between 
the contracting parties (Jensen and Smith, 1985). The focus is on the incentive 
systems and governance mechanisms that work towards economic efficiency in 
the presence o f these conflicts. The result is the set up o f an efficient 
contracting mechanism that serves to minimise both agency and transaction 
costs. Both theories differ from the standard neo-classical theory, which 
considers the firm as a production function, whereas TCE sees it as a
governance structure and AT as a nexus o f contracts. Both assume risk
$
neutrality o f investors and managers. Both maintain that the board o f  directors 
arises endogenously as a means o f control.
Notwithstanding these similarities, several conceptual differences exist between 
the transaction cost and agency theories.
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M arket characteristics: Transaction cost theory assumes that optimal contracts 
cannot be written owing to bounded rationality; therefore it is based on the 
assumption that markets may fail (Rumelt, at al. 1991). Agency theory, on the 
other hand, adopts the assumption o f market efficiency and seeks to find the 
optimal contract for the exchange.
Determination o f  relevant costs: In agency theoiy, the focus is on the relevant 
contracting action before the incentive scheme is introduced (Williamson, 
1990), Therefore, the agency costs are determined ex-ante as the incentive 
systems are established into the contract. In transaction cost theory ex ante 
costs arise from the set up and running costs o f alternative governance systems 
(Williamson, 1996, Chapter 7). However, the impossibility o f drafting 
complete contracts owing to bounded rationality implies that the likelihood o f  
opportunism still exists. Therefore, the ex post contracting action becomes 
more relevant to the contracting parties. Thus, although transaction costs have 
ex ante and ex post components, the emphasis is primarily on the situation after 
the transaction is entered into, with a specific governance structure. As 
governance structures, debt and equity are associated with different levels o f ex 
ante and ex post costs and benefits. Agency theoiy defines agency costs as the 
sum o f the monitoring expenditure o f the principal, the bonding expenditure by 
the agent and the residual loss, which reflect an ex ante incentive alignment. 
Transaction cost theory emphases the ex post costs which are: a) mal-adaptation 
costs when transactions drift out o f alignment; b) dispute costs rising when 
efforts to correct ex post misalignment are made, c) the setting up and running 
costs o f governance structures; and d) bonding costs o f ensuring effective 
commitments.
Assumptions about governance properties: In agency theory, the incentive 
alignment ability o f debt arises from the power available to debtholders in case 
o f default. The transaction cost reasoning also assigns the same governance 
properties to debt; however, equity is considered a more powerfiil governance
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instrument than debt, chiefly because debt is less interfering than equity. As 
long as the firm is meeting its contractual obligations, debt-holders are unable 
to influence managerial actions. On the other hand, equity-holders are able to 
continuously monitor and evaluate managerial decisions through the board o f  
directors. Hence, both debt-holders and equity-holders are able to influence 
managerial actions, although to differing degrees. While the transaction cost 
logic o f capital structure recognises the difference, the agency perspective does 
not make this distinction.
Assets under governance: According to agency theoiy, the free cash flow  
available in a company gives rise to conflicts between shareholders and 
managers (the appropriation o f perquisites) that could be resolved via the 
choice o f finance. On the other hand, in transaction cost theoiy appropriate 
financing solves conflicts arising from the resources o f the firm. The 
differences between the two perspectives can be considered in terms o f the 
governance o f free cash flows versus the governance o f resources. TCE 
assumes that the Board o f Directors is effective from the shareholders’ point o f  
view; an assumption that is treated as problematic in the Corporate Governance 
literature.
The unit o f  analysis: Whereas transaction cost theory has the transaction as the 
central unit o f analysis, agency theory considers the individual agent in that 
role.
Focal Cost Concern: While agency theoiy has the residual loss as the focus o f  
concern, transaction cost theoiy, has the cost o f mal-adaptation as its central 
focus.
Contractual Focus: Because o f ex ante and ex post differences, while agency 
theory is little concerned with dispute resolution, the avoidance o f disputes and
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the mechanisms for solving them are essential to transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1996, p. 176).
Table 6.1 gives a summary o f main differences between transaction cost theoiy 
and agency theoiy perspectives.
Differences Transaction Cost Perspective Agency Theory Perspective
1. Market Characteristics Capital markets can fail Capital markets are perfect
2. Determination of relevant After the contract is Before the contract is
costs established established
3. Assumption about 
governance properties
Debt and Equity both have 
governance abilities with 
equity being more powerful
Debt has governance abilities
4. Asset under governance Fiim resources Free cash flow
5. The unit of analysis Transaction Individual
6. Focal cost concern Misalignment Residual loss
7. Contractual focus Ex p o st governance Ex ante alignment
Table 6.1. A comparison of differences between TCE and AT approaches. 
Sources: Williamson (1996), pp. 179 and Cochar (1996), pp. 719.
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6.5. Empirical Research in Transaction Costs Economics.
Economists’ initial pessimism about the prospect o f deriving testable 
implications from transaction cost reasoning has turned out to be untrue. 
Theoretical advances beginning in the 1970s spurred a profusion o f empirical 
research, although much empirical research is required to examine the effect of 
financial strategies on firm performance.
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) investigate simultaneously the importance o f  
unique, firm specific characteristics and industry characteristics in determining 
the capital structure o f the firm. Evidence from their study o f 295 mining and 
manufacturing firms over a ten year period, strongly suggests that firm specific 
assets and skills are by far the most important determinants in explaining the 
observed cross sectional variations in capital structure. Structural 
characteristics o f industries and / or the notion o f large inter-industry 
differences in risk are not nearly as important as the firm-specific assets or the 
management o f risk and its implications. The relationships between leverage 
and certain determinants o f capital structure, such as tax shields and business 
risk, are also affected by specific effects.
Long and Malitz (1985) examined the effect o f the type o f investments a firm 
makes in its financing decisions. Their survey o f the aggregate financing 
practices o f over 500 firms supports their hypothesis that R&D and advertising, 
as intangibles, have little value in cases o f financial distress, while investments 
in plant and equipment support creditors in case of default. They conclude that 
it is the tangibility o f the firm’s assets and investments, and not profitability, 
which is the more important determinant o f capital structure.
Transaction cost economics has found an extensive application in the study o f  
leveraged buyouts (LBOs). TCE posits that LBOs are more likely to happen in
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firms that have low asset specificity. Several studies have examined the 
relationship between LBO occurrence and R&D as a representative o f asset 
specificity. Research evidence does support the notion that firms with a lower 
level o f asset specificity are more likely to undergo an LBO. R&D intensive 
industries and firms rarely undergo LBOs (Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1991). Long 
and Ravenscraft (1993) also found that LBOs are usually targeted towards “low 
tech” firms. Opler and Titman (1993) also found that firms with high R & D  
expenditures are less likely to go through a LBO. These results suggest that 
that it is in firms with non-unique assets that debt is the efficient form of 
governance.
Gordon (1988) looked at the capital structure o f 279 firms categorised by 
Rumelt typology o f  diversification strategy: single business, dominant business, 
related and unrelated diversification. He found that the determinants of 
leverage vary significantly among the different types. Both size and 
significance levels o f parameters vary for different types o f diversification. For 
all types o f diversification, profitability was inversely related to gearing. Film  
size and capital intensity were insignificant. For both related and unrelated 
firms, earnings volatility was negatively related to debt. Among unrelated 
diversified firms, sales growth was positively related to debt.
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6.6. Conclusions
Transaction Cost Economics has positioned itself in the centre o f the economics 
o f organisation. From Williamson (1975) onwards, TCE has made important 
progress both in conceptualisation and in empirical testing. The key concepts 
of TCE are o f a technical (asset specificity), o f a human (bounded rationality) 
and a behavioural nature (opportunism). The general strategy out o f which 
TCE works can be summarised as follows: After having characterised the 
transactions and distinguishing between them in terms o f asset specificity, the 
potential governance structures are discussed in terms o f transaction cost 
minimising capabilities.
TCE regards debt and equity as governance structures, rather than as financial 
instruments, that can be matched to the transactions in order to minimise the 
transaction costs. The degree o f asset specificity is considered as the 
determining factor in matching transactions to the respective governance 
structures, i.e., debt and equity. Williamson argues that when the asset 
specificity o f a project is low to moderate, debt is the best financing instrument. 
As the asset specificity becomes greater, equity ought to be used.
The limited empirical research earned out generally supports the TCE 
approach. Different studies have found a negative relationship between asset 
specificity and gearing. The majority o f studies conclude that intangible assets 
are negatively correlated with debt. Many LBOs studies support the notion that 
fiims with a low level o f asset specificity are more likely to undergo an LBO.
Future empirical research is required to address the TCE issues in more detail. 
The relationships between firm resources, the governance o f  these resources, 
and financial lenders need to be better delineated in order to examine the 
implications for strategic management.
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C h a p t e r  7
L i t e r a t u r e  R e v i e w  S u m m a r y
As seen from the previous chapters, the determination o f an optimal capital 
structure has been one o f the most contentious issues in the finance literature 
since Modigliani and Miller introduced their capital structure irrelevance 
prepositions in their seminal article in 1958.
What MM did not discuss in that article were the practical applications o f this 
theory for individual firms or how well the theory explained observed facts, 
such as corporate leverage ratios and market reactions to security issues. As 
Miller (1988) states: “ Scepticism about the practical force o f our invariance 
preposition was understandable given the almost daily reports in the financial 
press, then as now, o f spectacular increases in the value o f firms after changes 
in capital structure. But the view that capital structure is irrelevant or that 
“nothing matters” in corporate finance is far from what we ever said about the 
real-world applications o f out theoretical propositions. Looking back now, 
perhaps we should have put more emphases on the other, upbeat side o f  the 
“nothing matters” coin: showing what doesn’t matter can also show, by 
implication, what does”.
Much o f the financial literature over the past four decades has revolved around 
different theories that try to explain just exactly what does matter in 
determining capital structure.
Many interesting questions have been raised over the years: Is there really an 
optimal capital structure for any individual firm or industry? Does that ratio 
stay constant over time? Why have corporate leverage ratios not fluctuated in 
tune with changes in the corporate tax rate? How can one explain the sudden
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run-up in leverage in the U.K. during the 1980s? Why do leverage-altering 
transactions have such consistent effects on a firm’s stock price? Although 
most o f the literature on the topic points to the existence o f optimal capital 
structures, no one theoiy has emerged to explain all these phenomena. 
Research from Taggart (1977), Javiland and Hams (1984) and others suggests 
that managers do pursue a target debt ratio. Campbell (1988) showed that 
market reactions to leverage-altering transactions, such as convertible bond and 
equity-for-debt swaps, were related to whether the transaction moved the firm 
closer to or farther away from industry norms. That is why, according to 
Myers and Majluf (1984), “a full description o f corporate financing and 
investment behaviour will no doubt require telling several stories at once.”
Tax advantage o f debt
MM Preposition 1 stated that capital structure was irrelevant in a world without 
taxation. Latter they argued that introducing corporate taxes into the model 
created tax shield benefits to debt that could, in the limit, lead to an optimal 
capital structure for any company o f 100 per cent debt financing. One factor 
that could help explain the relatively low observed levels o f debt was the 
differential treatment o f equity and debt income on the personal level. The 
corporate advantage o f interest deductibility was partially offset by the personal 
tax disadvantage o f interest payments (see Chapter 2). The advantages o f debt 
would be completely eliminated if  a) the personal equity tax were eliminated, 
b) the personal interest income tax equalled the marginal corporate rate, and c) 
there were full loss offsets at corporate level. Loss offsets can potentially limit 
the expected value o f debt’s tax benefits to a firm. Non-debt tax shields such 
as net operating loss deductions, foreign tax credits and investment tax credits, 
may eliminate the benefit from debt-generated tax shields from being cashed 
in. Insufficient taxable income along with limits in carrybacks and 
carryforwards may also reduce the value o f interest deductions to a firm. 
Empirical research has concluded that for reasons of these kinds the after-tax
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cost o f debt varies widely across industries, which in turn might help to explain 
the variation in capital structure among industries.
Probability o f financial distress
Business risk is one o f the two determinants o f the costs o f financial distress 
according to Myers (1984). The multiplication o f the costs o f financial distress 
by the probability o f financial distress (not just bankruptcy, because indirect 
costs can be incurred even if  a firm recovers) results in the expected cost of 
financial distress. In this static approach to obtaining their optimum leverage 
ratio, companies should balance these costs against the tax benefits o f debt (see 
chapter 2).
The variability o f cash flows is at the heart o f business risk. The greater the 
fluctuations in a company’s cash flows, the greater the chance it will be unable 
to meet its obligations in any given period. Firms with steadier cash flows will 
be able to support higher debt levels than riskier firms, all other things equal.
One o f the biggest determinants o f the cost o f financial distress is the 
tangibility (in other words asset non-specificity, see Chapter 2 and 6) o f  a 
company’s underlying assets. Many tangible assets tend to retain their value 
even in bankruptcy, so tangible asset -intensive firms can support higher levels 
o f debt at lower costs because there is little risk to bondholders that the assets 
that support their claims will be worthless. Overall, there is fairly consistent 
evidence to support the relationship between asset intangibility (specificity), 
liquidation costs and financial leverage. Studies such as those o f  Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Williamson (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1990) generally find 
that leverage increases with the proportion o f fixed assets and non-debt tax 
shields, and decreases with proportion intangible assets, as evidenced by 
advertising expenditures, R&D outlays, and high market to book value ratios.
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Agency costs
Agency problems result when members o f one group o f stakeholders (such as 
managers) place their own interests before the interest o f the group they 
represent (shareholders). How well a company controls the losses o f value 
associated with agency problems (either through incentive schemes, monitoring 
or covenants) can have a dramatic impact on its capital structure and value.
Manager - shareholder conflict. The two primary areas where the managers 
fail to represent the best interest o f shareholders are under-leveraging and 
overspending.
Managers may be unwilling to leverage the firm to its optimal level because the 
added debt may increase the total risk. They could have a substantial amount 
o f company-specific human capital tied up in the success o f  the company (such 
as their wealth, reputation, future earnings and so on), a risk they as managers 
cannot diversify away. As a result, they may avoid additional debt that would 
increase the value o f the company, in favour o f greater job security.
Overspending can also be a problem in a business with an abundance o f  free 
cash flow. Managers have the incentive to spend that cash on “perks”. Some 
of the steps that can be taken in order to align the managers’ interests with 
those o f the shareholders are: executive compensation in incentive plans, equity 
owned by managers, investment bankers on the board, equity owned by large 
institutional investors. These conditions help persuade or force the managers to 
adopt a riskier, more leveraged capital structure when appropriate. Higher debt 
levels by themselves can serve as disciplinary or “bonding” forces by reducing 
the free cash flow available for perks, and they force management to work 
harder to meet higher interest payments.
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Shareholder -  bondholder conflict: After a bond issue is earned out, 
shareholders have an incentive to maximise their wealth at the expense o f debt­
holders in one o f the following ways:
- increase in dividend rate (by reducing investment or, at the extreme, 
liquidating the firm);
- -claim dilution (by issuing new debt o f equal or higher priority than the old 
issue);
- asset substitution (floating bonds for low-rislc projects and then using the 
funds for high risk projects instead); and
- underinvestment (rejecting positive NPV projects if  the benefits would 
accrue only to the debt-holders).
This phenomenon is more pronounced when a large portion o f the value o f the 
firm may comprise future growth investment opportunities, which may be 
selected in intangible assets such as goodwill. The threat o f bankruptcy can 
have a severe impact on the value o f these growth opportunities because the 
managers may reject positive NPV projects for the above mentioned reasons, or 
because they decide that they need the cash to keep the firm solvent.
Debt-holders can protect themselves against such wealth appropriations by 
drafting bond covenants as part o f the original floating agreement. These 
covenants can limit the firm in terms o f its production / investment policy, 
dividend payout rate, financing options, and performance bonding activities. 
Despite the low drafting costs, bond covenants have many indirect costs. 
Several empirical studies based on the hypothesis o f costly contracting have 
stated that the opportunity costs o f bond covenants are significant in terms o f  
limiting production, investment and financing decisions. (See Chapter 3).
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Asymmetric information
Another key assumption inherent to the validity o f MM Preposition 1 is the 
homogeneity o f expectations. This means that all the market participants are 
assumed to have equal information about the future states o f the nature, and to 
interpret this information in the same way. This is not, however, a safe 
assumption. New security issues illustrate this point. The potential purchaser 
o f a new security has less information about the prospects o f the firm than the 
management, and management is more likely to issue securities when the 
market price o f the firm’ s traded securities is higher than the management 
assessment o f their value. Sophisticated investors revise their estimate o f the 
value o f the firm if  management announces a new security issue; furthermore, 
the larger the disparity in information, the greater the revision in expectations 
and the larger the negative price reaction to the announcement o f  a new issue.
The information gap has at least two potential consequences for the capital 
structure debate. The first is the possible existence o f a “pecking order” firms 
may follow when financing new projects. The second involves the various 
signals companies can send to the market with different financial transactions.
According to the Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH), if  a company insider 
believes that the company’s stock is underpriced in the market, he will hesitate 
to issue new stock, even for a positive NPV project. Underpricing the equity 
may lead new buyers to gain more than the NPV o f the new project, at the 
expense o f the current shareholders. The company would much rather finance 
the project with retained earnings and riskless debt, both o f which are believed 
not to be undervalued. Lacking the available internal funds or ability to issue 
riskless debt, the company may finance the project with risky debt or preferred 
stock. Both these securities can be mispriced, but not to the extent that 
common stock would be. The firm will issue equity only as a last resort. Any 
equity issue will generally come soon after the release o f important financial
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information when information asymmetry, and therefore also the mispricing, is 
considered to be the smallest.
According to the POH, the desire o f firms to use internal funds first may lead 
companies to under-use leverage in a desire to gain financial slack. As a result, 
managers may place a value on available funds and the ability to issue riskless 
debt, foregoing some debt tax shields to maintain that slack. (See Section 4.3)
According to signalling models, the market interprets high leverage ratios as 
signs o f higher company quality. Moreover, increases in the dividend payout 
rate are taken as a sign o f permanently increased earnings, capable o f  
supporting higher dividends into the future. On the contrary, cuts in dividends 
and leverage reducing measures, such as stock issues, will have a negative 
impact on the film ’s stock value (See Section 4.4).
Information asymmetry problems along with agency costs have been used to 
explain levels o f debt, insider ownership and dividend payouts. Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992) argue that these factors are related to each other, both 
directly and indirectly, through the operating characteristics o f  the firm. 
According to their model, companies attempt to minimise the costs associated 
with information asymmetry and mis-aligned incentives by jointly optimising 
debt, dividend and insider ownership policies. This leads to a modified 
pecking order theory, although it is generally acknowledged that the pecking 
order is by no means a complete explanation for firm’s financial policy.
Although commonly accepted as a sound explanation for stock price reaction to 
new equity issues, the pecking order theory is not consistent with all empirical 
observations. For example it predicts a monotonically decreasing pattern 
regarding the drop in stock prices, i.e. the drop should be greatest for an equity 
issue, less for issues o f convertible debt, and least for straight debt. This 
pattern has not been found in empirical studies.
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According to the property rights theory, the firm is defined by its non-human 
assets and the allocation o f property rights to these assets. Property rights are 
defined as the rights to return streams and the rights to make strategic decisions 
in contingencies not explicitly contracted upon. According to Hart (1996), 
property rights to corporate assets are specified in the firm’s financial contracts. 
The property rights literature regards financial instruments as commitment 
devices and focuses on the control aspects o f these instruments. These 
instruments are viewed as defining both the allocation o f rights to the return 
streams and residual control rights (see Chapter 5).
Transaction Cost Economics. This approach attempts to explain the use o f  debt 
and equity as governance instruments. These can be matched to the asset 
attributes o f individual investment projects (transactions) in order to ensure the 
lowest cost o f transacting. The degree o f asset specificity is considered as the 
determining factor in matching transactions to the respective governance 
structures, i.e. debt and equity. According to Williamson (1996, ch. 12), when 
the asset specificity o f a project is low to moderate, debt is the best financing 
instrument (i.e. it entails lower transaction costs). As the asset specificity 
increases, equity ought to be used. Many studies have found a negative 
relationship between asset specificity and gearing. TCE, like the property 
rights approach, tries to offer an explanation for gearing levels from a strategic 
management point o f view, but there is a need for further deliberations 
especially regarding the definition and measurement of asset specificity (see 
Chapter 6).
Product/Input market forces attempt to explanation the observed capital 
structure patterns by hying to determine a link between debt levels and 
strategic variables.
Some models try to explore the connection between capital structure and 
strategy (Brander and Lewis, 1986), whereas other models consider the effects
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o f gearing on the customer/supplier relationships ((Titman (1984), Sarig (1988) 
and PeiToti and Spier (1993)). The fundamental idea behind the former models 
is that the gearing changes the pay-off to equity, and company managers quite 
often have incentives only to maximise their film s’ equity value. Debt forces 
oligopolists to undertake a more aggressive output strategy, which leads to all 
the producers being worse o ff than they would be if  all firms had pure equity 
financing. These models show that debt capacity is an increasing function o f  
industry’s price elasticity o f  demand and a decreasing function o f the discount 
rate.
The second major product/input market force model links capital structure to 
customers and suppliers of inputs via product markets. Customers suffer losses 
when a firm goes bankrupt. For durable and unique goods manufacturers the 
costs are greater in terms o f customers’ lost access to the product. Titman 
(1984) showed how leverage forces a company always to follow an optimal 
strategy o f only liquidating when the net benefits o f liquidation out-weigh the 
loss to customers. Sarig (1988) showed how debt can be used to strengthen the 
stockholder’s bargaining power when negotiating with input suppliers. Perroti 
and Spier (1992) examine the conditions where firms may use short-term 
strategic debt-for-equity swaps to extract concessions from workers when 
negotiating wages.
Capital structure has an important impact on the market for corporate control 
through mergers, acquisitions, and other corporate restructuring. The 1980s 
saw a dramatic increase in the level o f this activity in the U.K. The market has 
started to heat up again with 1995 being one o f the record years, a trend which 
is well set to continue. The debt versus equity decision has an impact on the 
eventual distribution o f voting rights and cash flows, and solving resource 
allocation problems.
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The last four decades have seen much development in the literature available 
on the capital structure debate. MM Preposition 1 guided subsequent 
researchers by proving that capital structure could be irrelevant under a very 
strict set o f assumptions. The perfect capital markets they assumed led to a 
wide variety o f research on the effects o f somewhat-less-than-perfect capital 
markets. Absence o f taxes was considered versus differential coiporate, 
personal equity and personal debt income taxes with varying non-debt tax 
shields and carryback/carryforward provisions. Absence o f bankruptcy costs 
was modelled versus different costs and probability o f financial distress. 
Assumptions o f no agency cost were compared to the difficulty o f aligning 
manager goals with firm goals and shareholders interests with debt-holders 
interests. Similar reasoning applies to the assumption o f perfect information in 
a market where in which the asymmetric information is present.
Out o f these theoretical and empirical treatments o f  capital structure, two 
models appear to come across strongly. One o f them is the target debt level 
model based on the trade-off between advantages and disadvantages o f the use 
o f debt. These trade-offs are influenced by several variable, most notably the 
tax advantages o f debt, the risk o f bankruptcy and the reduction o f agency 
costs.
In any event, the forces examined in the literature review chapters help, in 
varying degrees, to determine the corporation’s optimal capital structure.
The second o f these models is that o f the pecking order. It would seem that 
corporations do make intentional short-term decisions that may move them 
farther away from their leverage targets, or as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
put it “changes in debt ratios are driven by the need for external funds, not by 
attempt to reach an optimal capital structure.” It is believed that a pecking 
order exists, because there will be times when companies do not want to
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subject themselves to the regulatory discipline or the asymmetrical information 
(leading to mispricing) o f the market.
There is much room for improvement in the explanatory power and predictive 
ability o f capital structure theory. It is apparent that a more comprehensive 
testable model could be developed, where all the factors mentioned in this 
literature recapitulation are integrated, with the relative influences of each 
factor allowed to vary over time with changes in the business climate.
The empirical literature section that proceeds examines some o f these issues. It 
particularly tries to answer the question whether the gearing ratio o f the UK 
hotel and retail industries follows a pecking order approach or a target debt 
level alternative.
After a description o f the data and the statistical tools used to analyse these data 
in Chapter 8, Chapter 9 tests a pecking order model similar to that in Shyam- 
Sunder and Myers (1999) one based on the asymmetric information arguments 
presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 10 tests a target debt level model based on 
some o f the arguments discussed in Chapter 2. It also compares the results 
produced by both these mutually exclusive tests. Chapter 11 identifies some o f  
the variables which according, to different theories and previous empirical 
research on capital structure (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6) are identified as important 
factors that influence the capital structure behaviour. This study takes also into 
account some factors which are specific to the industries under study.
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C h a p t e r  8
D a t a  a n d  S t a t i s t i c a l  D e f i n i t i o n s
8.1 Introduction
Three types o f data may be available for empirical analysis: time series, cross- 
sectional, and pooled data.
In pooled data there are elements o f both time series and cross-sectional data. 
Therefore attention should be paid to problems that come from both time series 
(i.e. stationarity) and cross-sectional (i.e. heterogeneity) aspects.
Panel data used in empirical financial research are usually non-experimental 
and come mainly from secondary sources such as financial databases, like 
Datastream, COMPUSTAT, Extel etc. Several statistical packages can be used 
in order to analyse the data. The E-View statistical package is used in this 
research.
Regression analysis is one o f the most commonly used methods in empirical 
financial studies. It aims to estimate the average value of one variable on the 
basis o f the fixed values o f another variable (single regression analysis) or 
several variables (multiple regression analysis). Several aspects have to be 
taken into consideration during the regression analysis, such as: 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and robustness o f the model.
Section 8.2 discusses the nature o f panel data and their advantages and 
limitations. Section 8.2.1 describes the data and the samples used in this 
research. Section 8.3 discusses the multiple regression model. Fixed and
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random effect models are described in Section 8.3.1. Section 8.4 gives an 
overview o f  the heteroscedasticity problem and the way to deal with it. Section 
8.5 talks about multicollinearity and ways to limit it. Section 8 .6  describes the 
stationarity problem in time-series data. The chapter concludes with Sections 
8.7  and 8 .8 , which give a brief description o f some statistical definitions and 
the way E-View performs the regression calculations.
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8.2. Panel Data
Panel data, pooled cross-sectional and time-series, are used to empirically 
examine the hypotheses formulated hereafter.
Hsiao (1986) points out that panel data sets for economic research posses 
several major advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time series data 
sets. First, they usually give the researchers a large number o f data points, 
increasing the degrees o f freedom, variability and efficiency, and reducing 
collinearity among explanatory variables. The large number o f data points is 
very important when using financial accounting data, which are published only 
annually. Second, and more important, longitudinal data allow a researcher to 
analyse a number o f important economic questions that can not be addressed 
using pure cross-sectional and pure time-series data sets. Panel data are better 
able to study the dynamics o f adjustments and are able to identify and measure 
effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sectioned or pure time series 
data (Baltagi, 1995). Panel data provide a dynamic picture o f the samples’ 
financing behaviour.
Panel data control better for individual heterogeneity. Panel data allow for the 
fact that individuals, firms, countries are heterogeneous. Time series and cross- 
sectional data not controlling for this heterogeneity run the risk o f yielding 
biased results.
Panel data allow us to construct and test more complicated behavioural models 
than do purely cross-sectional or time series data. Also, fewer restrictions can 
be imposed in panels than in a purely time series study.
Panel data are usually gathered for micro-level units, like individuals, firms, 
and households. Many variables can be more accurately measured at the micro
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level, and biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals are 
eliminated.
Limitations o f panel data include:
Design and data collection problems: These include problems o f coverage 
(incomplete account o f the population o f interest).
Distortions or measurement errors: Measurement errors may arise because of 
inappropriate information, misrecording o f data.
Selectivity problems: in the form o f self-selectivity nonresponse or attrition. 
Short time series dimension: Typical panels cover annual data covering a short 
span o f time for each individual. Increasing the number o f years is not without 
cost either. This increases the chances that fewer firms with have data 
available for the extended period.
Panel data testing is very popular in product placement and marketing research, 
as well as in studies concerned with the labour force. Econometric testing in 
finance is mainly carried out using time series or cross sectional data. The 
availability o f long time series or disagreggated price data partially explains 
this phenomenon. Very little empirical work for testing capital structure has 
been done using panel data. Early studies, which have used panel data in 
finance, have mainly concentrated on dividends. In finance, empirical testing 
relies on firm specific samples limited to stock market quoted films. A sample 
of exclusively quoted firms is non-random, since firms may receive a stock 
market listing if  they satisfy specific criteria, and even some o f those that do 
choose to remain unquoted. Two capital structure studies that use panel data 
are Kim (1997) and Michaelas at al. (1999).
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8.2.1. Data and Sample
Most o f the data used in this study are gathered from secondary sources. The 
main source o f information has been the Extel database. It provides financial 
information for 10460 companies, 3642 o f which are U.K. firms. The database 
contains published accounts data as well as stock prices. The time span o f data 
availability varies among firms and ranges from 16 years to 1 year in some 
cases. For very few o f  them the data go back to the year 1983, but the most 
common cut off date is the year 1985. The database is composed o f two parts: 
Company Analysis and Equity Research. The former contains published 
accounts data while the latter contains stock market data. The database 
provides also information about the status o f the company (dead or alive), their 
addresses and contact numbers. During the data extraction process it was 
realised that there were many missing data, i.e. data that according to the status 
o f the company and the life span o f the database should have been there but 
they were not. There was a discrepancy among the companies that appeared in 
Company Analysis and those in Equity Research, which made it difficult to 
extract all the necessary variables. In order to have as complete as possible 
data sample two other financial databases, Fame and Datastream, were used. 
Fame provided some o f the missing data for the last five years, while 
Datastream was used mainly for calculating the missing shareholders’ equity 
figure (see variable definition in section 9.4). In a few cases hard copies of 
companies’ financial statements were used to complete the set o f  data or to 
make certain clarifications.
Primary 4 digit SIC codes were used as the initial criteria o f selection o f  the 
sample for both industries. They are:
6410 Food Retailers 55 companies
6420 Confectionery / newsagent/ off-license 30
6430 Dispensing and other Chemists 9
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6440 Mixed Retail Business 22
6450 Retail Distributing o f Clothing 
6460 Retail o f Footwear and Leather Goods
53
5
6470 Retail Fabrics and Textile 11
6480 Retail Household Goods and Hardware 58
66501 Hotel 65
Only companies with a full set o f data for the 13-year (1985 -  1997) period 
were then selected. The number o f companies was reduced from 243 to 134 
retail companies and from 65 to 22 hotel firms. Most o f  the retail firms 
belonged to more than one classification. They were included in the 
classification which appeared as their first line o f business. Because o f the fact 
that very few retail companies were left in some o f the aforementioned 
classifications they were regrouped in similar lines o f businesses. SIC 6450 
(Retail Distributing o f Clothing) 6460 (Retail o f Footwear and Leather Goods 
and 6470 (Retail Fabrics and Textiles) were joined in one compact group 
giving a total number o f 33 companies. SIC 6420 (confectionery / newsagent / 
o ff license) and 6430 (dispensing and other chemists) were also joined together 
giving a total number o f 21 companies. The following is the final classification 
for the retail companies:
Clothing and footwear 33
Food retailers 31
Retail household goods and hardware 27
Mixed retailers 22
Confectionery / News Agent / Dispensing / Chemists/
Off-license 21
The main reason why the initial number o f firms was reduced so drastically 
was that many companies had only a few years’ data. Some o f  them had 
“died”, or were young companies, or were taken over. Some others were
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excluded because the chosen industries, i.e., hotel and retail industries, 
appeared only as their 5th or 6th line o f business and it was considered that it 
was important for the outcome o f the tests that groups had to be as homogenous 
as possible.
The tests are carried out on the overall sample o f 134 retail firms as well as on 
the specific portfolios created in order to see if  there was any line o f business 
influence among retail films. These differences are expected to be very small 
as the companies still belong to the same industry and face similar business 
risk. The grouping o f some o f the retail firms might look somewhat arbitrary, 
especially the newsagent / chemists etc grouping. A careflil investigation of  
their line o f businesses was made looking at all the SIC classifications to which 
these firms belonged and making sure that the grouped firms were as similar as 
possible as well as making sure that the portfolios were big enough in order for 
them to contain the necessary number o f observations for the statistical tests to 
be robust.
The reason why 1985 was selected as the cut-off year was that 10 years o f data 
were deemed necessary in order to draw sound statistical conclusions from the 
tests described in the following sections. Taking into account the fact that 
some o f the variables are calculated as averages or standard deviations o f three 
years, an initial 13 years period o f raw data was needed in order to produce a 
10 year period for the dependent and independent variables.
The above mentioned selection o f companies and time span has resulted in 
1729 and 273 observations for the retail sector and hotel sector respectively.
Two companies Queen Moat House from the hotel sector and John Lewis 
Partnership from Mixed retailing were excluded as outliers. The former showed 
extreme figures as the result o f the deep financial difficulties they experienced
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in the early nineties, and it was very difficult to calculate the market value of 
equity.
8.3. The Multiple Regression Model
Regression analysis was first developed by Francis Balton in the latter part o f  
the 19th century. The term regression persists to this day to describe statistical 
relations between variables. Regression analysis is the statistical methodology 
for predicting the values o f one or more variables from a collection o f predictor 
(explanatory) variables.
The single regression equation is o f the following format 
Yj = a  + PiX|i
Panel data regression differs from a regular time series or cross section in that it 
combines both in a double subscript on its variables, i.e. Xit.
Y; = a  + PiXji + p2Xj2 + .........+ PtX it + uit (i)
With i denoting a cross-sectional category such as households, individuals, 
firms, etc., and t denoting time. Thus, i subscript denotes the cross-sectional 
dimension whereas t denotes the time-series dimension.
Yj is the dependent variable and X il5 X,-2 ... X it are the explanatory variables, a
is the constant and (3ls + (3t are the slopes o f the explanatory variables.
The error terms are assumed to have the properties:
E(iii) = 0 
Var(iij) = a 2 and 
Cov(uj,Uj) = 0 for i L  j
These relationships state that the error terms are assumed to have a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and constant variance a 2, and that error terms must be
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independent. Most o f the panel data applications utilise a one-way error 
component model for the disturbances, with 
uit = Pi + v it
where p, denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and vIt denotes the 
remainder disturbance. Note that pi is not time variant and it accounts for any 
individual specific effect that is not included in the regression. The remainder 
disturbance v it varies with individual and time and can be thought o f as the 
usual disturbance in the regression.
In matrix notion equation (i) can be expressed as:
a  + P  \X  n + P 2 ^  \l + + P  In + u  ,
a  + p  ! X 21 + P  2 X 22 + + p  r X 2ll + U 2
' Y , '
y 2
•
I *< 1_ Y j J ( a  +  fr {X  n + p  2X  j2 + .... + p  TX  in + ii . 
After division and addition o f the matrices we have:
Y , 1, X „ ,  X 12 , .. X ln " P  0 "u 1"
Y 2 1, X 21 » X 22 , . x 2ll u 2
— X +
.
Y , . _ 1 , x  u , X  i2 , ... .. x in _ _u i _
Multiple regression models can be presented as:
Y = X x |3 + u
(i x 1) (i x (i x n)) ((i x 1) x 1) (i x 1)
(ii)
One o f the objectives o f regression analysis is to develop an equation that will 
allow the researcher to predict the response for given values o f the predictor 
variables. Thus, it is necessary to fit the model in (ii) to the observed Yt 
corresponding to the known values X u, X i2.. .X in. That is, the value o f the
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regression coefficient (3 and the error variance a 2 consistent with the available 
data have to be determined.
. 8.3.1. Fixed and Random Effects Models
A simple way to take account o f heterogeneity across individuals and/or 
through time is to use variable intercept models. The basic assumptions of 
such models are that, conditional on the observed explanatory variables, the 
effects o f all omitted variables are driven by three types o f variables: individual 
time-invariant, period individual-invariant, and individual time-variant 
variables. The individual time-invariant variables are variables that are the 
same for a given cross sectional unit through time but they vary across cross- 
sectional units. Examples o f these are attributes o f individual-firm 
management, ability, etc. The period individual-invariant variables are 
variables that are the same for all cross-sectional units at a given point in time 
but that vary through time. Examples o f these are prices, interest rates, and 
widespread optimism or pessimism. The individual time-variant variables are 
variables that vary across cross-sectional units at a given point in time and also 
exhibit variations through time. Examples o f these variations are a firm’s sales, 
profits, and capital stock.
The variable intercept model assumes that the effects o f numerous omitted 
variables are each individually unimportant but are collectively significant and 
possess the property o f a random variable that is uncorrelated with all other 
included and excluded variables. On the other hand, because the effects o f  the 
remaining omitted variables either stay constant through time for a given cross- 
sectional unit or are the same for all cross-sectional units at a given point in 
time, or a combination o f both, they can be absorbed in the intercept term of a 
regression model as a means to explicitly allow for individual and/or temporal 
heterogeneity contained in the temporal cross-sectional data.
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The variable intercept model can provide a useful specification for fitting 
regression models using panel data.
The fixed effects estimation method treats the unobservable specific effects pt 
as fixed constants. In this case the jut are assumed to be fixed parameters and 
the remaining disturbances stochastic, with v it independent and identically 
distributed. The X u are assumed independent o f the v n for all i and t. The fixed 
effects model is an appropriate specification if  we are focusing on specific sets 
o f firms, and our inferences are restricted to the behaviour o f these sets of  
firms. Thus the value o f the dependent variable for the zth unit at time t, y ih
depends on K  exogenous variables, (x/i7,  xKit) =  x ’ih that differ among
individuals in a cross section at a given point in time and also exhibit variation 
through time, as well as on variables that are specific to the zth unit and that 
stay constant over time. The model is:
Yit ~ a * +A'xk i = 1 , N
t = 1,...., T
where p ’ is a IxK vector o f constants and a *\ is a lx l  scalar constant 
representing the effects o f those variables peculiar to the zth individual in the 
more or less the same fashion over time. The error term, uit represents the 
effects o f the omitted variables that are peculiar to both the individual units and 
time periods. It is assumed that uit can be characterised by an independently 
identical distributed (HD) random variable with mean zero and variance <j  u.
Random effects models treat the individual specific effects pj like nih that is, as 
random variables. It is standard practice in the regression analysis to assume 
that the large number o f factors which affect the value o f the dependent 
variable, but which have not been explicitly included as independent variables, 
can be appropriately summarised by a random disturbance. When numerous 
individual units are observed over time, it is sometimes assumed that some o f  
the omitted variables will represent factors peculiar to both the individual units
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and time periods for which observations are obtained, whereas other variables 
will reflect individual differences that tend to affect the observations for a 
given individual in more or less the same way over time. Still other variables 
may reflect factors peculiar to specific time periods, but affecting individual 
units more or less equally.
In the random effects model jp can be assumed random. In this case 
pi ~ IID(0,g m), Vjt ~  IID(0, a  v) and the pt are independent o f viu In addition, 
the X it are independent o f  the p t and vit for all i and t. The random effects 
model is an appropriate specification if  we are drawing n individuals randomly 
from a large population.
The issues o f whether to treat unobserved heterogeneity as random with a 
common mean and constant variance covariance matrix, or as fixed and 
different have aroused significant interest among econometricians and have 
paramount importance in panel data modelling (Matyas and Sevestre, 1996).
Whether to treat the effects as fixed or as random is a question with no easy 
answer. It can make a surprising amount o f difference in the estimates o f the 
parameters in the cases in which T is small and N  large. When only a few  
observations are available for different individuals over time, it is exceptionally 
important to make the most efficient use o f the data across individuals to 
estimate that part o f the behavioural relationship containing variables that differ 
substantially from one individual to another, in order that the smaller amount o f  
information over time can be used to best advantage for estimation o f the 
common part o f the relationship studied (Hsiao, 1986).
To decide on an appropriate structure for analysis, namely random effects 
versus fixed effects, it appears that consideration should be given to: a) the 
objectives o f the study; and b) the context o f the data, the manner in which they 
are generated, and the environment from which they came.
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When the objective is to make inferences about the population characteristics 
and the sample observations are random selections from the relevant 
population, a random effects model is appropriate. By contrast, choice o f a 
fixed effects model implies that our interest centres on the outcome o f  an 
individual unit. Hence, whether the particular sample can be realistically 
considered as a random sample from the population is irrelevant. In another 
situation the objective may be to leam about the mean outcome o f a specific 
factor over the population o f other factors. In this case, the analysis is more 
appropriately conducted in terms o f a mixed fixed and random effects 
framework.
Thus, the situation to which a model applies and the inferences based on it are 
the deciding factor in determining whether we should treat effects as random or 
fixed. When inferences are going to be confined to the effects in the model, the 
effects are more appropriately considered fixed. When inferences will be made 
about a population the effects from which those observations included in the 
data are considered to be a random sample, then the effects should be 
considered random.
In a hypothesis-testing framework, formal statistical testing procedures are 
based on one implication or another o f the random effects formulation relative 
to the fixed effects formulation. One formal statistical analysis is Breuch and 
Pagan (1979) where they exploit the fact that the effects o f  introducing a 
random coefficient o f variation is to give the dependent variable o f  the zth unit 
a different variance, therefore introducing a particular heteroscedasticity 
formulation, and suggest a Lagrange multiplier test for heteroscedasticity.
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8.4. Heteroscedasticity
One o f the important assumptions o f the classical linear regression model is 
that the variance o f each disturbance term uh conditional on the chosen values 
of the explanatory variables, is some constant number equal to c /. This is the 
assumption o f homoscedasticity, that is, equal variance. Symbolically,
E(u2j) = a 2 for i =  1 , 2 , n 
In contrast when conditional variance o f Yt increases as X  increases, that is, the 
variances o f Yj are not the same, hence, there is heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 
1995). Symbolically, E(u2 ) = g 2
The problem o f heteroscedasticity is likely to be more common in cross 
sectional than in time series data. In cross sectional data, one usually deals 
with members o f a population at a given point in time, such as firms, industries, 
etc. Moreover these members may be o f a different size such as small, 
medium, large firms. In time series data, on the other hand, the variables tend 
to be o f similar orders o f magnitude because one generally collects the data for 
the same entity over a period o f time.
8.4.1. The Generalised Least Squares Method
Ideally we would like to devise the estimating scheme in such a manner that 
observations coming from populations with greater variability are given less 
weight than those coming from populations with smaller variability. 
Unfortunately the usual Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method does not follow  
this strategy and therefore does not make use o f the “information” contained in 
the unequal variability o f the dependent variable Y. It assigns equal weight or 
importance to each observation. But a method o f observation, known as 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS), takes such information into account
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explicitly and is therefore capable o f producing estimators that are BLUE (Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimator).
The procedure o f transforming the original variables in such a way that the 
transformed variables satisfy the assumption o f the classical model and then 
applying OLS to them is known as the method o f generalised least squares. In 
short the estimators obtained are known as GLS estimators and these are 
estimators that are BLUE.
In GLS the weighted sum of residual squares (RSS) is minimised with
2 2 *
Wj = 1/ a  ,■ (o j is the heteroscedastic variance) acting as the weights, but in
OLS the unweighted or (what amounts to the same thing) equally weighted
RSS is minimised.
Detection o f  Heteroscedasticity'. As with multicollinearity described in the 
following section, the question is how does one know that the 
heteroscedasticity is present? There are no hard-and-fast rules for detecting 
heteroscedasticity, only a few rules o f thumb. Some o f the informal and formal 
methods for detecting heteroscedasticity are as follows:
7. Nature o f  the problem : Very often the nature o f the problem under 
consideration suggests whether heteroscedasticity is likely to be 
encountered. In cross-sectional data involving heterogeneous units, 
heteroscedasticity may be the rule rather than the exception.
2. Graphical method'. If there is no a priori or empirical information about 
the nature o f heteroscedasticity, in practice one can perform the 
regression analysis on the assumption that there is no heteroscedasticity 
and than do a “postmortem” examination o f the residual squares uit to 
see if  they exhibit any systematic pattern (Gujarati (1996).
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3. Formal methods include the Park test, Spearman’s rank correlation test, 
Goldfeld Quandt test, Breusch-Pagan-Godffey (BPG) test and White’s 
general heteroscedasticity test.
W hite’s general heteroscedasticity test: Unlike the Goldfeld-Quandt test, 
which requires reordering o f observations with respect to X variables 
that caused heteroscedasticity, or the BGP test which is sensitive to the 
normality assumption, the general test o f heteroscedasticity proposed by 
White does not rely on the normality assumption and is easy to 
implement.
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8.5. Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity originally meant the existence o f a “perfect” or exact linear 
relationship among some or all explanatory variables o f a regression model. 
For the k variable regression involving explanatory variables Xj, X 2, .... Xk, an 
exact linear relationship is said to exist if  the following condition is satisfied:
A,iXi + X2X2 + __+ ZkXk = 0
where X2, ••••?+ are constants (partial slope coefficients) such that not all o f  
all them are zero simultaneously.
Today however the term multicollinearity is used to in a broader sense to 
include the case o f perfect multicollinearity as described above, as well as the 
case where the X  variables are intercorrelated but not perfectly so, as follows: 
A^Xi + Z2X2 + ....+ A,kXk + vj = 0 
where Vj is a stochastic error term.
There are several sources o f multicollinearity. As Gujarati (1995) notes, 
multicollinearity may be due to the following factors:
1. The data collection method employed, for example, sampling over a limited
range o f the values taken by the regressors in the population.
2. Constraints on the model or in the population being sampled.
3. Model specification, for example, adding polynomial terms to a regression
model, especially when the range o f the X  variable is small.
4. An overdetermined model. This happens when the model has more 
explanatory variables than the number o f observations.
Theoretical consequences o f  m ulticollinearity .
Christopher Achen (1982) remarks: “ Beginning students of methodology occasionally 
worry that their independent variables are correlated -  the so called multicollinearity problem. 
But multicollinearity violates no regression assumption. Unbiased, consistent estimates will 
occur, and their standard errors will be correctly estimated. The only effect of
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multicollinearity is to make it hard to get coefficient estimates with small standard errors. But 
having a small number of observations also has that effect, as does having independent 
variables with small variances. Thus “What should I do about multicollinearity?” is a 
question like “What should I do if I don’t have many observations?” No statistical answer can 
be given.
Practical consequences o f  multicollinearity:
In case o f near or high multicollinearity, one is likely to encounter the 
following consequences:
1. Although meeting the BLUE criterion, the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
estimators have large variances and covariances, making precise estimation 
difficult.
2. Because o f consequence 1, the coefficient interval tends to be much wider, 
leading to the acceptance o f the “null hypothesis Ho” mode too readily (type 
error 2).
3. Also because o f consequence 1, the t ratio o f one or more coefficients tends 
to be statistically insignificant.
4. While the t ratio o f one or more coefficients is statistically is insignificant, 
R2, the overall measure o f goodness o f  fit, can be very high.
5. The OLS estimators and their standard errors can be sensitive to small 
changes in the data.
Detection o f  M ulticollinearity
How does one know that multicollinearity is present in any given situation, 
especially in models involving more than one explanatory variable? Here it is 
useful to bear in mind that multicollinearity is a question o f degree and not o f  
kind. The meaningful distinction is not between the presence and the absence 
of multicollinerity, but between its various degrees.
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Since multicollinearity refers to the condition o f the explanatory variables that 
are assumed to be non-stochastic, it is a feature o f the sample and not o f the 
population. Therefore we do not test for multicollinearity but can, if  we wish, 
measure its degree in any particular sample (Kmenta, 1986)
Since multicollinearity is essentially a sample phenomenon, arising out o f the 
largely non-experimental data that are collected in most social sciences, there is 
no unique method o f detecting it or measuring its strength. What exists are 
some rules o f thumb, some formal, some informal, but rules o f thumb all the 
same. They are:
2 * 21. High R  but few significant t ratios. If R  is high, say in excess o f 0.8, the F
test in most cases will reject the hypothesis that the partial slope coefficients 
are simultaneously equal to zero, but the individual t tests may indicate that 
none or very few o f the partial slope coefficients are statistically different from 
zero.
2. High pair-wise correlations among regressors. Another suggested rale is that 
if  the pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficient between two regressors is 
high, say, in excess o f 0.8, then multicollinearity is a serious problem. The 
problem with this criterion is that, although high zero-order correlations may 
suggest collinearity, it is not necessary that they be high to have collinearity in 
any specific case.
3. Examination o f partial correlation. Because o f the problem just mentioned 
o f relying on zero-order correlation, it is suggested that one should look at the 
partial correlation coefficients.
4. Auxiliary regressions. Since multicollinearity arises because one or more 
of the explanatory variables are exact or approximately linear combinations o f  
the other regressors, one way o f finding out which X  variable is related to other
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X is to regress each of Xi on the remaining X variables and compute the 
corresponding R . Each of these regressions is called an auxiliary regression, 
auxiliary to the main regression of Y on the X ’s.
Instead of formally testing all auxiliary R2 values, one may adopt Klien’s rule 
of thumb, which suggests that multicollinearity may be a troublesome problem 
only if  the R obtained from an auxiliary regression is greater than the overall
9 ■ •R , that is, that obtained from the regression of Y on all the regressors.
Remedial measures
What can be done if  multicollinearity is serious? As in the case of detection, 
there are no infallible guides because multicollinearity is essentially a sample 
problem. However, one can try and follow these rules of thumb, the success 
depending on the severity of the collinearity problem.
1. A p r io r i information. This could be obtained from previous empirical work 
in which the collinearity happens to be less serious or from the relevant 
theory underlying the field of study.
2. Combining cross-sectional and time series data. A variant o f the extraneous 
or a p r io r i information technique is the combination of cross-sectional and 
time series, knowing as pooling the data.
3. Dropping a variable and specification bias. When faced with severe 
multicollinearity, one of the simplest measures is to drop one o f the 
collinear variables. But in dropping a variable from the model we may be 
committing a specification bias. Specification bias arises from incorrect 
specification of the model used in the analysis. Hence the remedy may be 
worse than that the disease in some situations because, whereas 
multicollinearity may prevent precise estimation of the parameters of the 
model, omitting a variable may seriously mislead us as to the true value of 
the parameters.
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4. Transformation of variables. For example the use of first differences 
regression. Although the levels of X2 and X3 may be highly correlated, 
there is no a p r io r i reason to believe that their first differences will also be 
highly correlated.
5. Additional or new data. Since multicollinearity is a sample feature, it is 
possible that in another sample involving the same variables collinearity 
may not be so serious as in the first sample. Sometimes simply increasing 
the size of the sample may attenuate the collinearity problem. Obtaining 
additional or “better” data is not always easy.
Of course, which of these rales will work in practice will depend on the nature 
of the data and severity of the collinearity problem.
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8.6. Stationary Stochastic Process
Any time series data can be thought of as being generated by a stochastic or 
random process; and a concrete set of data can be regarded as a realisation of a 
particular stochastic process. The distinction between the stochastic process 
and its realisation is similar to that between population and sample in cross- 
sectional data. Just as the sample data are used to draw inferences about a 
population, in time series the realisation is used to draw inferences about the 
underlying stochastic process. A stochastic process is said to be stationary if its 
mean and variance are constant over time and the value of the covariance 
between two time periods depends only 011 the distance or lag between the two 
time periods and not on the actual time at which the covariance is computed.
One simple test of stationarity is based on the so-called auto-correlation
function (ACF). The ACF is defined as the fraction of covariance at lag k over 
* 2 *variance (a ). It lies between -1 and 1 like any other correlation coefficient. 
The statistical significance of any ACF can be judged by its standard error. It 
is shown that that if  a time series is purely random, (that is, it exhibits white 
noise) the sample auto-correlation coefficients are approximately normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance 1/n, where n is the sample size.
An alternative test of stationary is the unit root test. If we run the regression 
Yt — pYu + ut
where ut is a stochastic error term with zero mean, constant variance a 2 and is 
unautocorrelated, and find p = 1, than we say that the stochastic variable Yt has 
a unit root. In time series econometrics, a time series that has a unit root is 
known as a random walk. And a random walk is an example of a non- 
stationary time series.
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8.7. Statistical Definitions
The coefficient of determination r2 (two -variable case) or R2 (multiple 
regression) is a summary measure that tells how well the sample regression line 
fits the data.
R2 = ESS / TSS
(ESS - explained sum of squares, TSS -total sum of squares)
Some of the properties of r are as follows:
1. It can be positive or negative.
2. It lies between -  1 and + 1.
3. It is symmetrical in nature.
4. It is independent of the origin and scale
5. Zero correlation, i.e., r = 0 does not necessarily imply independence.
6 . It is a measure of linear association or linear dependency.
The T-test is a test of significance approach. A test of significance is a 
procedure by which sample results are used to verify the validity or invalidity 
of a null hypothesis.
The F -Test is a measure of the overall significance of the estimated regression. 
It is also a test of significance of R2.
The Standard Error is simply the standard deviation of the Y  values about the 
estimated regression line and is often used as a summary of the “goodness of  
fit” of the estimated line.
The Durbin Watson (DW) statistics is the ratio of the sum of squares 
differences in successive residuals to the RSS (Residual Sum of Squares). It is 
one of the most frequently used tests for serial correlation. As a rale of thumb,
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if DW is found to be 2 in an application, one may assume that there is no first- 
order correlation, either positive or negative.
8.8. E-View Statistical Package
As mentioned above, E-View is the statistical package used in this research.
E-view does not weight observations in pooled estimation by default, but there 
is the option of estimating weighted versions of the specifications. There are 
three options:
- No-weights: all observations are given equal weight
- Cross-section weights: GLS using estimated cross-section residual variances 
weighted within cross-sections.
- SUR: analogue or seemingly unrelated regression GLS using an estimated 
cross-sectional residual covariance matrix.
E-View can estimate covariances that are robust with respect to general 
heteroscedasticity. This form of heteroscedasticity is more general than cross- 
sectional heteroscedasticity since the variances across sections are allowed to 
differ across time.
White’s heteroscedastic consistent covariance estimates may be computed in E- 
View for pooled specifications (except for SUR combined with random effects 
estimation as described below). This variance estimator is robust with respect 
to heteroscedasticity within each cross-section, but does not account for the 
possibility of contemporaneous correlation across cross-sections.
E-View allows one to perform coefficient tests on the estimated parameters of 
the pool equation, such as the Wald test.
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The explanatory variables can be:
® Common coefficients: variables that are to have the same coefficient across 
all cross-section members of the pool.
• Cross section specific coefficients: variables with different coefficients for 
each member of the pool.
E-View allows four options for dealing with intercepts:
• None No intercept a it = 0
• Common Identical intercepts for all pool members a it = a  over time
and cross-sectionally.
® Fixed effects Different intercepts estimated for each pool member
cross-sectionally but held constant over time 
a it = a i} E(ajSit) ^ 0 
« Random effects Treats intercepts as random variables across pool 
members : otjt = a  + Uj, E(iijejt) = 0
The fixed effects estimator allows a,j to differ across cross-section units by 
estimating a different constant for each cross-section. E-View computes “fixed 
effects” by subtracting the “within” cross-section mean from each variable and 
estimating OLS using the transformed data which are the deviations from 
cross-section means.
The random effects model assumes that the term ajt is the sum of a common 
constant a  and a time invariant cross-section specific random variable Uj that is 
uncorrelated with the residual Sjt.
Cross-section weighted regression is appropriate when the residuals are cross- 
sectionally heteroscedastic and contemporaneously uncorrelated (E-View, 
Users Guide, p. 732).
191
J. Nuri Chapter 8: Data and Statistical Definitions
Because of the above mentioned characteristics that E-View displays, 
particularly in dealing with heterscedasticity and multicollinearity of panel data 
analysis, it was considered as the most appropriate package to be used in 
carrying out the statistical analysis of this research.
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8.9. Conclusions
This chapter describes the type of data used in the following empirical 
research. The data used in this research come from secondary resources such 
as Extel and Datastream databases. The study uses 13 years of accounting data 
from 1985 to 1997, during which the databases provided full sets of accounts. 
The number of quoted companies in each industry under study, i.e. Retail and 
Hotel industries, are: 133 companies in the Retail industry and 21 companies in 
the Retail industry.
This chapter discussed the advantage of using panel data as well as the 
problems that might arise as the result of pooling together time series and 
cross-sectional data, (i.e. stationarity and heterogeneity respectively).
Regression analysis was considered as the best method to carry out the 
empirical research in this study. Several aspects connected with regression 
analysis such as: multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and robustness of the 
model, were discussed in this chapter.
Finally the chapter discussed some of the characteristics of E-View statistical 
package which is used to carry out the regression analysis in this research.
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Chapter 9
D o  F i r m s  F o l l o w  a  P e c k i n g  O r d e r  A p p r o a c h ?
9.1. Introduction
This study tests the hypothesis that firms follow a pecking order approach in 
their choices o f financing sources. The hypothesis has generally been 
formulated in terms of a pecking order in using the funds available to the firms 
by starting with internal equity, continuing with debt as a second resort and 
using external equity only as a final source of funding (Myers and Majluf 
(1984). The main argument behind this formulation is the presence of 
information asymmetry, which causes a mispricing for the external financing. 
The mispricing is more severe for equity issues which makes them the last 
source of financing.
The pecking order hypothesis translates into an empirical hypothesis which 
associates gearing levels very closely with the retained earnings, dividend 
policy and investment opportunities.
Section 9.2 provides a general discussion of the pecking order hypothesis and 
findings from different studies. Section 9.3 discusses the pecking order model. 
Definitions of variables used in the model are provided in Section 9.4. A  
summary of results from testing the model and a discussion of them are 
provided in Section 9.5. Section 9.6 concludes the chapter.
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9.2. Do Firms Follow a Pecking Order Approach?
This study is an empirical investigation of the film’s choice of financing 
sources. A firm in need of cash has three major sources o f funds. These 
sources are: internally generated funds, debt and external equity.
Filins are usually able to generate funds by retaining earnings plus 
depreciation, and selling marketable securities.
Mayers and Majluf (1984) argued that the information asymmetry that exists 
between a firm’s managers and the market necessitates a pecking order when 
choosing among the available resources of funds. According to the pecking 
order theory, internally generated funds are the film’s first choice. Firms prefer 
to use internal equity to pay dividends and implement growth opportunities. 
The use of the internal funds avoids the problems associated with external 
financing such as having covenants that impose restrictions on the firm’s future 
financial decisions in the case of a debt issue, or having to underprice the 
film’s stock in case of a stock issue. However, the free use o f internal equity 
financing may be limited, as the managers hesitate to cut dividends.
The pecking order theory also suggests that when external financing is needed, 
firms prefer to raise debt before external equity ((Donaldson, (1961), Myers 
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)). There are two different views in the 
literature about why films prefer to raise debt before external equity. 
Donaldson (1961) suggests that internal equity is preferred because firms want 
to avoid flotation costs, which usually accompany external financing. He also 
suggests that firms prefer debt to external equity because the flotation cost (i.e. 
transaction costs of flotation) of debt is usually less than that of external equity.
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Myers and Majluf (1984) disagree with the view that firms prefer internal 
equity to debt because of the flotation costs. Conventional finance theory 
would not consider internal equity as “cheaper” than debt. If it is cheaper, this 
is presumably because of agency costs as discussed in the earlier chapters (e.g. 
underinvestment and asset substitution problems). They argue that the net 
benefits of debt financing, in terms of the trade-off between non-debt tax 
shields and financial distress, are likely to outweigh flotation costs. Myers and 
Majluf argue that managers rely on internal funds because they want to 
maximise existing shareholders wealth. They suggest that sale o f new shares is 
not in the interests of the existing shareholders because it usually leads to a 
decrease in the market price of the existing shares (Adedeji, (1998). Evidence 
observed by Marsh (1982) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) is consistent with 
this suggestion.
Myers and Majluf also argue that firms prefer debt to external equity, if  they 
require external financing, because the issue of risk free debt will not have any 
impact on the value of the existing shares. It is further argued that even if  debt 
is risky, the impact of its issue on the value of existing shares will be less than 
that of an issue of new shares. The value of debt is less sensitive to private 
information than the value of equity therefore; even risky debt is preferred to 
equity
Despite their differences, the explanations of both Donaldson and Myers and 
Majluf lead to the same conclusion, namely that firms relate their profitability 
and growth opportunities to their long term target dividend payout ratios in 
order to minimise the need for external financing. A number of testable 
propositions follow from this conclusion. One of them is that profitability has 
a negative influence on financial leverage, since a firm that can generate more 
earnings will borrow less, other things being equal. Highly profitable firms 
may be more able to use internally generated funds than others since high
197
J.Nuri Chapter 9: Peeking Order Hypothesis
profitability is usually associated with high cash inflow (this is tested in 
Chapter 11).
The relationship between gearing and dividend payout ratio on one hand or 
investment on the other is not very clear, as they both depend on the firms’ 
response to a shortage of earnings. If films respond to earnings shortages by 
borrowing both to pay dividends and to finance growth opportunities, then the 
dividend payout ratio and investment should have a positive influence on 
gearing. By contrast, if  firms respond to earnings shortages by reducing or 
postponing investment, while borrowing to pay dividends in the short term 
because of the reluctance to cut dividends, financial gearing may have a 
positive relationship with the dividend payout ratio and a negative relationship 
with the level of investment. Furthermore, if over time the earnings shortage 
persists, firms will be forced to adjust their dividend payout ratio to the new 
level of earnings
The suggestion of the pecking order theory that only a shortage of internal 
funding makes firms use external financing is questionable because it 
contradicts some other theories and ignores the effects of various institutional 
factors that encourage or discourage the use of debt.
Myers’ (1977) argument that firms should not use risky debt to finance growth 
opportunities in order to avoid the underinvestment problem is relevant. In this 
case, firms will not follow a pecking order and would prefer external equity to 
debt. De Angelo and Masulis’ (1980) suggestion that there is an inverse 
relationship between gearing and the amount of non-debt tax-shields 
substituted for debt indicates that firms with a low level of non-debt tax-shields 
may prefer to use debt before internal equity in order to obtain the tax 
advantages of debt.
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The degree of encouragement given to firms to use debt by various institutional 
arrangements is an important factor because it can change the pecking order 
and, therefore, the relationship between financial gearing, investment and 
dividend payout ratio. Some of these institutional arrangements that can 
influence firms5 decisions to use internal or external financing are the interest 
rate, the relationship between creditors and firms, and the likelihood of 
Government intervention if  there is a financial crisis (Adedeji (1998)). For 
example, a different relationship between investment and earnings will be 
expected to exist among British firms compared with German or French firms. 
Germany is known for its system of bank intermediation, and France for its 
Government intervention, though this only applies to larger firms and less than 
in the past e.g. bail-out of the bank Credit Lyuonnis.
The tax system is an important factor that may encourage firms to use debt 
financing to greater or lesser extent. Since the imputation tax system that has 
existed in the U.K. until very recently does not encourage the use of debt as 
much as the classical system in the U.S., the relationship between investment 
and financial gearing in the U.K. may be different from that observed in the 
U.S.
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9.3. The Pecking Order Model
If financial gearing, earnings, dividends and investments are interrelated, 
financial gearing (FG) should be a function of the cash flows generated by the 
firm, its dividend payout ratio and investments.
FG = f  (Earnings, Dividends, Investments)
In its simplest form the pecking order of corporate financing would be:
NE = Div + CE + WC + Dif 
D if = NE -  (Div +CE + WC) 
where NE = Earnings after interest and tax 
Div = Dividends 
CE = Capital Expenditures 
WC = Working Capital Change
D if = Difference which can be positive (surplus) or negative (deficit)
If D if > 0 i.e., NE > Div + CE +WC the firm has a surplus of funds so it retires 
debt, and if  D if < 0 the firm has a deficit so issues debt.
In a strict pecking order model, as long as safe debt can be issued there is no 
need to go down the pecking order and issue stock.
The model to be tested is:
D t - D w = a + P  Di f  it + u jt
Where p is the pecking order coefficient and Dt -  Dt_i is the amount of debt 
issued or retired depending on the sign of Dif. In order for Dt -  Du = Dif, we 
would expect a  = 0 and p = 1. The above equation does not include equity 
because the pecking order model will issue or retire equity only as a last resort. 
The pecking order does not depend on the sign of Dif. In principle a firm can 
become a net lender if  the surplus persists (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)).
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LTGit -  LTGjt_i = a  +(3Difit + uit 
and TGjt -  TGju = a  + (3Difit + uit
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9.4. Definition of Variables
There is a general agreement among academics that the book value of debt can 
be used as a substitute for the market value of debt. It can be very difficult to 
calculate the market value of debt, and studies have shown that there is 
normally very little difference between the market value of debt and its book 
value. Auerbach (1985) calculated the market value of debt by using its book 
value and transforming it using assumptions about the initial age structure of 
such debt, the maturity of new issues, and the coupon rate on such issues. 
These data are not ready available in the secondary data sources, which makes 
it vary difficult to calculate the market value of debt from the book value.
Long term debt is the total company’s debt payable after one year. This 
includes long-term bank loans and other long-term liabilities repayable beyond 
one year. Total debt is the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt. Short­
term debt is defined as the portion of the company’s total debt payable within a 
year. This includes bank overdrafts and the current portion of bank loans.
As defined above, variable D if = NE -  (Div +CE + WC).
Net earnings are the operating earnings after interest and taxes. Another 
measure that could be used instead of net earnings is the operating income 
before interest and taxes. The two figures are correlated and comparison of the 
results would give an indication of the effect of interest and taxes on the 
borrowing decision.
There is no figure for capital expenditures in the available database, therefore, 
the first lagged difference of net fixed assets can be used as a proxy for capital 
expenditures. Alternatively, if depreciation is added to both sides , operating 
cash flow (OCF) may be used and the first lag difference of gross fixed assets
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can be the proxy for capital expenditures. This would clearly give the same 
results.
Working capital is the first lagged difference between current assets (minus 
cash) and current liabilities.
Another variable that should ideally be taken into account in the “D if’ equation 
is the current portion of loans repayable in the year i, i.e., this should be 
excluded from the working capital calculations. These data are not available in 
the database, and so are excluded from the calculation and will be taken into 
consideration in the discussion and analysis section. (Under the assumption 
that firms have not issued new debt, the difference between the long-term debt 
at t- 1  and t can be used as a proxy for the current portion of loans payable. 
This was tried, but the results were not very different from the case when this 
was not included in the equation.)
Therefore, Difit = NEit -  (Divit +CEit + AWCit)
Difit = NEit -  [Dfyt + (FAit -  FAjt-0 + (WCit -  WCiM)]
Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 describe the statistical properties of variables First 
Difference of Long Term Gearing (LTG), Total Gearing (TG) and “D if’ for the 
hotel and retail data sets respectively.
First Difference L T G Mean Median Min Max
Clothing and footwear retailers 0.57 0.00 -354.50 308.90
Food retailers 11.10 0.00 -498.00 951.70
Household Goods & Hardware -0.46 0.00 -504.00 339.30
Mixed retail business 2.06 0.00 -201.50 364.60
Confection/Newsagent/Chemists 4.86 0.00 -116.00 291.90
Retail Industry 3.69 0.00 -504.00 951.70
Hotel Industry 25.28 0.02 -337.00 2367.00
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics of first lag difference of long-term gearing
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First Difference TG Mean Median Min Max
Clothing and Footwear Retailers 1.35 0.00 -341.90 365.40
Food Retailers 17.89 0.33 -323.00 1031.10
Household Goods & Hardware -1.38 0.00 -419.50 343.70
Mixed Retail Business 3.82 0.00 -445.10 364.30
Confection/Newsagent/Chemists 7.74 0.00 -235.50 461.80
Retail Industry 6.00 0.00 -445.10 1031.10
Hotel Industry 39.14 0.69 -391.00 4291.00
Table 9.2 Descriptive statistics of first lag difference of total gearing
'D IF ” Mean Median Min Max
Clothing and Footwear Retailers -12.60 -0.69 -594.22 441.10
Food Retailers -31.71 -1.73 -1576.50 1352.60
Household Goods and Hardware -2.27 -0.02 -1889.77 1889.90
Mixed Retail Business -9.26 -0.13 -694.60 692.46
Confection/N ews agent/Chemists -3.38 -0.56 -569.90 606.20
Retail Industry -12.66 -0.36 -1889.77 1889.90
Hotel Industry -63.11 -2.60 -6657.00 2196.00
Table 9.3 Descriptive statistics of variable “D if5
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9.5. Results and Analysis of the Pecking Order Tests
The regression model seeks to explain if  the firms follow a pecking order 
approach in their choice of financing sources.
The results of the pooled data fixed effects cross section regression, using the 
above described model for long and short term gearing, are shown in tables 9.4 
and 9.5 respectively.
Pecking Order 
Test
LTG
P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W
Clothing -0.03 -5.15* 0.10 0.08 2.04
Food 0.00 -1.33 0.05 0.03 2.31
Hardware -0.02 -5.41* 0.14 0 .11 2.28
Mixed -0.01 -1.58 0.08 0.06 2 .1 1
News /Chemist
ooi -1.89 0.07 0.05 2.27
Retail Industry -0.01 -5.73* 0.09 0.08 2.21
Hotel Industry -0.06 -0.68 0.06 0.05 1.83
* - significant at 2.5 per cent level o f  probability 
**- significant at 5 per cent level o f  probability 
c 5 -  significant at 10 per cent level o f  probability
Table 9.4 Regression results of the pecking order model for LTG
Pecking Order 
Test
TG
P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W
Clothing -0.27 -6.58* 0 ,11 0.08 2.20
Food 0.001 -1.38 0.07 0.05 2.13
Hardware -0.01 -8.36* 0.07 0.05 2.23
Mixed -0 .11 -9.23* 0.22 0.18 2.00
News /Chemist -0.08 -4.70* 0.13 0.10 2.40
Retail Industry -0.02 -8.35* 0.10 0.06 2.23
Hotel Industry -0.04 -2.62 0.07 0.07 2.03
T able 9.5 R egression  results for the peck ing  order m odel for T G
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As can be seen from the above tables most of the coefficients for the retail 
sector are significant at the 2.5 per cent level or better.
As explained in Section 8 .8, pl91, there are no figures for the intercept as we 
have used the fixed effects cross section estimator.
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 indicate that in general the slopes for long-term gearing are 
small and they have negative values. The only exception is food retailing 
which has a very small positive slope coefficient of 0.001. Clothing retailing 
has the largest slope coefficient of -0.27 which still is far from what can be 
expected if  a pecking order approach holds tine.
The coefficients o f determination are not high and they vary from 5% (food 
retailing, LTG) to 22% (mixed retailing, TG) for the retail sector and 6 % and 
7% for the hotel sector. The total gearing performs slightly better than the 
long-term gearing but figures are very close. These results indicate that the 
debt behaviour of companies in both sectors does not follow a pecking order 
approach.
Durbin-Watson statistics are all around the required level of 2.
The results are somewhat different from the conclusions o f other studies, 
especially Shyam -  Sunder & Myers (1999) which found high coefficients of 
determination.
The simplicity of the model, and the fact that the current portion of loans 
payable is missing from the calculation of AWC, might be a contributing factor 
to the low explanatory power of the model, but could not all alone count for the 
big difference between the R2,s and the small p (slope coeffcients) o f the two 
studies. It is clear from the data shown in table 9.4, 9.5, that firms in both retail
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and hotel sector do not follow a pecking order approach in their financing 
strategies.
As can be seen from Figures 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3, there is very little correlation 
between D if and the difference in the level of borrowing for both LTG and TG. 
The graphs show clearly that the deficit in funds available is not always 
associated with the same size of borrowing (e.g. years 1988, 1989, 1996 retail 
sector and 1988, 1996 hotel sector). There are years when companies have 
borrowed (1987) when under Shyam-Sunder and Myers model they could have 
acted as net lenders, i.e. they pay off the debt when there is a surplus of funds 
(positive correlation coefficient). Moreover, the size of the deficit seems to 
have no predictive power for the decision to borrow.
Table 9.6 shows that the correlation coefficients between D if and the first 
differences of borrowing are very small. The only exceptions are Clothing and 
Mixed retailing with respective coefficients of -0.41 and -0.42 (long-term 
gearing) and 0.43 and 0.45 (total gearing). But when we look at the 
coefficients for the whole sample (Ret + Hot) they are very small (respectively 
0.06 for LTG and -0.03 for TG). This gives further support for the results of 
the regression tests, namely that the pecking order approach does not seem to 
explain the debt behaviour of companies in both sectors.
One of the possible reasons for this is that firms that have ready access to the 
capital markets do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of 
security to offer. Therefore, a better defined test would be the one where the 
equity issues are included, as the assumption that firms will issue equity only as 
a last resort does not seem to hold.
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C o rre la tio n
C o e ffic ien ts
D l l  &  D if D 12  &  D if
C lo th in s -0 .42 -0 .43
F o o d -0 .06 -0 .2 7
H ard w are -0 .1 0 0 .02
M ixed -0.41 -0 .65
N ew s -0 .23 -0 .2 7
R e ta i l -0 .02 -0 .0 6
H o te l 0 .25 0.31
R e t  +  H o t 0 .06 -0 .03
Table 9.6. Correlation coefficients o f POH D if and first differences o f  LTG and TG
Cross-sectional Comparison of POH Dif and first differences of LTG and TG
(Retail Sector)
40.00
30.00
20.00 
10.00
0.00
-10.00
-20.00
-30.00
-40.00
Years
Figure 9.1. Cross-sectional com parison o f  D if and first differences o f  LTG and TG for the 
Retail Sector ( D l l  -  LTG first difference, D12 -  TG first difference)
■Dll Ret 
•D12Ret 
DIFRet
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■DllHot
-D12Hot
DIFHot
400.00
300.00
200.00 
100.00
0.00
-100.00
-200.00
-300.00
-400.00
Cross-sectional Comparison of PO DIF and first differences of LTG and TG (Hotel
Sector)
Years
Figure 9.2. Cross-sectional com parison o f  D if and first differences o f LTG and TG for the 
Hotel Sector ( D l l  -  LTG first difference, D12 -  TG first difference)
—♦—  D l 1 Ret+Hot 
—■ —  D12Ret+Hot 
DIFRet+Hot
Cross-sectional comparison of PO Diff and the first differences of LTG andT G  
(Retail &  Hotel Sectors)
80.00
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0.00
-20.00
-40 .00
-60.00
-80.00
V'ears
Figure 9.3. Cross-sectional com parison o f  D if and first differences o f  LTG and TG for the
Retail and Hotel Sectors. ( D l l  -  LTG first difference, D12 -  TG first difference)
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9.6. Conclusions
This chapter develops a simple model that synthesis the pecking order theory of 
capital structure.
Using a fixed effects general least squares model, we estimate the regression 
coefficient for the year to year difference of long-term and total gearing levels 
by using as a regressor a calculation of deficit (surplus) of funds available for 
investment.
We found that the slope coefficients are all significant, mostly negative but 
very small which means that most of the firms exhibit some PO behaviour (i.e 
borrow when deficit and pay back debt when surplus). But the explanatory 
power of the model is poor, i.e. the coefficients of determination do not support 
the pecking order hypothesis. This is true for both long and total gearing with 
total gearing having a higher explanatory power. The only sectors for which 
the model performed moderately well are hardware and mixed retailing.
The model is simple. It suffers from some variable calculation problems which 
stem from the unavailability of certain raw data, in particular that for capital 
expenditures which had to be estimated, and the inability to separate out the 
current portion of long term debt from trade credit which distorts the 
calculation of the working capital and working capital difference. Trade credit 
plays an important role in the financing of the companies in the sample, 
especially for the retail sector. For this reason, the result obtained from the 
model using LTG are in principle more meaningful than those from the model 
using TG. This is because gross working capital may normally be financed 
either by trade credit or by short-term debt (STD), i.e. short term credit is a 
substitute for short term debt. Thus the difference in gross working capital will 
be pai*t of “D if’, but may be financed by either trade credit or STD, rather than 
by LTD. However, it is the model using TD that has greater explanatory
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power. This may be because trade credit tends to be a fixed proportion of gross 
WC in the short term, while TG captures more “pecking order effects” than 
LTG.
The results of the regression model, despite its simplicity, show clearly that the 
pecking order approach is not the driving force in the debt policy of the sample 
companies. This questions the fundamental assumption of the pecking order 
approach that companies will issue equity only as a last resort.
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Chapter 10
D o  F i r m s  a d j u s t  t o w a r d s  a  T a r g e t  D e b t  L e v e l ?
10.1. Introduction
The search for a theory of optimal capital structure has dominated the finance 
literature during the past 40 years. Numerous studies have been carried out to 
test the hypothesis that there is an optimum. The hypothesis has generally been 
formulated in terms o f an optimum trade-off between the benefits and costs of 
debt. The most discussed trade-off is that between the tax-advantages of debt 
and the costs of financial distress. A value maximising firm would equate 
benefits and costs at the margin. In order to do so, that firm must aim at the 
optimum or the target. Note that the terms “trade-off model” or “target 
adjustment model” are used interchangeable in the literature and in this chapter.
The static trade-off theory translates into an empirical hypothesis that predicts 
that actual debt ratios move towards a target or optimum debt level. If the 
move is upwards, i.e. from a lower level of gearing to a higher one towards the 
target, it is considered a positive adjustment and if  the move is downwards i.e. 
from a higher gearing level to a lower one towards the target, it is considered a 
negative adjustment.
Section 10.2 provides a general discussion of the target adjustment argument 
and the support given to it by different studies. Section 10.3 discusses the 
target adjustment model. Definitions of variables used in the model are 
provided in Section 10.4. A summary of results from testing the model and a 
discussion of them, are provided in Section 10.5. Section 10.6 concludes the 
chapter.
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10.2. Do Firms adjust towards a Target Debt Level?
The question “Is there an optimum debt level?” has occupied a centre place in 
the corporate finance research. The optimum debt level reprisents the debt 
level that maximises firm value. This optimum requires a trade-off between 
the benefits of debt use and the costs associated with it: for, example the trade­
off between tax. advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs (see Chapter 2), or the 
trade-off between the reduction o f free cash flow agency problems and the 
increase of underinvestment problems (see Chapter 3). In an empirical 
framework, the trade-off argument predicts that firms adjust (increase or 
decrease) their actual debt ratios towards a target debt level. This means that 
the debt financing decisions are not residuals of other financing, investment, 
and strategic decisions.
There is evidence in favour of the static trade-off and optimal capital structure 
argument. Several authors have documented evidence of strong industry 
effects in debt ratios which is interpreted as evidence of optimal ratios (see 
Schwartz and Aronson (1967), Scott (1972), Ferri and Jones (1979), Bradley at 
al, (1984), Balakrishnan and Fox (1993)). Bradley at al. (1984) gives a review 
and synthesis of some of the earlier theoretical treatments of optimal capital 
structure, and concludes that their findings also support the trade-off theory.
Other studies provide more direct evidence that firms adjust toward a target 
debt ratio. Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Auerbach (1985) and Opler and 
Titman (1994) find mean reversion in debt ratios or evidence that firms appear 
to adjust toward debt targets.
Practitioners seem to support this concept as well. As it can be seen from the 
following quotation, some companies seem to try to keep their debt level 
around a target level.
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“The main policy of the group in the mitigation of the financial risk is to 
maintain gearing of around 50%. It is thought that this level o f gearing will 
allow us to enter the recession reasonably safe from potential breaches of 
banking covenants and withdrawal of facilities. Consequently when gearing is 
below 50% we feel able to borrow further funds for investment. At present our 
gearing is clearly below this level and this positions us well for opportunistic 
acquisitions if  prices of trading units fall”, (Stakis Annual Report and Accounts 
1998)
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10.3. The Trade-off Model
The static trade-off model has managers seeking an optimal capital structure. 
Random events would shift them away from it, and they would then have to 
work their way back. If the optimum debt ratio is stable we should see mean- 
reverting behaviour.
The simple form of the target adjustment model states that changes in the debt 
ratio are explained by deviations of the current debt ratio from the target. The 
regression specification is:
G « -G it-i = « + /J(G it - G it.,) + u it
where Gjt is the target debt level for firm z at time t, and P  the target 
adjustment coefficient. The hypothesis would be that 0 < P < \ .  The inequality 
shows that there is an adjustment coefficient (P  > 0) and that there are costs 
associated with this adjustment ( p  < 1 ).
The targets are unobservable; therefore a proxy must be used. The most 
common proxy used in the previous studies is the average debt ratio over the 
study period, for each firm. Another alternative is the average debt ratio for the 
whole industry sample over the entire study period, which could be considered 
as an industry average. As mentioned before, a number of studies have found 
the existence of a relationship between the debt level and the industry average. 
They have concluded that firms try to keep their debt levels around the industry 
debt level. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) report that the use of a three years 
moving average does not changes their results.
Two variables are used to measure deviation from the target debt ratios, first 
focusing on long term debt and second on total debt (long-term debt plus short­
term debt). The reason why we use the second variable is to see the
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contribution of short-term debt in the target debt level. The ratio of short-term 
debt will vary between companies because of differences in both asset 
composition and firm size. The two variables allow us to examine the 
influence of the maturity structure of debt in the target debt ratios. The 
respective models for the long-term debt and total debt are:
LTG,, - LTG,,., = a  +  p L (LTG* - LTG,,,) + u it 
TG „ - TG = a  +  /?T (TG *, - TG ) + u it
Where pL and pT are the target adjustment coefficients for long term gearing 
and total gearing respectively.
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10.4. Definition of Variables
10.4.1. Dependent Variables
The financial gearing ratio is usually measured by the ratio of long term debt to 
total capital. Market gearing, a measure of financial gearing, is measured as 
market value of debt divided by the sum of the market value of debt and market 
value of equity.
For the purpose of measuring financial gearing, market value of equity (MVE) 
is defined as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at 
the balance sheet date. In order to avoid the effect of financial statement 
publication on the average of the stock price formation, the average stock price 
for the four weeks prior to the balance sheet date was used to calculate the 
market value of equity.
Two other measures are used to measure financial gearing. They are long-term 
and short-term debt scaled by the book value of total assets (TA) or total sales
LTD LTD
TA ’ TS
TD TD
TA ’ TS
There is contradictory evidence about the use of the market value of equity or 
book value of equity. Some of the previous studies have used the book value 
of equity, arguing that although the theory of capital structure suggests that 
debt ratios should be measured in market value terms management prefers to 
use the book value. Myers (1977) argues that market values incoiporate the 
present value of future growth opportunities. Debt issued against these values
LTD 
LTG = ------
T G -
MVE
TD
MVE
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can distort future real investment decisions. However, most o f the finance 
literature supports the concept that the market value is a more accurate measure 
because it presents the present value of the firm’s equity as a going concern, as 
reflected in the stock market of the publicly traded firms; that is, it reflects the 
present value of the firm’s expected future cash flows.
The two dependent variables used for this study are defined as the ratios of (a) 
the book value of long-term debt and (b) the book value o f total debt, to the 
market value of equity.
Book value of long-term debt (LTD)
LTG = ______________________________
Market value of equity (MVE)
Book value of total debt (TD)(long-term + short term debt)
TG = --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MVE
Tables 10 .1  and 10.2 give descriptive statistics for LTG and TG respectively.
Long-term gearing Mean Median Min M ax
Clothing and footwear retailers 0.23 0.07 0.00 2.81
Food retailers 0.20 0.08 0.00 3.36
Household Goods & Hardware 0.14 0.03 0.00 1.90
Mixed retail business 0.14 0.02 0.00 2.9
Confection/Newsagent/Chemists 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.72
Retail Industry 0.17 0.05 0.00 3.36
Hotel Industry 0.28 0.20 0.00 3.35
Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics of long-term gearing
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Total gearing Mean Median Min Max
Clothing and Footwear Retailers 0.40 0.22 0.00 3.22
Food Retailers 0.39 0.18 0.00 4.27
Household Goods & Hardware 0.28 0 .11 0.00 1.94
Mixed Retail Business 0.32 0.10 0.00 3.29
Confection/Newsagent/Chemists 0.29 0.19 0.00 2.03
Retail Industry 0.34 0.16 0,00 4.27
Hotel Industry 0.50 0.37 0.00 4.17
Table 10.2. Descriptive statistics of total gearing
The data shows that both sectors are not highly geared, especially as regards 
the long-term gearing. The comparison between table 10.1 and 10.2 mean 
figures shows the contribution o f short-term debt use. In some cases it 
contributes for half of the total gearing figure, and as expected is higher for the 
retail sector than the hotel sector. One of the reasons might be the fact that the 
retail sector has more working capital to be financed by the use o f the credit 
terms offered. In line with our expectations, the hotel sector has a higher 
gearing level than that of the retail sector. The hotel sector can absorb more 
debt due to the greater fixed asset intensity.
10.4.2. Independent Variables
The proxy target debt level is usually calculated as the historical average debt 
level over the study period. However, the hypothesis that the target debt levels 
would remain the same over a period as long as 13 years may be questionable. 
Instead, firms might aim at a short to medium term target, which can be 
measured as a three or five years’ prior or future moving average, depending on 
whether companies is assumed to he backward or forward looking in setting 
their target debt ratios.
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The use of the three years prior is based on the argument that companies set 
their target debt level based 011 past experience. The alternative argument is 
that companies set their targets looking to the future, i. e. they decide where 
they want to be in the future and adjust their debt levels accordingly.
There are thus six measures that are used as the target debt level for both long­
term and total gearing. They are:
Tj = thirteen years average of LTG (TG) for each company.
T2 = industry sample average of LTG (TG) over the study period (1985 
-  1997).
T3 = three years moving average prior to the year t for LTG (TG).
(1985 -  1995), for each company 
T4 = five years moving average prior to year t for LTG (TG),
(1985 -  1993), for each company
T5 = moving average of future three years from year t for LTG (TG).
(1985 -  1995), for each company 
T6 = moving average of future five years from year t for LTG (TG), 
(1985 -  1993), for each company
Tables 10,3 and 10.4 give descriptive statistics for Tj, T3, T4, T5, and T6. The 
descriptive statistics for T2 are given in tables 10 .1  and 1 0 .2 .
As the data show, the mean figures for all target measurements are similar, 
increasing slightly as the target period is reduced, and the TG figures are almost 
twice as big as the LTG figures.
The reason why the medians are much lower than the means is that the gearing 
ratio has lower hound of zero and no upper bound.
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Long term Gearing Mean Median Min Max
13 years Average 
Retail industry 
Hotel industry
0.17
0.28
0.10
0.23
0.00
0.00
1.56
0.96
3 years prior moving average 
Retail industry 
Hotel industry
0.16
0.28
0.07
0.20
0.00
0.00
3.05
2.15
5 years prior moving average 
Retail industry 
Hotel industry
0.17
0.29
0.08
0.22
0.00
0.00
3.03
1.73
3 years future moving average
Retail industry 0.18 0.07 0.00 3.04
Hotel industry 0.30 0.21 0.00 2.15
5 years future moving average
Retail industry 0.18 0.08 0.00 3.04
Hotel industry 0.29 0.22 0.00 1.73
Table 10.3. Descriptive statistics for the long-term gearing target measures.
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Total Gearing Mean Median Min Max
13 years Average 
Retail industry 
Hotel industry
0.34
0.50
0.24
0.51
0.00
0.00
2.26
1 .2 1
3 years p rio r moving average 
Retail industry 
Hotel industry
0.33
0.51
0.18
0.41
0.00
0.00
3.78
2.58
5 years prior moving average 
Retail industry 
Hotel industry
0.35
0.53
0.21
0.42
0.00
0.00
3.84
2.07
3 years future moving average
Retail industry 0.35 0.20 0.00 3.85
Hotel industry 0.53 0.43 0.01 2.58
5 years future moving average
Retail industry 0.36 0.22 0.00 3.84
Hotel industry 0.53 0.42 0.01 2.07
Table 10.4. Descriptive statistics for the total gearing target measures
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10.5. Results and Analysis of the Static Trade-off Hypothesis
The regression model seeks to explore to what degree the gearing ratio of 
sample firms moves towards a proxy target gearing level.
The results of the pooled fixed effects cross section regression are shown in 
tables 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9 and 10.10.
13 years company 
Average
LTG TG
P t-stat. R2 Adj. R D -W P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D - W
Clothing 0.51 9.5* 0.55 0.51 2.17 0.52 6.33* 0.47 0.42 2.01
Food 0.52 10.60* 0.30 0.24 1.87 0.49 9.65* 0.28 0.21 1.91
Hardware 0.35 8.44* 0.22 0.16 2.16 0.39 9.21* 0.30 0.24 2.03
Mixed 0.43 9.93* 0.33 0.27 2.07 0.55 8.28* 0.50 0.45 1.92
News /Chemist 0.47 9.21* 0.29 0.23 1.91 0.57 10.53* 0.39 0.34 1.85
Retail Industry 0.48 9.02* 0.30 0.26 2.21 0.50 9.90* 0.32 0.37 1.86
Hotel Industry 0.46 8.33* 0.24 0.17 2.15 0.48 8.69* 0.25 0.18 1.97
* - significant at 2.5 per cent level o f probability
** - significant at 5 per cent level o f probability 
‘ ’ - significant at 10 per cent level o f  probability
Table 10.5 Regression results of trade-off model: LTG & TG -  13 years average for 
each company
Industry (sample) 
Average
LTG TG
P- t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W
Clothing 0.54 9.28* 0.62 0.59 1.83 0.53 6.65* 0.48 0.43 1.97
Food 0.52 10.09* 0.24 0.17 1.71 0.42 9.23* 0.26 0.23 2.26
Hardware 0.28 7.35* 0.19 0.12 2.21 0.39 10.21* 0.30 0.23 2.03
Mixed 0.34 8.33* 0.25 0.18 2.02 0.55 4.28* 0.50 0.45 1.95
News /Chemist 0.31 6.80* 0.13 0.06 1.82 0.33 7.62* 0.19 0.12 1.79
Retail Industry 0.42 8.44* 0.33 0.27 1.85 0.34 9.60* 0.29 0.23 2.11
Hotel Industry 0.47 8.32* 0.24 0.17 2.15 0.48 8.69* 0.25 0.18 2.07
Table 10.6 Regression results of trade-off model: LTG & TG -  sample (industry) 
average
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3 Years Prior
Moving
Average
LTG TG
P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W P t-stat. R 2 Adj R2 D -W
Clothing 0.77 5.57* 0.83 0.81 2.29 0.75 8.32* 0.50 0.46 2.32
Food 0.72 11.97* 0.65 0.61 2.16 0.68 9.22* 0.59 0.54 2.25
Hardware 0.69 9.76* 0.64 0.61 2.39 0.67 10.77* 0.71 0.68 2.39
Mixed 0.74 8.47* 0.71 0.67 2.33 0.80 5.16* 0.80 0.80 2.26
News /Chemist 0.69 6.70* 0.61 0.57 2.24 0.74 9.75* 0.69 0.66 2.07
Retail Industry 0,73 6.24* 0.74 0.71 2.27 0.70 5.18* 0.64 0.60 2.26
Hotel Industry 0.68 7.44* 0.64 0.59 2.49 0.70 7.13* 0.59 0.54 2.43
Table 10.7 Regression results of trade-off model: LTG & TG - 3 years prior moving 
average
5 Years Prior
Moving
Average
LTG TG
P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W P t-stat. R2 Adj R2 D -W
Clothing 0.67 16.68* 0.74 0.71 1.90 0.55 9.27* 0.44 0.43 1.86
Food 0.55 13.31* 0.49 0.42 1.87 0.62 10.31* 0.49 0.42 2.05
Hardware 0.45 10.15* 0.42 0.34 2.18 0.44 6.40* 0.60 0.54 2.26
Mixed 0.65 9.38* 0.63 0.58 2.05 0.74 7.19* 0.73 0.69 1.99
News /Chemist 0.58 10.27* 0.47 0.40 1.92 0.60 8.55* 0.62 0.57 2.03
Retail Industry 0.60 7.88* 0.60 0.54 1.97 0.61 9.59* 0.59 0.53 2.01
Hotel Industry 0.45 8.58* 0.40 0.32 2.06 0.45 7.97* 0.36 0.27 2.20
Table 10.8 Regression results of trade-off model: LTG & TG - 5 years prior moving 
average
3 Years Future
Moving
Average
LTG TG
P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W P t-stat. R 2 Adj R2 D -W
Clothing 0.78 35.57* 0.83 0.82 2.29 0.76 29.91* 0.77 0.75 2.37
Food 0.73 21.97* 0.66 0.62 2.16 0.68 19.21* 0.60 0.54 2.25
Hardware 0.69 19.76* 0.65 0.61 2.39 0.67 21.73* 0.71 0.68 2.39
Mixed 0.74 19.33* 0.71 0.68 2.41 0.80 27.46* 0.82 0.80 2.21
News /Chemist 0.69 16.71* 0.62 0.57 2.25 0.74 19.75* 0.69 0.66 2.07
Retail Industry 0.74 25.26* 0.73 0.70 2.28 0.75 35.72* 0.73 0.70 2.24
Hotel Industry 0.69 17.44* 0.64 0.59 2.49 0.70 17.12* 0.62 0.58 2.43
Table 10.9 Regression results of trade-off model: LTG & TG -  3 years future moving 
average
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5 Years Future
Moving
Average
LTG TG
P t-stat. R2 Adj. R2 D -W P t-stat. R 2 A djR 2 D -W
Clothing 0.91 29.67* 0.81 0.78 2.08 0.87 22.75* 0.70 0.66 2.19
Food 0.79 16.57* 0.56 0.50 1.99 0.79 15.52* 0.52 0.46 2.17
Hardware 0.64 12.75* 0.47 0.41 2.31 0.68 15.55* 0.61 0.56 2.28
Mixed 0.85 15.15* 0.64 0.60 2.24 0.92 20.18* 0.76 0.72 2.13
News /Chemist 0.80 12.63* 0.52 0.46 2.02 0.83 16.18* 0.65 0.61 2.03
Retail Industry 0.82 19.68* 0.64 0.60 2.10 0.84 20.44* 0.65 0.61 2.13
Hotel Industry 0.77 12.84* 0.52 0.46 2.19 0.74 12.19* 0.49 0.42 2.30
Table 10.10 Regression results of trade-off model: LTG & TG -  5 years future 
moving average
As can be seen from the above tables, the slope ((3) coefficients are all 
significant at 1%. This result suggests that our sample is not biased towards 
firms operating above their optimal debt ratio for most of the sample period. If 
there were such a sample bias, then contrary to the results shown in the above 
tables we should have found negative constants and low explanatory power. 
The coefficients for the 13 years and sample targets are rather small, mostly 
under 0.5, which would imply that there are some costs and constraints 
associated with the adjustment which increase as the time lag of adjustment is 
increased, resulting in a smaller partial adjustment towards the target when 
there is a long term target debt level than with a medium to short term target. 
By contrast all coefficients for short and medium term targets (i.e. three and 
five years prior and future targets) are in the range of 0.7 and 0.9, which 
indicates that in a short and medium time-scale period an almost full mean- 
reverting process occurs.
As explained in Section 8 .8, p i91, there are no calculations for the intercept 
because we have used a fixed effect cross-section estimator. When the 
estimator is calculated using the random effects-no weighting method, the 
intercepts were very close to zero and the explanatory power fell slightly. This 
confirms again the non-bias argument mentioned above.
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The regression coefficients, R2 and adjusted R2, are lower for the 13 years 
average target and sample average in comparison to the 5 years and 3 years 
moving average (prior or future) (See Figures 10.1. and 10.2). The latter has 
the highest regression coefficient and R2 for both long-term and total gearing. 
This confirms the expectation that the target adjustment behaviour is expected 
to be observed more in a shorter-term framework. From a capital structure 
perspective 13 years is a relatively long time in the life of a company; the effect 
of different micro and macro developments such as the interest rate, the 
changes in the tax regime and the condition of the economy can make it 
difficult to maintain a long term target debt ratio over such a period. It is rather 
surprising, however, that the sample (industry) target variable does not show as 
strong explanatory power as the 3 and 5 years moving averages. Most 
researchers consider that the industry average is a good proxy for the target 
debt ratio. One reason might be that the average used in this study is calculated 
as a sub-sample average rather than as a whole industry average, i.e. low R2 
due to the small sample size, at least for the hotel sector.
t 2 * * •The R s are in general lower for total gearing in comparison to long-term 
gearing. This can help to explain the role of short-term debt in the gearing 
behaviour. It can be argued that firms are more interested in keeping the long 
term gearing around a target level rather than short-term debt, while the latter is 
more likely to be the residual of other decisions. The level of long-term 
gearing is directly correlated to the likelihood of bankruptcy and strategic 
decisions. Short-term debt is used more for working capital expenditures of a 
short-term nature, or as “bridging” finance used while longer term sources of 
funds are found.
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The regression coefficient for LTG & TG - 13 years average, Sample 
average, 3 years average and 5 years average
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0.20 
0.10 
0.00
13 years Sample 3 yr prior 5 yr prior 3 Yr futur 5 yr futur
Figure 10.1 Com parison o f  regression coefficients P (note b stands for P)
The R S q  for LTG &  TG - 13 years average, Sam ple average, 3 years 
average, 5 years average
0.80 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
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13 years Sample 3 years 5 years 3 Yr futur 5 yr futur
2 2 Figure 10.2 Com parison o f  R (note R Sq. stands for R )
The results of the present study are similar to those found from other studies 
like Auerbach (1985), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Shyam -  Sunder 
and Myers (1999). The main difference in the model used in this chapter is that 
it does not control for other variables such as non-debt tax shields and 
bankruptcy costs that are factors that are hypothesised to influence the 
optimum capital structure. The main purpose of this simple regression model 
was to see only the one-to-one relationships between the year-to-year 
differences in the gearing level and the difference between the gearing level 
and the target level. We wanted to demonstrate that
■  Retail RSq L T G
■  Retail R Sq T G
□  Hotel RSq L T G
□  Hotel RSq T G
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when firms change the year-to-year gearing level they change towards the 
target level, following a partial adjustment pattern.
The results from the target regression models clearly suggest that firms follow  
a partial adjustment pattern, especially as regards short and medium term 
targets. Figures 10.3 and 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8 show clearly that the 
average cross-sectional debt levels fluctuate around the targets. This is true for 
both sectors, for long and short term gearing level.
L T G  fo r  H o te l an d  R e ta il S ec to rs  - C ro ss  section  a v e ra g e
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Years
Figure 10.3 Cross-sectional com parison o f LTG w ith the sample target gearing -  Retail and 
Hotel sectors
(Ret and Hot Av -  13 year average for the Retail and Hotel industries)
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■ Retail 
•Hotel
Retail Av
■ Hotel Av
TG Hotel and Retail Sector - Cross section average
0.20
0 10
0.00
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Years
Figure 10.4 Cross-sectional com parison o f TG with the sam ple target gearing -  Retail and 
Hotel sectors
Figure 10.5 Cross-sectional com parison o f  LTG and TG with 13 years average target -  
Retail sector
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L T G  an d  T G  H o te l S e c to r  - C ro ss  S ection  A v e rag t
Years
- ♦ — LTG Hotel 
- • — LTG Hotel Av 
TG Hotel 
— TG Hotel Av
Figure 10.6. Cross-sectional com parison o f LTG and TG with 13 years average target - 
Hotel sector
C ro ss-sec tio n a l co m p ariso n  o f  3 an d  5 y ea rs  fu tu re  m oving  a v e ra g e  w ith  the  
sam p le  ta rg e t d e b t level - R e ta il se c to r
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■ LTG 3yr Fu Re 
• LTG 5yr Fu Re
LTG Retail Av
■ TG 3yr Fu Re 
■TG 5yr Fu Re 
■TG Retail Av
Figure 10.7 Cross-sectional com parison o f 3 and 5 years future m oving averages with the 
sam ple target debt level - Retail sector
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Figure 10.8 Cross-sectional com parison o f 3 and 5 years future m oving average and the 
sam ple target debt level - Hotel sector
10.5.1. Addressing the spuriousness issue
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, p. 239) argue that “...fluctuations in the 
sample companies’ capital expenditures are positively serially correlated, and 
their operating earnings are cyclical. Since dividends are “sticky”, and not 
used as a short-run offset to net funds requirements, the companies tend to have 
string of years with financial deficits, followed by string of surplus, or vice 
versa. Under the pecking order, debt ratio climbs in deficit years and falls in 
surplus years. When the average debt ratio, measured ex-post, is taken as the 
target, the pecking order debt ratios show mean-reversion. Thus the target 
adjustment models generate a misleading good fit. The target adjustment 
model’s fit to actual data falls apart when a three-or-five-year rolling average is 
used the debt target. In other words, the model seems to work for this sample 
only because of the apparent mean reversion generated by use of an ex-post 
historical average debt ratio”.
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One can argue that mean reversion in debt ratios can generate spurious good 
fits, and significant coefficients for target adjustment models, even when the 
mean reversion has nothing to do with optimal debt ratios but simply reflects 
cycles or mean reversion in financial deficit or surpluses. The “spuriousness” 
argument asserts that data that are in fact driven by pecking order (PO) 
behaviour may also look as though they were being driven by target adjustment 
behaviour (where the target is the company average for the study period, 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999, p. 240). If this were the case in our sample 
periods, a surplus of funds (a positive difference) should not be followed by an 
increase in borrowing as it was according to the data in Chapter 9. There was 
clearly little correlation between the level of deficit / surplus and the debt 
issues / retirement; therefore, it is difficult to say that the trade-of results are a 
spurious outcome of a PO behaviour.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ argument was directed at a version of the trade-off 
model that uses the company average for the study period as the proxy for the 
target. This version has poor explanatory power in the test in this study (Table 
10.5).
This study uses a more “realistic” proxy for the target debt level, namely a 
short -  medium run target (3 to 5 years). The R2s of the 3-year moving average 
(prior and future) are very high and similar. The R2s of the 5-year moving 
average prior are significantly lower, but somewhat better for 5 years moving 
average (future). In fact, the R2s for the 3 years moving average are so high as 
to imply a high degree of mean reversion. It seems that the target is equally 
well proxied by the mean o f {t-3, t-2, t-1} as by the mean o f {t+l,t+2,t+3}. 
This is interesting, as it suggests that the targets may be relatively stable for as 
long as 7 years. To what extent the better fit of the 3-year model compared to 
the 5 year model (in terms of R2) may be attributed to the greater number of 
moving averages (only 3 years lost rather than 5) is not clear.
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Another argument to be put forward is that, if  there is a cyclical trend in capital 
expenditures, it makes sense to suggest that in order to invest heavily firms will 
increase the level of gearing (which the POH would predict); but the 
reformulated POH as described by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (p. 233) is not a 
mechanical process. They are considering simultaneously the borrowing for 
investment and the change in the target debt level, As shown in Table 10.11, 
the regression coefficients, when CE is regressed against the proxy target 
gearing level (3 years moving average of the actual gearing level), are in the 
range of 14% and 23% which indicates that the capital expenditure cycle and 
the boiTOwing behaviour are positively related, but not nearly as strongly as 
would be expected under a POH formulation.
CE LTG CE TG
b t-stat R2 AdjR2 D-W b t-stat R2 AdjR2 D-W
Retail 0.37 12.6 0.20 0.14 1.96 0.31 16.1 0.23 0.17 1.99
Hotel 0.76 4.91 0.14 0.08 1.97 0.63 6.78 0.16 0.11 2.01
Ret + Hot 0.09 6.25 0.19 0.13 1.91 0.12 8.81 0.21 0.16 1.94
Table 10.11 Results of the regression test: for Capital Expenditures (CE) and 3 years future 
moving average of LTG and TG
This suggests that the independent variables in the POH formulation are an 
influence for at least this set of data, but they are only an influence and cannot 
explain much of the debt behaviour of our sample companies. What we may 
have is that capital expenditure may influence the companies to move away 
from the target, but the firms would not be out of the target range for a 
substantial amount of time, as shown from our regression results in Tables 
10.7, 10.8, 10.9 and 10.10. Therefore, the POH has very little explanatory 
power, but a hybrid of POH and the Target Adjustment Model (TAM) might be 
a plausible alternative that could explain the observed capital structure 
behaviour better than either TAM and POH alone.
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As it can be seen from Figure 10.9, 10.10 and 10.11, there is very little 
correlation between the cross sectional average o f capital expenditure levels 
and the 3 years future target moving average. The same is true when the level 
of capital expenditure is compared with the 5 years moving average target.
These results are further confirmed from the comparison o f the level of capital 
expenditure and either the level of gearing or the first differences of the level of 
gearing, as shown in Figures 10.12, 10.13, 10.14 and 10.15 and Table 10.12.
CE LTG CE TG
b t-stat R2 Adj R2 D-W b t-stat R2 Adj R2 D-W
Retail 0.07 4.11 0.23 0.17 1.86 0.12 7.47 0.26 0.20 1.89
Hotel 0.05 2.53 0.15 0.09 1.79 0.06 2.16 0.19 0.11 1.81
Ret + Hot 0.06 3.75 0,22 0.16 1.86 0.10 6.93 0.25 0.19 1.86
Table 10.12 Results of the regression test: for Capital Expenditures (CE) and first differences 
of LTG and TG
The same pattern of little or no correlation appears, especially for the retail 
sector. This is very pronounced in the first part of the study period, 1985 -  
1990, followed by a deep dive of capital expenditure in the years 1991 and 
1992 which coincides with the economic recession that the U.K. economy went 
through in that period. The correlation coefficients between capital 
expenditures and the first differences of LTG and TG vary from almost 0% for 
the retail sector to about 30 % for the hotel sector. The results for the hotel 
sector might be not as conclusive as for the retail sector, due to the small 
number of companies in the sample (21 hotel companies in comparison to 133 
retail companies). As can be seen from Table 10.12, similar to the results in 
Table 10.11, the regression coefficients (i.e. the slopes) and the coefficients of 
determination are small, confirming even further that PO variables are an 
influence hut only an influence. The following plots show that the 
relationships between CE and levels, first differences and proxy target of LTG
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and TG are weak. The relationship seems to be especially weak for the retail 
sector during the first part of the study period, i.e. 1985 — 1990, where there 
seem to be no correlation at all between CE and the level, the first difference 
and the three years moving average target of LTG and TG. The hotel sector 
exhibits a mixed behaviour
The regression results shown in Tables 10.10 and 10.11 and the following plots 
clearly demonstrate that Shyam-Sunder-Myers proposition that mean reversion 
in debt ratios can generate spuriously good fits, even when mean reversion has 
nothing to do with optimal debt ratios, but simply reflects pecking order 
financing, does not seem to hold for this set of data.
Another statistical argument in favour of the non-spuriousness of our results is
2that of Granger and Newbound. They suggest that an Rf > d (Durbin-Watson) 
is a good rule of thumb to detect whether that the estimated regression suffers
from spurious regression. In our case all Durbin-Watson coefficients are
2around two, higher than all the Rfs, which indicates that the results are not 
spurious.
Figure 10.9. Cross-sectional com parison o f  capital expenditures (CE) and 3 years m oving 
average o f LTG and TG -  Retail Sector
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■ C E - hotel
■ 3 yr mov av hotel - LTG 
3 yr mov av hotel - TG
C ross-sectional com parison  o f C E and  3 years moving average o f L TG  and  TG
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Figure 10.10. Cross-sectional com parison o f  CE and 3 years moving average o f  LTG, TG -  
Hotel Sector
■CE - ret & hot 
■ 3 yr mov av ret & hot - LTG 
3 yr mov av ret & hot - TG
C ross-sectional com parison o f C E and  3 years m oving average o f L TG  an d  TG 
Retail and  Hotel sectors together
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Figure 10.11. Cross-sectional com parison o f  CE and 3 years m oving average o f  LTG and TG 
Retail and Hotel sectors together
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Figure 10.12 Cross-sectional com parison o f CE and levels o f LTG and TG -  Retail Sector
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Figure 10.13 Cross-sectional com parison o f CE and levels o f LTG and TG -  Hotel Sector
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C ross-sectional com parison o f C E and  first differences o f L TG  and  T G  - R etail
Sector
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Figure 10.14 Cross-sectional com parison o f  CE and first differences o f  LTG and TG -  Retail 
Sector
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Figure 10.15 Cross-sectional com parison o f CE and first differences o f  LTG and TG -  Hotel 
Sector
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10.6 Conclusions
This chapter develops a simple model that synthesises the modem trade-off 
theory of optimal capital structure.
The empirical section investigates the cross sectional behaviour of first lag 
differences of firm’s leverage ratios over a period of 13 years, for 143 firms.
Using a fixed effect general least squares model, we estimate the regression 
coefficient for year to year differences of long-term and total gearing by using 
13 years average, sample average, 3 years (prior and future) moving average 
and 5 years (prior and future) moving average as explanatory variables.
We found that all regression coefficients are significant and positive, and that 
all explanatory variables explain a high percentage of the year to year 
differences.
The short to medium term explanatory variables i. e. 3 and 5 years moving 
average prior to or after the year t, perform better than the two other target 
proxies (i.e. the industry average and the 13 year targets), the future 5 years is 
the best performer, thus suggesting that firms aim for a medium-term target 
debt level rather than a long-term target debt level. Intuitively, it could indeed 
seem to be difficult in today’s fast changing economic environment to maintain 
a long-term target debt level. The easy access to capital markets makes this 
adjustment faster and less costly making a short to medium run partial 
adjustment more plausible.
The issue of spuriousness, i.e. that data which are in fact driven by pecking 
order behaviour also look as though they were being driven by target 
adjustment behaviour, was addressed. From different tests, it is clear that for
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this set of data this is not a real issue (see Figure 10.14, and 10.15 and Tables 
1 0 . 1 1  and 1 0 .1 2 )..
The results strongly support the target adjustment hypothesis, i.e. firms in the 
UK hotel and retail industries adjust their debt levels towards a short to 
medium-term target debt level.
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Chapter 11
D e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  C a p i t a l  S t r u c t u r e
11,1. Introduction
The models tested in Chapters 8 and 9 are based on assumption sets of 
underlying independent variables. This chapter uses a stepwise multiple- 
regression approach to test the explanatory power of these sets of variables 
rather than testing these models itself. In other words chapter 10 seeks to show 
how much of the explanatory power of the models is captured by the associated 
variables underlined in the theory.
Because some of the explanatory variables support more than one theory the 
first part of the regression analysis tests the aggregate explanatory power of all 
identified variables. The second part runs multiple regression tests using sub 
sets of variables, based on the model they mostly support, i. e. hade-off and 
pecking order model. A separate set of variables was created based on the 
asset specificity argument of TCE.
Some of the variables identified by the capital structure theory and tested by 
previous studies are: profitability, volatility of earnings, non-debt tax shields, 
size, asset structure, etc.
Section 11.2 starts with a detailed discussion of the hypotheses that are to be 
tested in this chapter. Definitions of variables is provided in Section 11.3. 
Section 11.4 sets out the multiple regression equations used in this chapter. 
Results and analysis of the multiple -regression model are provide in Section
11.5. The main conclusions of the chapter are summarised in Section 11.6 .
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11.2. Hypotheses on the Determinants of Capital Structure
The following are the hypotheses developed in the light of the trade-off model, 
pecking order model and other existing theories on the determinants of capital 
structure
H . 1. Cost o f  F inanc ia l Distress (Earnings Volatility)\ A number of papers have 
been able to show that a unique debt/equity ratio will exist if  bankruptcy costs 
are not zero (Kim, 1977). The bankruptcy costs are losses the firm faces either 
when it can not pay back creditors, or when it is close to not being able not to 
pay them: but they are specific to debt financing. In a model where bankruptcy 
is costless, the variance of earnings will not affect the debt/equity ratio (see 
Scott 1976, Castanis, 1983). If there are no bankruptcy costs, firms may issue 
risky debt with a higher interest rate, but higher interest rates do not limit debt 
issuance except in the extreme cases (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1980) where the 
lender refuses to take up debt because of the default risk. With positive 
bankruptcy costs, a larger variance in earnings implies a lower debt/asset ratio. 
Since increasing the area under the tails of the earnings distribution also 
increases the probability o f bankruptcy. The expected value of bankruptcy 
costs is what really matters. This is the product of size of bankruptcy costs 
multiplied by the probability of bankruptcy. The larger the expected value of 
bankruptcy costs, the more an increase in earnings volatility decreases the 
debt/equity ratios. Thus a negative coefficient of variation of earnings variance 
may indicate the existence of bankruptcy or financial distress costs, and its 
magnitude measures their importance in determining the optimal capital 
structure.
Many prior regressions have found a significant negative coefficient on risk 
(i.e. volatility of earnings) when measuring debt/equity ratios (e.g. Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984), Friend and Lang, (1988)). The present study uses the 
coefficient of variation and standard deviation of Earnings Before Interest and
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Taxes (EBIT) over the previous 5 years as well as the coefficient o f variation 
and standard deviation o f Cash Flows over the previous 5 years.
H . 2. Asset structure (m oral hazard/asset specificity): Intuitively, a positive 
impact of the fixed asset ratio on the debt/equity ratio is expected, due to the 
fact that debt is used more readily if  there are durable assets to act as collateral 
for the debt. Companies with a high fixed asset ratio tend to use more long­
term debt. In anticipating a management incentive to underinvest or increase 
risk, creditors find it easier to monitor investment decisions if  the investments 
are in tangible assets such as plant and equipment rather than in intangible 
assets. Creditors would know whether and how much the firm invested, as 
well as being more able to evaluate the risk of the investment, since the results 
are tangible and therefore observable in a relatively short time span. Thus any 
problematic changes in the investment policy could be identified in time to 
prevent further erosion of value. In the worst case of default the asset could be 
sold to provide some of the money to be paid to the creditors.
For this reason the type of the investment opportunities a firm has may affect 
considerably the amount of debt a firm can support. Firms that have tangible 
investments can support more debt than firms have intangible and unobservable 
growth opportunities. It is the tangible assets which generally have a well 
defined market value and can be sold in the case of default, which provide the 
basic security for the debt holders. It is much harder for a firm to cash in on 
intangible assets because these assets have a market value only as part of a 
going concern. Thus, such intangible assets provide little or no security at all 
for creditors, therefore they can not support much debt. This is TCE argument 
about asset specificity (Williamson, 1996, p. 184).
There are conflicting theories regarding the relationship between the fixed asset 
ratio and the gearing ratio. Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that capital 
structure mitigates inefficiencies in the firm’s investment decisions that are
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caused by information asymmetry. If the investors are less informed than the 
firm’s insiders, equity may be mis-priced and an underinvestment problem may 
occur. Debt whose value is less sensitive to the private information is preferred 
to equity. Even risky debt may be preferred to equity. Firms with high 
tangible non-specific assets that can be used as collateral may be less subject to 
severe information asymmetries and use less debt. Therefore, according to 
Myers and Majluf, the gearing ratio and fixed asset ratio will show a negative 
relationship, which is the opposite o f  the TCE argument.
Grossman and Hart (1982) suggested that higher debt levels reduce the optimal 
consumption level o f perquisites because o f the increased threat o f  bankruptcy. 
The costs associated with this agency relation may be higher for firms where 
assets are less collateralisable; because monitoring capital outlay on such 
investments is more difficult. Firms with low collateral value o f their assets 
would have high agency costs. High debt helps to reduce agency costs by 
reducing the managers’ consumption o f perks and increasing managers’ 
ownership. Therefore, to Grossman and Hart, gearing ratio and asset structure 
will also show a negative relationship. This would apply only to firms in 
which managers hold a significant equity stake, so that substituting debt for 
equity would increase their equity stake and reduce perquisites and shirking.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1984) argue that the debt/equity ratio 
is determined by costs. Conflicts between debt holders and equity holders arise 
because the presence o f debt gives the shareholders the incentive to underinvest 
or take on riskier projects so as to expropriate wealth from debtholders. If the 
debt can be supported by collateral, the borrower may be restricted to using the 
funds for a specific project. Since no such guarantee is used for projects that 
can not be collateralised, creditors may require more favourable terms and 
induce the firms to use more equity rather than debt financing. Therefore, 
according to Jensen, Meckling and Myers (1984), the debt/equity ratio and 
fixed asset ratio will show a positive relationship.
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Williamson (1996) argues that asset specificity (in other words, the degree o f  
non-redeploybility) determines the capital structure. The greater the degree o f  
asset specificity the more costly it is to redeploy the assets to their next best 
use, i.e. the more value they lose when redeployed. This would limit the ability 
to use such an asset as collateral and increase the lenders’ risk exposure. He 
concludes that for investment where the underlying asset is easily redeployable, 
or has low asset specificity, debt should be used; by contrast, as the asset 
specificity increases, equity becomes the preferred form o f financing. 
Therefore, a positive relationship between the gearing and fixed asset ratios 
should be expected.
Titman (1984) describes a model where greater asset specificity, represented by 
R&D expenses to sales, is associated with a reduction in the debt asset ratio.
The three variables that can be considered under the asset structure argument 
are the net property, plant, and equipment to a three year average o f total 
assets; the ratio o f R&D expenses to sales; and advertising expenses to sales.
H . 3. Tax Effects'. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show how firms with greater 
non-debt tax shields will issue less debt. They argue that tax shields from 
depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax benefits o f the 
debt financing. These firms have less need for the tax deductions provided by 
debt, and thus issue less debt relative to equity. They argue that the presence o f  
the non-debt tax shields affects the extent to which the corporation can gain 
from the substitution o f debt for equity. Because the higher debt/equity ratio 
increases the probability that the non-debt tax shields will be lost through the 
insufficiency o f the taxable profits, they hypothesise that firms with fewer non­
debt tax shields would employee more debt in their capital structure. Bradley, 
Jarrell and Kim (1984) also showed that the debt/equity ratio is inversely 
related to the level o f non-debt tax shields through theoretical proof as well as
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simulation results. Depreciation over total assets is used as a measure o f non­
debt tax shields.
H.4. Profitability: Jensen (1986) and Williamson (1988) describe debt as a 
bonding or discipline device to ensure that the managers pay out profits in the 
form of interest rather than build empires. In Jensen’s model, companies with 
free cash flow, or high profitability, would be most subject to takeover and 
increased gearing (leveraged takeovers). Thus, once these takeovers have 
occurred, more profitable firms will have a higher debt/equity ratio. 
Alternatively, the pecking order hypothesis o f Myers and Majluf (1984) 
suggests that information asymmetry causes firms to prefer internal financing 
when it is available. Under Myers and M ajluf s model, firms will finance new 
projects first with internal funds, then with low risk debt and only issue equity 
as a last resort. The model explains well why more profitable firms in the past 
have generally had a high level o f retained earnings and they borrowed less not 
because they have low target gearing ratios, but because they are not forced to 
go to the capital markets to raise funds. Less profitable firms in the past issue 
more debt because they did not have sufficient internal funds for their capital 
investment programme.
A number o f  prior studies have tested the effect o f profitability on firm gearing, 
including Friend and Lang (1988), and Kester (1986) who find a significant 
negative relationship between profitability and debt/equity ratios. The measure 
o f profitability used in the regression equation is the average profitability over 
the past three years. The study uses the ratio o f earnings before interest and tax 
divided by sales or by total assets, or operating income divided either by sales 
or by total assets.
H. 5. Growth opportunities: Intuitively, a positive relationship exists between 
gearing and growth options because o f the heavy requirement for capital.
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However, high growth firms tend to use less debt despite the rapid expansion 
and heavy requirements for capital.
Finns holding valuable growth opportunities tend to borrow less than firms 
holding mostly tangible assets. Growth opportunities are capital assets that add 
value to a firm but can not be collateralised and do not generate current taxable 
income. For these reasons firms that have tangible investments that are easy to 
monitor can absorb more debt than firms more o f whose value consists o f  
growth opportunities. Therefore there is a negative relationship between debt 
and growth opportunities. Long and Malitz (1985) found a significant negative 
relationship between debt and rates o f investment in advertising and R&D. 
Advertising or R&D expenses to total sales can be used as proxies for growth 
opportunities.
According to Jensen (1986), growth firms with plenty o f good investment 
opportunities are expected to have low debt levels relative to firms in mature, 
slow growth cash rich industries. Firms with high growth opportunities, which 
have more flexibility in their choice o f future investment, have a tendency to 
invest sub-optimally so as to benefit the firm’s equityholders at the expense of  
the debtholders. Equity holders may benefit from investing in very risky 
projects, even if  they are value decreasing for the firm as a whole. An 
important factor that influences the optimal debt equity ratio is the agency cost 
of debt used to finance growth opportunities. High growth firms have a 
tendency to have high agency costs o f debt because o f the asset substitution 
effect. High growth opportunities should thus be found inversely correlated to 
debt levels. In the absence o f R&D and advertising expenditures figures in the 
data set, the sales growth or total intangible asset growth are used as indicators 
o f growth opportunities in this study. The problem in using total asset growth 
is that it counts for growth in both tangible and intangible assets. A more 
accurate measure used in this study is the growth o f the difference between
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total assets and fixed assets, which will amount only for the growth in 
intangible assets.
H. 6. Size: The following three theories indicate a conflicting relation between 
size and the leverage ratio. Intuitively, large firms are more diversified and 
less prone to bankruptcy because they have relatively more product lines and 
divisions than small firms. Therefore, large firms have higher debt capacity 
and are able to be more highly geared.
The asymmetric information theory o f Myers and Majluf (1984) can explain an 
inverse relation between firm size and the leverage ratio. Size may also be a 
proxy for information asymmetries between inside and outside investors, which 
are likely to be less severe for large companies. If small firms are required to 
finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing may be so severe that the 
new investors capture more than the net present value o f the new project, 
resulting in a net loss to the existing shareholders. The underinvestment can be 
avoided if  the small firms can finance the new project via internal funds or low  
risk debt. Since small firms tend to have more severe informational 
asymmetries, debt financing will be more preferred to equity for small firms 
because debt financing involves no undervaluation. Therefore, small firms 
would prefer to have higher debt ratio than large firms.
The cost o f issuing debt and equity is also related to the firm size. In particular, 
small firms face relatively higher costs than larger firms in issuing new equity, 
because issuing costs are semi-variable in nature and thus larger firms face 
propoitionally lower costs. In addition, smaller firms obtain less favourable 
prices because they are relatively less well known to equity investors. Small 
firms also pay somewhat more to issue long-term debt, because they are 
relatively unknown to lenders and are expected to carry more risk, but the 
effects are less than in the case o f equity issue.
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Kester (1986), Titman and Wesels (1988), (1990) produced empirical findings 
indicating that leverage is negatively correlated to firm size. However, their 
findings were not statistically significant. Marsh (1982) found that there was a 
positive relationship between debt and firm size. His findings were statistically 
significant. He found that smaller firms are less likely to issue debt and carry 
less debt. His study uses natural log o f sales and o f total assets as indicators o f 
size. The logarithmic transformation o f sales or total assets reduces the outlier 
effect, making extremely large or small firms less influential.
H. 7. Leasing'. Intuitively firms with a heavy usage o f capital leases are 
expected to have relatively low debt levels.
Short-term cancellable leases are known as operating leases. In this case the 
lessor bears the risk o f obsolescence. Long-term, non-cancellable leases are 
called financial or capital leases. Operating leases are usefi.il when firms want 
to use the assets for only a relatively short time or where the lessor has some 
control over the obsolescence rate.
Many hotel firms tend to lease rather than buy buildings, land or equipment. 
Leasing is seen often as a cheap means o f financing for many small hotel firms. 
It offers long-term financing on a flexible, piecemeal basis, with lower 
transaction costs than bond issues or medium term bank finance.
There are theories in finance suggesting that capital leases and long-term debt 
are substitutes, so that an increase in capital lease should lead to a 
compensating decrease in long-term debt. (Miller and Upton (1976). Lewellen 
at al. (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984), Idol, Lewis and Schallheim (1980). 
Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe ((1996), p. 638) state: “If a firm leases, it will not 
use as much debt as it would otherwise. The benefits o f debt capacity will be 
lost, particularly the lower taxes associated with interest expenses”. Bowman
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(1980) produced an empirical finding that capital leasing and debt are close 
substitutes.
According to TCE, the owner or lessor o f general-purpose assets can redeploy 
these assets more effectively than could the owner or lessor o f  more specialised 
assets. In this case, leasing is arguably the least-cost form o f finance for 
general purpose assets.
The few empirical studies about lease-debt relationship use capital lease as a 
measure to represent leasing in the regression equation. Only Graham at al 
(1998) argue that the operating lease is the “tine” tax advantage lease 
recognised by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in USA. Operating leases 
produce tax shields since 100% o f lease payments are tax deductible (tine in 
U.K. as well). This may or may not be true o f capital leases depending on tax 
regime (e.g. it is not the case in U.K.). Whether leases are considered as 
substitutes for debt or as non-debt tax shields should not affect the results.
In published financial statements, leases are classified as capital leases (in the 
balance sheet) and operating leases (off balance sheet but disclosed in the 
footnotes).
Capital lease rather than operating lease is an appropriate measure to represent 
leasing. Operating leases are short and cancellable during the contract period 
as the discretion o f the lessee, while the capital lease can not be cancelled or 
can be cancelled only with a penalty. Capital lease figures will be used as a 
leasing variable for this study. Capital leases are expected to be negatively 
correlated to long-term debt/equity ratio.
Ang and Peterson (1984) found out that there was a significant positive 
relationship between capital leasing and long-term debt. Their empirical 
findings suggest that leasing and debt are complements rather than substitutes.
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Greater use o f debt is associated with greater use o f leasing. According to the 
complementary assertion, firms with a high level o f long-term debt are 
expected to have high levels o f leasing. This could also be because firms with 
a high level o f gearing are more motivated to use off-balance sheet financing, 
but the capital leases have had to be accounted for in the balance sheet since 
F A S - 1 3 .
H. 9: Dividend: Finns with high a dividend pay-out ratio are more likely to use 
debt financing to fund their investments. Donaldson (1961) found that 
managers prefer to keep dividends stable across time. As dividends are sticky, 
they become a “pseudo fixed expense”. Although dividend payout ratios are 
controlled by the managers, decreasing them sends a pessimistic signal to the 
capital markets. Increases in dividend payout ratios potentially increase the 
need for external financing. Finns prefer debt to equity when going to capital 
markets for funds (pecking order theory). Also, the issuance o f equity, unlike 
debt, would increase the dividend burden on the firm.
H. 8. Management Contracts'. The management contract variable is an 
important and unique element o f the hotel industry. One significant effect of 
the recession at the end o f the 1980s and beginning o f the 1990s was the 
growth in the number o f management contracts. Management contracts 
provide an attractive method for hotel groups to bring in steady incomes 
without adding heavily to fixed asset investment and hence their level o f debt. 
With a management contract, the firm has complete control over the standards 
and quality o f each property and is responsible for the day-to-day operation. 
The management contract has been replacing franchising in popularity among 
the major hotel chains. Hotel chains have found that taking up management 
contracts is a relatively low cost method o f expansion. With little investment 
or no liability for loss, the management companies are able to escape with little 
loss even if  the property fails. The following citation taken from hotel 
companies’ annual reports confirms the general trend o f the nineties where
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hotel firms see themselves more as management firms rather than owner 
operator.
Forte Report and Accounts (1998)
“At present the preferred method by which Forte will expand its hotel network is not entirely 
clear. Judging from the importance that it attaches to the Meridian brand and the attempt 
being made to reduce its indebtedness through asset sales, however, it seems more likely that 
the company will move towards the operational and management side of the hotel business, 
rather than become an expanding owner operator. To do otherwise would be to go against the 
trend in the international hotel industry. Forte is a company where growth by acquisition and 
merger has formed a central part of its development since its first hotel was opened. In some 
of the regions where growth is more likely to accrue, growth by obtaining more management 
contracts, joint ventures and leases also remains a strong possibility.”
Radisson Reports and Accounts (1998)
“Radisson is best described as a mixture of owner manager, management company and 
franchiser, although it describes itself as “primarily a franchise and management 
organisation”. It believes that franchising is the best way to achieve its growth ambitions.”
Hilton Reports and Accounts (1998)
“Hilton International is a mixed company with equity participation in some of its properties, 
leases and management contracts. The primary methods of growth within Hilton’s existing 
market segment will be to seek ownership, additional management contracts and direct 
management arrangements, much as currently the case.”
Marriott Corporation (1987)
The four key elements of Marriott’s financial strategy were:
Manage rather than own hotel assets;
Invest in projects that increase the shareholders value;
Optimise the use of debt in the capital structure; and 
Repurchase undervalued shares.
In the 80’s Marriott developed more than $1 billion worth of hotel properties, making it one 
of the ten largest commercial real estate developers in US. After development, the company 
sold the hotel assets to limited partners while retaining operating control as the general 
partner under a long-term management contract”.
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The management firms are expected to have a low financial gearing ratio 
because they do not need the heavy capital investment that is required to the 
independent hotel firm. Also, they have higher asset specificity (management 
skills and brands being intangible assets) which is difficult to fund by debt.
A management company dummy variable is coded as 1 i f  there is a 
management contract and 0 otherwise.
Table 11.1 gives a summary o f the variables hypothesised above and their 
expected relationship with gearing.
Hypothesis Expected Sign
HI. Earnings Volatility Negative
H2. Asset Structure Positive
H3. Tax Shields Effect Negative
H4. Profitability Negative
H5. Growth Opportunities Positive / Negative
H6. Size Negative !
H7. Leasing Positive / Negative
H8. Dividend Positive
H9.Management Contract 
(hotel sector only)
Negative
Table 11.1 Summary of the deteiminants of capital structure and their expected signs
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1 1 .3 .  D e f i n i t i o n  o f  V a r i a b l e s
The dependent variable long term gearing and Total gearing are measured as in 
the two previous chapters:
LTG = book value o f long term debt / market value o f equity 
TG = book value o f total gearing / market value o f equity
The explanatory variables are measured as follows:
1) Earnings volatility (EV) can be calculated as the standard deviation (STDV) 
o f Earnings Before Interest an Taxes (EBIT), o f operating income before 
depreciation or o f cash flows (CF).
Another measure o f volatility is the coefficient o f variation (CY). Coefficient 
of variation is a relative measure o f dispersion. The coefficient o f variation, 
given by the symbol CV, measures the scatter o f the data relative to the mean. 
It is computed by a  / p, where a, p are the respectively the variance and mean 
of a set o f data.
Earnings volatility: This study uses two measures of earnings volatility. They 
are:
EV! = STDV o f EBIT over 5 years 
EV2 -  CV of EBIT over 5 years
2) Asset Structure (AS) is calculated as the ratio o f gross property (P), 
equipment (E) and plant (PI) over the 3 years average o f total assets (TA.
AS = (P + E + PI) / 3 years average o f TA
3) Non-Debt Tax Shields (TS) is calculated as the ratio o f the Depreciation (D) 
over TA.
TS = D / TA
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4) Profitability (PROF): This study uses two measures o f profitability. They 
are:
PROFi = EBIT / Sales 
PROF2 = CF / Sales
5) Growth Opportunities (GO) is measured by:
GO] = Sales Growth = (St -  St_i) / St.j 
G 0 2 = Intangible asset growth = (TA -  FA) growth 
= [(TAt -  FAt) -  (TAm -  FAt.j)] / (TAM -  FAt.,)
6) Size (S) is measured by:
S] = In o f Sales 
S2 = In o f TA
7) Leasing is represented by capital lease (CL).
CL = (capital lease commitments) / TA
Capital leases will be in the balance sheet as leasing obligations
8) Dividend (DIV) is measured as:
DIV = Dividend payout ratio = Dividend / Retained Earnings
9) Management Contract (MC) is measured by a dummy variable 1 for firms 
making extensive use o f management contracts.
Some o f the independent variables can be calculated in a number o f ways.
Since the hypothesis has nine variables to test, there would be 29 = 512 possible
regression models. Since earnings volatility, profitability, growth and size are
measured in more than one way it would be a difficult task to run all these 
• * 2regression equations. R , the coefficient o f multiple determination when there
are p independent variables in a regression model could be used to eliminate
2 *some o f the variables. The R will be maximum when all potential variables
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are included in the regression model. The reason to use R2p criterion is to find 
the point where adding more independent variables is not worthwhile because
• • 9it leads to a very small increase in R . Often this point is reached when only a 
limited number o f independent variables are included in the regression model. 
Clearly, the determination o f where diminishing returns set in is often a 
subjective one.
An automatic search procedure that develops sequentially the subset o f  
independent variables to be included in the regression is helpful to find a best 
subset o f independent variables. The forward stepwise regression procedure is 
probably the most widely used o f the automatic search methods. R and MSEP 
(Mean Square Error) criteria are used to identify the best subset o f  independent
9 *variables in this study. R is a ratio o f sums o f squares:
, RSS„ ESS„
R 2 =  L = 1------- S-
p TSS TSS
• • .  • 9The denominator is constant for all possible regressions. R varies inversely 
with the ESS. ESSP can never increase as additional independent variables are 
included in the model.
MSE can be written as a function o f  R2P. It is defined as:
1 R2
MSE = —— L (TSS)
1 n -1
Since TSS is constant, regardless o f p, then MSE is inversely related to R2P. 
When MSE criteria is used the aim is to find a few subsets for which MSEP is
at the minimum or so close to the minimum that adding more variables is not
worthwhile.
However a subset o f independent variables are just the starting point. R2, F-test 
and t-statistics are good criteria to select the best regression models among 
subsets o f independent variables. The coefficient o f determination R2 as 
defined in Chapter 7 is the percentage o f the total variation in the dependent
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variable that is explained by the regression equation. The higher the coefficient 
of determination, the greater the explanatory power o f the regression equation 
and the better the prediction power. The F-ratio is used to test the overall 
indication o f the “goodness to fit” o f the regression equation. The F-ratio is 
used to test the significance o f the entire model, not to test individual variables. 
The t-test is used to examine the significance o f the individual regression 
coefficient. A highly significant F-ratio would suggest that the results o f the 
equation have not happened by chance.
Tables 11.2 and 11.3 give a summary o f the variable definitions and the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in this 
study for the retail and hotel industries respectively. The selection o f  the 
dependent variables was made following the above mentioned procedures.
There was no increase in R2 when we used Cash Flows / Sales as a measure of 
profitability. The same could be said for G 0 2 intangible asset growth and S2 
(In o f total assets). Therefore there were not included in the filial regression 
models:
Variables Variable Definition Mean Median Min Max StDev
Dependent Variable 
LTG Long term debt / market value of 0.14 0.10 0.00 1.56 0.32
TG
equity
Total debt / market value of equity 0.34 0.24 0.00 2.26 0.48
Independent
Variables
EV, STDV of EBIT 14.58 2.5 0.00 26.60 0.30
AS (Plant + Equip + Plant) / total assets 0.42 0.4 0.00 0.99 0.19
TS Depreciation / total assets 0.04 0.035 0.00 0.43 0.03
PROF, EBIT / Sales 0.20 0.10 -0.05 0.60 0.15
GO, Sales growth 0.15 0.08 -0.86 24.57 0.57
s , Ln of sales 4.90 4.60 -0.43 9.54 1.70
CL Capital lease / total assets 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.89
DIV Dividend / retained earnings 0.63 0.35 -10.27 12.83 6.00
Table 11.2. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the retail industry
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Variables Variable Definition Mean Median Min Max StDev
Dependent Variable 
LTG long term debt / market value of equity 0.28 0.23 0.00 0,96 0.34
TG Total debt / market value of equity 0.50 0.51 0.00 1.21 0.52
Independent
Variables
EV, STDV of EBIT 34.09 4.1 0.00 27.13 20.42
AS (Plant + Equip + Plant) / total assets 0.67 0.78 0.00 0.98 0.28
TS Depreciation / total assets 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.02
PROF, EBIT/Sales 0.18 0.09 -0.07 0.65 0.20
GO, Sales growth 0.21 0.08 -0.89 9.83 0.96
s, Ln of sales 4.62 4.41 -1.41 8.81 2.31
CL Capital lease / total assets 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.13
DIV Dividend / retained earnings 0.30 0.29 -8.46 40.67 2.97
MC Dummy variable (1 if MC) 0.30 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.45
Table 11.3. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the hotel industry
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1 1 .4 .  T h e  M u l t i p l e  R e g r e s s i o n  M o d e l s
For the retail industry the following regression models are found to be the best 
ones to test the above hypothesis:
LTDr = a  + |3EVj + p2AS + P3TS + p4PROF, + P5GO1 + P^ S t + p7CL + p8DIV + Ujt
TDr = a  + PEV, + p2AS + p3TS + p4PROF, + p5 GO, + p6S, + p7CL + p8DIV + uit
For the hotel industry the following regression models are found to be the best 
to test the above hypothesis
LTDh = a  + PEV, + p2AS + p3TS + p4PROF, + p5 GO, + p6S, + p7CL + p8DIV + p9MC + uit 
TDH = a  + pEV, + p2AS + p3TS + p4PROF! + psGO, + p6S, + p7CL + p8DIV + p9MC + uit
1 1 .5 .  R e s u l t s  a n d  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  M u l t i p l e  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s
The correlation matrix between the above mentioned independent variables for 
the retail and hotel sector are given in Table 11.4 and 11.5 respectively.
Variables EV, AS TS PROF, GO, s, CL DIV
EV, 1.00
AS +0.18 1.00
TS -0.06 +0.42 1.00
PROF, -0.33 +0.21 +0,52 1.00
GO, -0.16 +0.13 +0.41 +0.60 1.00
s , -0.08 +0.25 +0,63 +0.12 +0.35 1.00
CL -0.035 -0.10 +0.20 0 .11 +0.09 +0.18 1.00
DIV -0.10 +0.09 +0.15 0.60 +0.10 +0.15 -0.01 1.00
Table 11.4. Correlation matrix between variables - Retail Sector
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Variables EV, AS TS PROF, GO, s, CL DIV
EV, 1.00
AS +0.20 1.00
TS -0.08 +0.40 1.00
PROF, -0.31 +0.23 +0.50 1.00
GO, -0.19 +0.15 +0.39 +0.50 1.00
s, -0.10 +0.23 +0.59 +0.10 +0.37 1.00
CL -0.03 -0.02 +0.20 0 .11 +0.09 +0.16 1.00
DIV -0.08 +0.12 +0.55 0.65 +0.13 +0.09 -0.02 1.00
Table 11.5. Correlation matrix between variables - Hotel Sector
Tables 11.6 and 11.7 give a summary o f results o f the regression analysis using 
the above mentioned models.
Variables
LTG Cloth. Food. Hardw. Mixed N ew s /  
Chemist
Retail
Sector
Hotel
Sector
EV, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.96) (-4.87)* (-2.24)** (4.62) (-1.91) (-14.90*) (-2.29)
AS 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.67
(2.59)** (1.20) (9.24)* (4.33)* (0.10) (-0.92*) (6.93)*
TS 0.10 -0.02 -0.13 -0.36 3.57 0 .11 -2.89
(1.27) (-0.04) (-1.06) (-2.23)* (5.50) (1.9**) (-3.88)
PROF, -0.17 - 1 . 1 1 -0.08 -0.15 -0.38 -0.36 -0.17
(-8.13)* (-1.61)" (-6.15)* (-4.05) (-3.77)* (-22.39*) (-8.01)
GO, -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.02
(-2.85)** (-0.41) (3.28)** (5.25)* (-5.95)* (-0.58) (-2.94)*
Si -0.02 0 .11 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.08
(-4.86)* (1.96)** (1.72)" (5.18)* (0.89) (33.13*) (10.59)*
CL 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.26 -0.01 -0.09
(0.06) (0.03) (-5.99) (-0.09) (1.88) (-2.26**) (-0.86)
DIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MC
-(0.36) (-1.97) (-12.09) (3.04) (-0.44) (-15.90) (-2.39)
0.87
(3.57)
R2 0.33 0.64 0.47 0.68 0.73 0.50 0.63
Adjust. R2 0.24 0.60 0.40 0.62 0.68 0.43 0.59
F-stat 19.13 65.31 27.03 38.37 54.52 27.17 26.95
D-W statistics 1 .10 0.85 1.01 1.27 1.38 1 .1 2 1.15
No. of obs. 297 328 279 168 189 1423 228
* - the variable is significant at 2.5 % level of probability or better
** - the variable is significant at 5 % level of probability
“ - the variable is significant at 10 % level of probability
Table 11.6. Multiple regression results for long term gearing
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Variables
TG Cloth. Food. Hardwar Mixed N w es / 
Chemist
R etail
Sector
H otel
Sector
EV, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-1.75") (4.81*) (-3.24*) (0.98) (1.02) (4.3*) (-2.19**)
AS 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.35
(2.27) (-2.92) (3.30) (4.58*) (0.68) (-3.4*) (3.98*)
TS 0.79 0.07 0.63 -3.08 6.51 0.31 -3.24
(18.82 V (0.34) (0.64) (-3.86*) (5.95*) (4.60*) (-2.37**)
PROF, -0.84 -0.87 -0.60 -0.75 -0.97 -0.75 -0.36
(-8.46 *) (-7.90*) (-6.76*) (-2.9*) (-5.05) (-1.69”) (-9.32*)
GO, 0.03 -0,02 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.91) (-2.46**) (1.86") (-0.57) (-1.75)" (-1.69”) (-0.92)
s , -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03
(-0.52) (6.51) (-0.40) (1.53) (0.95) (26.00*) (2.59**)
CL 0.00 0.58 -0.03 -0.00 -0.39 0.00 0.00
(2.27) (4.61) (-4.34) (-0.04) (-1.76) (0.62) (-2.19*)
DIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
MC
(2.27**) (-0.25) (-4.53*) (2.24**) (0.31) (-12.33*) (-7.23*)
0.94
(5.08*)
R2 0.60 0.61 0.52 0.85 0.83 0.65 0.67
Adjust R2 0.54 0.56 0.46 0.82 0.80 0.61 0.62
F-stat 49.61 57.57 34.12 102.07 101.13 297.00 50.91
D-W Statistics 1.49 1.40 1.25 1.20 1.39 1.28 1.32
No. of obs. 297 328 279 176 189 1412 297
* - the variable is significant at 2.5 % level of probability or better 
** - the variable is significant at 5 % level of probability 
“ - the variable is significant at 10 % level of probability
Table 11.7. Multiple regression results for long term gearing
The regression model seeks to explain the determinants o f long-term gearing 
and total gearing by examining a number o f important variables. As can be 
seen from tables 11.6 and 11.7, that the coefficients o f determination are 
relatively high. They vary from 33% (LTG -clothing) to 85% (TG -  mixed). 
This means that the chosen explanatory variables explain a considerable 
percentage o f the long-term gearing and total gearing variations. An exception 
is Clothing Retail, which has a low R for the LTG. They are almost half o f the 
figures for TG. This might indicate that firms in the clothing sector do not use 
very much long-term debt.
If we compare both industries, their R2 is above 50% for both LTG and TG. 
However LTG performs better for the retail sector while TG is almost the same 
for both o f them. Another thing to be noticed is that TG has a higher R2 than
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LTG for both sectors, which indicates to some extent the role o f  short-term 
debt in the total gearing ratio.
The adjusted R2, which is the R2 adjusted for the degrees o f freedom, is also 
high although lower than R2 itself.
The F statistics are all significant which confirms the significance o f the entire 
model.
All Durbin-Watson coefficients are under 1.5 which indicates the present of 
multicollinearity. This will be addressed latter in this chapter.
Although there is no test for heteroscedasticity the condition was taken into 
account during the data analysis by controlling for White heterscedasticity.
From tables 11.6 and 11.7 it is clear that none o f the coefficients o f the 
independent variables is large for the long-term gearing. The largest is 
profitability which is significant and with the expected sign. Earnings volatility 
and growth display the expected signs but a robust conclusion can not be drawn 
as not only their coefficients are very small but also they are insignificant. Size 
and leasing have the expected signs and they are both significant confirming 
that size is positively correlated to long term gearing while leasing is negatively 
correlated. Asset structure and dividends are both negatively correlated to long 
term gearing while non-debt tax shields are positively correlated. All three o f  
them display the opposite o f the expected signs. One would expect that asset 
structure and dividends would be positively correlated to gearing while non­
debt tax shields would be negatively correlated.
By looking at the hotel sector, it is noticeable that most o f variables have the 
expected sign: earnings volatility (-); asset structure (+); non-debt tax shields
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(-); profitability (-); growth (-); size (+); leasing (-). The only exceptions are 
dividends and management contracts which both have a different sign from the 
expected one, respectively (-) and (+). All o f them with the exception of 
dividend are significant, with some o f the t-statistics significant at the 2.5 % 
level o f probability. Non-debt tax shields has the highest coefficient followed 
by asset structure.
The retail sector again displays mix results regarding the signs, the size and the 
significance o f the variables for total gearing. For example, volatility has a 
positive sign and it is significant but it has a coefficient o f almost zero. The 
same can be said for most o f the variables. They display the opposite o f the 
expected sign and some o f the coefficients are very small. The only exceptions 
are profitability (-), size (+) and growth (-), two o f them are significant at the 
10% level and one at 2.5%. Profitability has also the highest coefficient.
The model again performs much better for the hotel sector. Most o f the 
coefficients are larger, with the right sign and are significant compared to the 
retail sector. Earnings volatility (-); asset structure (+); tax shields (-); 
profitability (-); growth (-); size (+); and leasing (-) all display the expected 
signs and are significant with exception o f size. Similarly to the long term 
gearing, both dividend and management contracts display the opposite o f the 
expected sign and they are both significant.
The variable with the highest coefficient is again non-debt tax shields o f -3.24. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the model has a high explanatory 
power as whole and all F -  statistics are significant. The retail sector displays 
mix results regarding the size, the signs and the significance o f the coefficients. 
It is a common feature for both industries that most o f the coefficients are small 
(some o f them near to zero). The most important variable for the retail sector 
for both long-term gearing and short term gearing is profitability. This is not a
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surprise retail firms are known to rely in the operating incomes because o f the 
credit facilities they have.
By contrast, the model hotel sector displays a more rigor behaviour by having 
most o f the coefficients in the right sign, significant and one o f them large in 
size. Non-debt tax shields is the variable that has the highest coefficient for 
both long and short term gearing. This result again is not surprising as the 
hotel firms have much more tangible assets than retail firms. It is a bit 
surprising the signs o f the management contract variable as it was expected to 
be negatively related to gearing.
The fact that the model is robust as a whole but most o f the coefficients are 
small indicates that the multicollinearity is present. This is confirmed by the 
low value o f the Durbin -  Watson figures.
One way to limit the effect of the multicollinearity is to ran the regression 
equations with sets o f limited number o f variables by grouping them together 
based 011 the underlying theories.
The tests showed that by grouping the variables together, the Durbin-Watson 
statistics improved but not for all sectors in the level required in order to 
conclude that the multicollinearity is limited.
The results showed that when tested for Profitability and Dividend for both 
sectors the profitability variable explained about o f 30% and 27% of the 
regression for long-term gearing o f the retail and hotel sectors respectively, 
while they explained only 32% and 29% o f total debt. Taking into account that 
the coefficients o f determination for the whole set of variables were 50% and 
65% it can be concluded that the profitability variable is an important one, 
especially for the retail industry. The same could be concluded for the total 
gearing.
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The second subset o f variables was based on the trade-off theory. They were 
volatility, non-debt tax shields and size. The results showed again that non- 
debt-tax shield is the determinant variable with the highest explanatory power 
for both retail and hotel industries at 0.26 and 0.24 level. Volatility again 
shows the right sign but the regression coefficient is small at 0.004. Size as 
before has a positive sign but the regression coefficient (0.028) is still small.
The third subset contained variables that have asset specificity as their 
underlying theory. They are: asset structure, leasing and management 
contracts. All their regression coefficients are slightly higher than their 
corresponding values in the overall multiple regression equation (see Table 
10.6 and 10.7). Their overall explanatory power is 0.07 with leasing and 
management contract having the highest regression coefficients for the retail 
and hotel industry respectively.
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1 1 .6 .  C o n c l u s i o n s
The tests earned out in this chapter investigated the explanatory power o f  
different variables which are most likely to influence the models described in 
chapters 9 and 10. Some other variables are drawn from the current theory o f  
corporate finance.
Using a stepwise multiple regression tests we estimated the regression 
coefficients initially for all independent variables identified from the trade-off 
model, pecking order model and other capital structure theories. On the second 
stage we tested for subsets o f independent variables which were composed o f  
variables that best explained a certain model pr theory.
The test showed that the variables identified explain a relatively large amount 
o f debt behaviour. Most o f the coefficients were small but significant at 5 %  
level. The signs were in the expected direction for most o f the variables tested 
on the hotel’s data sample. The retail sample gave a mixed picture regarding 
signs o f the variables.
The same could be said for the regression results from the variable subsets. 
They in general confirmed the results concluded by the overall regression test 
by pronouncing even more the role o f profitability and non-debt tax shields as 
the main explanatory variables for the retail and hotel industries respectively.
2 7 0
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L im ita tio n s  a n d  F u r th e r  R esea rch
Chapter 12
Summary of Conclusions, Limitations of 
Research and Suggestions for Further Research
1 2 .1  S u m m a r y  o f  C o n c l u s i o n s
This first study o f the capital structure o f the hotel and retail industries in U.K. 
showed that they are not very highly geared. As shown in Chapter 10, the 
gearing ratio varies from 17% for long-term gearing to 30% for total gearing 
for the retail sector, and from 30% for long term gearing to 50% for total 
gearing for the hotel sector. The gearing ratios for the U.K hotel and retail 
industries are not as high as the corresponding gearing ratios in U.S. (recall that 
Kim’s (1996) study found a gearing ratio o f over 60% for the hospitality 
industry in U.S.). One o f the reasons for this difference might be the different 
tax treatment that debt receives in the two countries. As was expected, the 
hotel sector has a higher gearing ratio in comparison to the retail sector.
The empirical tests carried out in Chapter 10 have shown that the trade-off 
model explains the capital structure in the U.K. hotel and retail industries well 
when the proxy target is calculated as the sample mean or the 13 years average, 
and indeed very well when the target level o f debt is considered as a short to 
medium term (3-5 year) target. All the coefficients o f determination for this 
test were significant and explained between 50 to 90 per cent o f gearing level 
changes. These results are similar to those found hy De Angelo and Masulis 
(1980), Dammon and Senbet (1988), Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984), Ashton 
(1989) and ICwansa (1995).
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By contrast, the explanatory power o f the pecking order model is much weaker. 
The coefficients o f determination are low. The regression coefficients are 
small but with the right sign. Only in two o f the sub-sectors o f  the retail 
industry did the data show a moderate level o f support for the peeking order 
model. There seem to be no correlation between the surplus / deficit of funds 
and the debt levels and first differences (see Figure 9.1 -  9.3).
The issue of spuriousness, as defined by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), that 
data that are in fact driven by pecking order behaviour may look as though they 
were being driven by target adjustment behaviour, was addressed, and from 
several tests and calculations it was concluded that this was not the case for this 
set o f data. The pecking order variables had a positive relationship with 
changes in the level o f gearing, but only a weak one, especially for the retail 
sector. The low level o f correlation observed between capital expenditure and 
changes in gearing levels might indicate that a “hybrid” model in which 
pecking order variables (and in particular capital expenditures) were combined 
with target adjustment variables could better explain the firms’ capital structure 
behaviour.
Taking into consideration the trade-off model and other variables suggested by 
the capital structure literature, several variables were selected in order to 
examine their explanatory power. The tests showed that the identified 
variables explained 50% and 65% o f the long-term and total gearing for the 
retail sector and 65% and 67% o f the o f the long-term and total gearing levels 
for the hotel sector, respectively. Profitability was the most important factor 
for the retail sector followed by non-debt tax shields. Non-debt tax shields, 
management contracts and profitability were the most important factors for the 
hotel sector. The overall explanatory power o f this test is comparable with 
those concluded by other similar studies. The surprising fact is that individual 
variables, apart from the above-mentioned ones, tended to have low
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explanatory power. Hence it is not clear which o f these variables are the most 
significant in determining firms’ capital structure.
This study extends empirical work on capital structure by utilising extensive 
panel data on U.K. retail and hotel industries. The panel character o f the data 
permits the use o f statistical techniques that reduce the model specification bias 
or omitted variable bias,
1 2 .2 .  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h e  s t u d y
This study is the first extensive study o f capital structure in the U.K. service 
sector industries. Its findings hopefiilly contribute towards a better 
understanding o f  firms’ capital structure behaviour in an U.K. setting. It is a 
further contribution towards the limited amount o f capital structure research 
that is based 011 U.K. data.
For the first time, a combination o f different capital structure models was 
applied in a U.K. setting with the aim o f  showing how well these different 
models fit the data and trying to throw more light on the debate as to whether 
the Target Adjustment Model or Pecking Order Model has greater explanatory 
power.
Further more, this study is a further contribution to the small but ever growing 
research literature involving the use o f panel data.
1 2 .3  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h
The primary limitation o f this study is the lack o f complete data availability, 
partly due to the limited number o f publicly traded hotel and retail firms but 
primarily due to the incomplete data sets provided by financial databases. The
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available databases did not provide information for certain variables and had 
missing data for some o f the variables that were present. Difficulties were 
encountered in collecting information about the market value o f equity, as 
some o f the companies in the sample are not publicly traded.
1 2 ,4 .  S u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h
Given the scarcity o f research into the issue o f capital structure in the U.K., 
further research is suggested to examine the phenomenon.
An area o f  research would be to apply the models described in this research 
with data sets gathered from other industries in the U.K. so as to see if  the 
results show any industry differences.
Further research is also suggested on the consequences o f applying the models 
described in this research on data from the same industries but from different 
countries, to see to what extent the findings o f the present study are applicable 
in other countries and to what degree are they peculiar to the U.K hotel and 
retail industries.
Despite the much better performance o f the target adjustment model in 
comparison to the pecking order model, one must not oversimplify the 
complexities o f the firm’s capital structure decision. By expanding the works 
o f Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Hams (1984), Auerbach (1985) 
and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) one could seek a more comprehensive 
explanation o f how firms manage their capital structure. Issues o f security 
timing and agency theory variables have to be incorporated in the target 
adjustment or pecking order models. Some thoughts regarding such a hybrid 
theory are set out below.
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Limitations and Further Research
Dominant approaches o f capital structure theory and empirical research assume 
that managers mechanistically follow a certain approach ignoring the fact that 
managers might make a conscious choice to follow either a pecking order or a 
target adjustment approach. If so, we need to know what factors motivate such 
a choice. This may call for extensive questionnaire/interview type research 
aiming at ascertaining the views and practices o f financial managers and 
thereby creating a linkage between theory, empirical research and practice. 
There is a relative scarcity, particularly in U.K., o f such studies in long-term 
financing and capital structure decisions o f firms.
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Appendix 2
Mathematical Derivation o f  M odigliani and M iller Propositions
Key Definitions in MM’s Proposition Analysis:
V 0 - the market value o f the firm
Vs -the market value o f shares in the company
Vg -the market value o f debt
B - the book value o f debt
ke - the rate o f return required by shareholders
kd - the rate o f return required by debtholders
i - the coupon rate on debt
iB - interest payments
E - earning before interest and taxes
D - dividend
Appendix 2.1: Derivation o f MM’s Proposition I
Under the MM proposition 1 the value o f the firm is irrelevant o f  its capital 
structure:
V0 = Ss + V B =  E /k o  
where: ko is the overall rate o f return that the firm must achieve to satisfy all 
stakeholders. This is given by the average cost o f capital. 
k0 = (ke Vs/Vo) + (kd V B/V0) = (kevs + 1^WB) / Vo
Given that: D = keV s and i = kdVB we have, 
k0 = (D + i)/V o — E/V0
a - l
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In order to prove the above equilibrium MM consider two firms, U and G, that 
belong to the same risk class and have the same level o f expected operating 
profit E. Furthermore, assume that the required rate o f return o f the risk class p 
is k0. Firm U has no debt outstanding. Geared firm G, on the other hand has 
both debt and equity outstanding. Suppose first that the value o f the geared 
firm, VG, to be larger than that o f the ungeared one, Vy. Consider an investor 
holding sG worth o f shares o f firm G, representing a fraction a  o f the total 
outstanding stock Sq. The return from this portfolio, denoted Y G will be a 
fraction a  o f the income available for the shareholders o f company G, which is 
equal to: EG -kdBG (where kdBG is the interest charge). Taking into account 
earning homogeneity, EG = Ey = E, the return from the geared firm can be 
written as:
YG = a(E - I^Bq).
Now suppose the investor sells his a S G worth o f company G shares and buys 
instead an amount sy = a S G + aB G = a(S G + BG). He could do this by using the 
amount a S G realised from the sales o f his initial holding in company G, and by 
borrowing the amount a B G, pledging his new holdings in company U as 
collateral. His fraction o f the shares and earnings in company U  is: Sy/Sy = 
a(SG + Bc)/Sy. Taking into account the allowance for interest payment on his 
personal loan aB G, and that Vy = Sy, the return from the new portfolio, Yy, is: 
Yy = [(a(SG + B a))/Sy]E - raBG =  a  VG/Vy - ktjotBc
From the two return equations it is clear that Yy > YG as long as V G > Vy 
(VG/Vy > 1 ) . So, that it pays owners o f shares in firm G to sell their holdings, 
thereby depressing SG and therefore VG; and to buy shares o f firm U, thereby 
increasing SG and hence V G. Therefore, MM conclude that geared firms can 
not master a premium over ungeared firms because the investors have the 
opportunity o f creating the same gearing in their portfolio by borrowing directly 
on personal account (homemade gearing).
A - 2
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MM consider the opposite, that the market value o f the geared firm is lower 
than the value o f the ungeared firm, V G < Vy. Suppose an investor holds 
initially Sy shares in firm U, representing a fraction a  o f the total stock Sy. The 
return from this holding is:
Yy — aE
Suppose that the investor exchange this holding for another portfolio with the 
same value sy, which is compound o f sG shares from film ’s G stock and b 
dollars o f bond. The respective values o f sG and b are: 
s g =  ( S g / V g ) s u  => s g / S g  — Sy/VG 
b = (BG/VG)Sy
The return from the new portfolio is composed of a fraction, sG/SG, o f the total 
return to stockholders o f firm G,. which is (E -kdBG) and the return from the 
bonds which will be kdb. Thus the return from the portfolio, YG, can be written 
as follows:
Y g = sG/SG (E -kdBG) + lqb
Substituting for sG/SG and b,
Yg = S y /V G (E -kdB0) + kd(BG/V G)sy
Factoring for Sy/VG we have
YG = sy/VG (E -k dBG + lCdBG)
Y g = S y /V G E
since sG = aSy, and Sy = Vy than:
YG = a V y /V GE
A - 3
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By comparing Yy and YG it can be seen that Y G > Yu as long as V G < Vu 
(Vu/VG > 1 ). Hence it pays the holders o f firm U ’s shares to sell these holdings 
and buy a mixed portfolio composed o f a fraction o f the shares o f firm G.
The creation o f a mixed portfolio o f stock o f a geared firm and o f bonds, may 
be considered as an undertaking which “undoes” the gearing. It is this 
possibility o f undoing gearing which prevents the value /o f  geared firm of  
being persistently less than that o f ungeared firm, or in other words, prevents 
the average cost o f capital from being consistently higher for geared than for 
nongeared firms in the same risk class. Since it is already shown that arbitrage 
prevents V G being larger than VUs it can be concluded that in equilibrium Vu 
must be equal to VG.
A - 4
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Appendix 2.2: Derivation o f MM’s Proposition II
Proposition II states: “ The expected value o f a share o f  equity is equal to the 
appropriate capitalisation rate, ke, for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a 
premium related to financial risk equal to the debt/equity ratio times the spread 
between ke andkd.” (MM, 1958, pp.271)
Given that:
V s = (E - iB) / ke ke = (E - iB) / Vs and E = k0V 0 = k0(Vs + VB)
Substituting for E we have,
k e= [k 0(Vs + VB) -iB] / Vs 
ke = (k0Vs + k0VB - iB) / V s
Taking into consideration that V B = B and dividing by Vs each o f the terms in 
the bracket we have,
ke = k0 + k0 VB/Vs - iV B/Vs
Factoring V B/VS,
ke = k0 + (k o -i)V B/Vs
Since Proposition I argues that k0 equals the rate o f return required by 
shareholders in an equivalent ungeared company, ko = keu, and so long as book 
and market value o f debt are the same, ensuring that i = kd, than the above 
expression can be written :
ke = keu + (keu " kd)VB/Vs
The above equation shows that, the return required by shareholders is a linear 
function o f the debt/equity ratio.
A - 5
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Appendix 2.3: Derivation o f MM’s Proposition III
MM’s third proposition states that “the cut-off rate for investment will in all 
cases be ko, and will he unaffected by the type o f security used to finance the 
investment”.
Consider a firm whose initial value is:
E0 ^ Voko = (Vso + VBo)k0 V0 = E0/k0
The firm considers an investment outlay £1, which will generate a perpetual 
return, R, for each £ invested. Giving Ei = (E0 + RI), the new value o f the 
firm, after the investment is accepted is:
V, = Ei/ko = (E0 + RI)/k0 = E0/k0 + RI/k0 = V 0 + RI/k0
If the project is debt-financed the value o f the debt is VBi = (Vbo + I)- 
Substituting this in the expression Vi =  V Si + VBi, the new share value is:
VSi = (Vi - V bi) -  V j - (VB0 + 1),
Substituting for Vj we have:
V s l =V o + R I/ko-V Bo -I
Vsi = (V0 -VBo) + RI/k0 -I
VSi -  Vso + RI/k0 -I 
V S1 - Vso = I (R/k0 -1)
As I > 0, the expression in the right hand site will be greater than zero only if  
R > lc0. Therefore it can be concluded that a firm should only undertake 
investments which rate o f return is equal or higher than ko, the weighted 
average cost o f capital, which according to Proposition I is independent o f the 
gearing ratio.
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Appendix 2.4. MM Proposition with Corporate Taxes
Corporate tax is applied to the stream o f earnings after deducting interest 
charges. The value o f a geared company’s shares is the capitalised value o f the 
after-tax earnings stream, i.e. (E-iB)(l-T) (T is the rate o f tax on corporate 
earnings):
Vs = [(E -iB )(l-T )]/k eg
The cost ofdebt. kd, equates the coupon rate i based on the assumption that the 
book and market value o f debt are the same (B = VB). Therefore we can write: 
V B = B or V B = iB/i
The overall firm value will be:
Vo = V s + VB = [(E-iB)(l-T)] / lceg + iB/i
The post-tax annual expected earning stream, noted ET, is composed o f the 
earning distributed to the shareholders plus the interest paid on the outstanding 
debt:
Et = (E-iB)(l-T) + iB 
ET = E(l-T) - iB + iBT + iB 
Et =  E(l-T) + iBT
The first element in the last equation is the net income o f a uneared firm will 
receive, whereas the second element is the tax benefit gained by the debt 
interest shield. The total value o f a geared company, Vg, can be calculated by 
discounting the first element at the cost o f equity of an ungeared firm, keu, while 
the second is discounted at the cost o f debt, I:
Vg = [E(l-T)]/keu + iBT/i 
V g = V u + TB
A - 7
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The last expression tells that the value of a geared company is equals the value 
o f an equivalent ungeared company plus a premium derived by discounting to 
perpetiuty the stream of interest tax-savings.
Proposition II can be modified to reflect the cosporate tax. According to 
Proposition II the cost o f capital for shareholders is: 
keg ~  keU + (keu - kd) BA7s
Given that:
Vs = (E - iB) / ke => ke = (E - iB)(l-T) / Vs and E = k0V 0 = k0(Vs + V B)
Substituting for E we have,
ke =[ko(Vs + V B) - iB ]( l-T )/V s 
ke = (koVs + k0VB - iB)(l-T) / Vs
Taking into consideration that VB = B and dividing by Vs each o f the terms in 
the bracket we have,
ke = (ko + ko V B/VS - iVB/Vs)(l-T)
Factoring VB/VS,
ke = [k<, + (ko - i)](l-T )V B/Vs
Since Proposition I argues that k0 equals the rate o f return required by 
shareholders in an equivalent ungeared company, k0(l-T) = keu, and so long as 
book and market value o f debt are the same, ensuring that i = Iq , than the above 
expression can be written :
keg = keu + (keu-kdXl-T) B/Vs
A - 8
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Appendix 2.5: Miller’s revision o f MM theory allowing for personal taxation
Miller’s model is based on valuing the combined flows o f  income to corporate 
shareholders after allowing for their personal tax positions. These flows 
comprise the flow o f shareholder’s income taxed at the marginal rate o f tax on 
equity income, te, plus the flow o f lenders interest payments, taxed at their 
marginal rate o f tax on interest payments, tB, :
[(E-iB) (1-T) (l- te)] + [(l-tB) (iB)
With zero retention, this equals the net-of-tax cash flow into the firm and its 
appropriation into interest and dividend.
The value o f  the geared company is calculated by discounting the stream of  
equity income at the appropriate risk adjusted rate and discounting the stream 
o f tax savings at the cost o f debt:
V g = V u +[1 - ((1 -T)( 1 -te))/( 1 -tB)]B
A - 9
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Appendix 3
3 .1  R i s k  S h i f t i n g
Bamea, Haugen and Senbet (1985), to demonstrate the proposition that 
shareholders may benefit by investing in high risk projects, consider the equity as 
a European-type call option to buy back the entire firm from the debtholders at 
maturity, at an exercise price equal to the principal amount o f the debt. 
Debtholders can be viewed as buying the assets o f the firm and issuing the call 
option (equity) in these assets. In the framework o f the option pricing model, the 
value o f this call option increases with the variance o f the cash flows o f the 
underlying assets, therefore shareholders will increase the market value o f equity, 
at the expense o f debtholders, by selecting high-risk projects. Assume that the 
firm has issued bonds, which have a face value £m at maturity. The firm has only 
investment opportunity - Project A. Assume the shareholders choose Project A, 
the risk adjusted value o f  the firm is V(A), as shown in Fig 3.4.
Value of Debt D(a) +
Figure 3.4 Risk Shifting Payoffs o f Debt and Equity: One Project
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In Figure 3.4 the curved line A is the relationship between the value o f the Equity 
in the firm and the value o f Project A given that it has variance a 2a- The value of 
the firm’s equity is the line segment S(A). The value o f the debt is the firm’s 
total value less the value o f the equity, V(A) - V(S). This is the line segment 
D(A).
Assume now that the firm has another investment opportunity as well, Project B.
It is riskier than A but has the same risk adjusted set of payoffs, g 2a  < g 2b  and 
V(A) = V(B). The value o f the riskier investment is given by curve B. The 
overall value o f the firm is independent o f investment opportunity choice since 
both projects have the same value as shown in Figure 3.5.
Because o f the higher risk, the value o f the equity would be higher. Shareholders 
would prefer Project B over Project A. In Fig. 3.5 the value o f the equity would 
be the line segment S(B) while the value o f debt is the line segment D(B). 
However, rational debtholders recognise the investment alternatives and 
shareholders’ risk incentives. Thus, they offer a price for the debt that reflects the 
distribution of wealth given adoption of the high-variance project. In any case, 
since both projects command the same value, no cost is incurred by either party.
Value of Debt D(A) + 
Value of Equity S(A)
the Firm
Figure 3.5. Risk Shifting Payoffs of Debt and Equity: Two Projects
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Now assume that project B is not only riskier but it is also worth less than A,
2 2V(A) > V(B) and a  a  < a  b 5 as shown in Fig. 3.6. Given the choice between 
projects A and B shareholders will still choose project B, even though it has a 
lower total value, since S(B) > S(A). Given the principal amount o f the debt (the 
exercise price), the price o f debt is D(A) if  priced in accordance with the adoption 
of the higher value-lower risk project A, but it is D(B) if  priced with the 
presumption that the lower value-higher risk project B is adopted. If bondholders 
have no means o f neutralising the shareholders’ incentive for risk shifting, they 
would presume that the lower value-higher risk project will be adopted, and 
therefore offer price D(B). Different from the previous case, the price reflects 
not only the higher risk, from which equity holders benefit, but also the inferiority 
of the project in terms of current value. If shareholders subsequently wish to 
finance project A, they will lose, since the bond price will go up to D(A) from 
D(B), and the stock price will decline from S(B) to S(A) accordingly. Thus, they 
are forced to adopt the lower value-higher risk project with the smaller value. 
This difference in value is a deadweight loss (an agency cost), rather than a 
redistribution o f wealth between shareholders and debtholders.
Value of Debt +
the Firm
Fig.3.6. Risk Shifting Payoffs when Shareholders’ Choose Riskier Lower Valued Project
A - 12
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3 .2 .  U n d e r i n v e s t m e n t  P r o b l e m
The value o f a firm’s assets V consists o f Va the value o f assets already in place, 
and Vg the value o f the option to invest in assets not yet in place, V = V a + Vg. 
Assets already in place are sunk costs - irreversible investments. By assumption, 
their value would be unaffected by any subsequent, discretionary investments. 
On the other hand, the growth opportunities create value by giving the firm the 
flexibility to create new assets in place in the future. By definition, a growth 
opportunity is an option over an investment whose value is affected by 
subsequent, discretionary investment decisions. They represent the firm’s right, 
(not an obligation), to undertake profitable (positive NPV) investments at some 
future date. To be exercised, these options require further discretionary 
investments. An option will not be exercised unless its value exceeds its exercise 
price. As shown in the following simplified Myers’ model, the shareholders have 
no incentive to exercise the option to invest in some positive NPV projects, 
because the resultant value of the firm would not be enough to also repay the 
debtholders.
Myers’ Model
Assume that the only asset is a growth opportunity and there are three periods, t =
0, 1, 2. At t = 0, a firm owns an investment opportunity whose true value, V, will 
become known at t = 1. At that time the firm has to decide whether to invest I in 
the assets that will generate cash flows that will be realised at t = 2.
How will the firm decide to exercise the investment at t = 1? In a wholly equity 
funded firm the NPV criteria would be the main decision tool. Shareholders 
would maximise the value o f their equity when they accept any project where V >
1. V is the present value o f the proceeds and I is the present value o f  the cost. 
The equity holders actually own a call option on exercising the growth
A - 13
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opportunity. They would exercise the option to create new assets in place as long 
as the project’s revealed present value V is 110 less than the cost o f investment I, 
the exercise price. Hence, the value o f the growth option at t = 1 is like the value 
o f a call option at expiration. Let Cg be the value o f the growth opportunity when 
the firm is entirely equity funded:
Cg(V,T,I) -  Cg(V,0,I) = max(0,V-I) 
where T represents the point o f time (0, 1,2) .
However, when the firm has debt in its financial structure, this changes 
shareholders’ payoffs and incentives. The firm raises part o f its capital by issuing 
zero-coupon bonds at t = 0, that mature at t = 2. The loan must be repaid out o f  
the realised proceeds o f the investment opportunity. The value o f the growth 
opportunity is revealed at t = 1, prior to maturity. With limited liability and 
lender priority, the shareholders receive nothing unless the debtholders are paid 
first. For the shareholders to have the incentive to exercise the growth option, the 
project’s proceeds should exceed the cost of investment by at least the amount o f  
the face value o f the debt.
V > I + D
C(g/d)(V,T, I+D) = C(g/d)(V,0,I+D) = max(0,V-I-D)
where C(g/d) is the value o f the growth option when the firm is partially 
debt funded, and D the debt outstanding.
In some states o f the world, the value o f the growth option may be greater than 
the cost of the investment, but not greater than the cost of the investment plus the 
face value o f debt. In this case the shareholders have the incentive not to exercise 
the option. They essentially default on the loan by letting the option die 
unexercised. The existence o f outstanding debt eliminates the shareholders’ 
incentive to accept every project that has a positive NPV for the firm. This 
underinvestment creates a deadweight loss as shown in figure 3.7.
Let V equal the value o f the firm at t = 0. Let S be the set of all possible states of 
world and s is an element of the set S, s e  S. V(s) is the value o f the firm given
A - 14
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the state s occurs.
V)
(Value of the Finn V(s)
State of World
Fig. 3.7 Myers’ Underinvestment Problem
The states o f the world will be ranked based on the realised value o f V, e.g. V(s2) 
> V(si), etc. Let q(s) be the equilibrium price $1 delivered at t = 1 if  and only if  
the state s occurs. x(s)is a binary decision variable o f value 1 if  the decision is 
made for the investment to he earned out and 0 if otherwise. The value o f the 
firm at time zero is:
co
ftfC s)ri> )l7 (s)-/]d£
o
In an all equity firm the shareholders would accept all projects for which V > I. 
Let sa be the state o f the world such that V(sa) = I. Shareholders would accept the 
project for all states o f the world s > sa and reject the option for all s < sa. So 
x(s) = 1 for all s > sa and x(s) = 0 for all s < sa. The value o f all equity firm at t = 
0 is:
co
V =  j 9(0 x (i) [F (s )- /]&
s r,
When the firm issues debt that comes due after the investment decision must be 
made, the value o f the partially debt financed firm at t = 0 is V*
CO OO
V* = JgOy)[F($) - I  -B]ds + Jgfs)min[5, V(s)]ds
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The term on the right hand side is the present value of the payoffs to 
shareholders. The second term is the present value of the payoffs to debtholders. 
Define sb as the break-even point, V(sb) - I = B. With limited liability 
shareholders would receive nothing until the creditors are repaid. So the 
shareholders exercise their option on the project only for values of s greater than 
sb. In other words:
x(s) = 1 for V(s) - 1 > B 
x(s) = 0 for V(s) - K B  
V(sb) > V(sa) when B > 0
When V(s) - 1 < B but V(s) - 1 > 0, positive NPV projects would be rejected. In 
other words some profitable investments opportunities would be rejected simply 
because the firm has debt outstanding when the opportunities must be exercised. 
The value o f the ungeared firm will be greater than the value o f the levered firm.
OO O0
V  = Jg(s)[F(s) - I - B ] d s  + jV(s) min[£, K(s)]&
** suCO 00
V  = J?(i)[F(i) - I - B ] d s +
CO
V ' =  l q ( s ) [ V ( s ) - I ] d s < V  
There is a dead weight loss, VL. This is the triangle ABC in Fig 3.7.
* LSince sa < sb, V can be written as the sum o f V and V
Sh CO
K = jV (s ) |y ( .y )- /]* +  j5 (s)[F (s )-/]&
V1 = V - V*
V L = }9 (i)[K (S) - / ] *
•s,.
Myers (1977) points out that this sort o f incentive problem exists whenever there 
is outstanding debt and the decision makers have the discretion to expend cash
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flows. The model works in a similar way when the existing assets embody the 
option to abandon (sell-off) a project. This is like a put option on the existing 
asset. In each period the decision maker has the option to continue the project for 
one more period or sell the assets for their salvage value. He/she will continue 
the project i f  its value exceeds the salvage value o f the asset. The firm essentially 
invests the amount o f the salvage value for one period. The salvage value is 
essentially the opportunity cost o f continuing the project for one more period. In 
all equity funded firms the shareholders would liquidate when V(s) < I, where I is 
the salvage value and V(s) is the value as an ongoing project.
An incentive compatibility problem arises if  the firm has debt outstanding. The 
shareholders have a strong incentive to sell-off assets and distribute the proceeds 
to themselves as a dividend whenever V(s) - B < I. This increases the number o f  
states o f the world in which assets would be sold. If shareholders liquidate they 
receive I. If they keep the project as an ongoing business they only get V(s) - B. 
Myers points out that one can not legally liquidate assets immediately before 
default. This would leave the leaving lenders “holding an empty bag”.
In both underinvestment and the risk shifting agency models, creditors recognise 
the shareholders’ incentives and therefore are willing to pay less than they would 
otherwise pay for the debt. The shareholders end up bearing the ultimate cost for 
the incentive problems. John and Kalay (1984), argue that at least some o f these 
costs can be offset by using debt covenants which impose dividend constraints. 
However there is still a “deadweight loss” in the value of the firm.
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Appendix 6
Klein and Leffler’s (K&Lj Reputation Model
There are two quality type goods, high (H) and low (L) quality. The production 
and marginal costs o f high quality good are higher than the respective ones o f  
low quality product. Let denote r the interest rate for the period, and R = 1 / 
(1+r) the discounting factor where r > 0, Q is the level o f output for the period, 
to simplify the model let assume thar Q is a unit. Let denote C(H) and C(L) the 
respective costs o f  high and low quality goods, where:
C h (Q )  >  C L(0 )
A firm that produces the high quality product gains the present value o f the 
infinite stream o f one period profits:
PVH = (P - Ch(Q)) / r 
where P is the selling price.
A firm that produces low quality products can claim that produces high quality 
product only once. The true qiality is always exposed in the next period. It can 
charge the high quality price and receice only a one period profit.
PVL =  (P - Cl(Q))/ (1 + r)
A -  18
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